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This map illustrates the current maritime limits and boundaries in the Baltic Sea. The outer limits of the territorial waters are 
marked in red, and the delimitation of the exclusive economic zones is marked in purple. (Source: HELCOM, 2016.)
1 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The treatment of the maritime legacy of the First and Second World Wars, and of potentially 
hazardous wrecks dating from earlier times, is a matter that should be addressed by the interna-
tional community as a matter of urgency.1 
Sarah Dromgoole 
 
  Introductory Notes 
A fellow diver of mine was once asked why he preferred diving in the Baltic Sea over every 
other ocean in the world. His answer was simple, although perhaps a bit brutal: ‘Because of the 
two World Wars’. Most people do not know that the brackish waters of the Baltic hide the 
most well-preserved shipwrecks in the whole world. Nowhere else can one find and have access 
to intact men-of-war from the 17th century, with cannons still sticking out of their gun ports; 
sailing ships from the same century still standing upright on the ocean floor; or warships of the 
past two World Wars, with their guns, railings and painted wooden structures waiting to be 
discovered. What Tintin and Donald Duck saw in the comic books, is reality in the Baltic.2  
The romantic ideas of ‘underwater treasures’ seen in the comic books have certainly shaped 
the general public’s attitude towards shipwrecks. However, these attitudes have not always been 
welcomed by the scientific community. Robert Grenier, the President of the ICOMOS 
International Scientific Committee on Underwater Cultural Heritage (ICUCH), has said that 
one of the problems faced by the drafters of the 2001 UNESCO Convention on the 
Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage (CPUCH) 3  was the general ignorance 
regarding underwater cultural heritage issues. The negotiations had to be liberated from ‘the 
romantic clichés fostered by comic strips, literature or cinema which has [sic] nurtured us with 
archetypes as extravagant as the Titanic or even the image of Red Rackham’s treasure, in the 
Tintin series’.4 
                                                
1 Sarah Dromgoole, Underwater Cultural Heritage and International Law (Cambridge University Press: New York, 
2013) at 165–166. Sarah Dromgoole is a professor of Maritime Law at the University of Nottingham. 
2 From the Tintin series, see especially Hergé, The Secret of the Unicorn (1943); Hergé, Red Rackham's Treasure (1944).  
3 Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage, 2 November 2001, in force 2 January 2009, 
41 ILM 40. 
4 Robert Grenier, David Nutley, and Ian Cochran (eds), Underwater Cultural Heritage at Risk: Managing Natural 
and Human Impacts (ICOMOS: Paris, 2006) at x. 
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Grenier was also referring to the discrepancy between cultural protection on land and at 
sea, where the latter has been subject to the age-old tradition of ‘first come, first served’ salvage 
practice. This practice has seen historic wrecks as a source of supply rather than something 
worth protecting. One of the most important contributing factors to the diluted appreciation 
of shipwrecks in general is that activities — both desirable and objectionable; preservative and 
destructive — on dry land leave traces and can be observed by witnesses, but as Grenier 
explains, underwater almost anything can happen unnoticed.5 All too often, ‘out of sight’ does 
mean ‘out of mind’. 
 
An unknown sloop-of-war sunk near Helsinki, found in 2002 by the Finnish Maritime Administration. One theory suggests that the 
ship was a privateer, possibly of English origin based on the artefacts found on the deck. (Copyright 2011 P. Raasakka/badewanne.fi) 
The year 2014 marked the centenary of the First World War. UNESCO (United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization) estimated that roughly 10  000 wrecks from 
World War I can be found on the seabed around the world. This figure includes warships as 
well as civilian vessels, sunk both by accident and as victims of naval blockades. Globally some 
wrecks are well preserved, but many have been destroyed or severely damaged by non-scientific 
salvage, commercial exploitation, looting, scrapping and trawling.6 Many ships were lost 
during battle, but the majority of losses were caused by the mine lines laid down by the 
belligerents. During the past two World Wars, the Baltic Sea was by far the most heavily 
mined sea in the world, with an estimated total exceeding 60  000 naval mines.  
Many new wreck discoveries related to both World Wars were made in the Baltic Sea 
during 2014 and 2015. Different projects and diving teams made several remarkable 
discoveries, including the two German submarines SM U-26 and U-679, and at least three 
Soviet submarines, the M-95, Sch-324 and Sch-306. Other discoveries include the German 
                                                
5 Ibid. 
6 See <www.unesco.org/new/en/culture/themes/underwater-cultural-heritage/world-war-i> for more information 
and news regarding the centenary of the First World War. References to all online sources are accurate as of 24 
April 2016. 
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torpedo boat T18 and Schnellboot S106. Most of these wrecks are located outside the 
territorial waters of Finland or Estonia, but in the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of the two 
countries. 
 
The general locations of naval mines (shown in pink), and the threat they pose, is illustrated in the 2008 survey conducted by Nord 
Stream for the natural gas pipeline system through the Baltic Sea.7 
Sunken warships are objects of great cultural, historical and archaeological value and can 
hold significant national importance. In this sense, they are non-renewable resources, and they 
will grow even more valuable over time, as direct windows into the past. Whether sunken 
warships fall under the scope of underwater cultural heritage (UCH), and are protected on a 
national level, is a matter of domestic legislation. Many national jurisdictions follow a 100-
year cut-off rule inside their territorial waters, meaning that a wreck becomes UCH and 
generally protected as such after 100 years have passed since the sinking of the ship. This 
national protection extends to the limits of a State’s territorial jurisdiction, leaving shipwrecks 
resting in areas beyond the territorial sea usually with very little or no legal protection. 
What makes this issue even more relevant now are the recent advances in technical diving. 
Underwater sites were first made accessible after World War II, following the invention of the 
open-circuit self-contained underwater breathing apparatus ‘Aqua-Lung’ — better known 
today as SCUBA — by French engineer Émile Gagnan and French naval officer Jacques-Yves 
Cousteau. This opened up the underwater world and its hidden cultural heritage in a whole 
new way, although sadly with this came the plundering of most archaeological remains in 
                                                
7 Map MU-1-F, ‘Areas with chemical and conventional munition’ in Nord Stream, Environmental impact 
assessment in the exclusive economic zone of Finland, February 2009, at 39. 
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shallow waters. In the beginning of the 1990s, technical open-circuit mixed gas diving started 
to gain popularity in the Nordics. Today the advances and affordability of mixed gas 
technology, along with computer-controlled closed-circuit rebreathers (CCR), allow divers to 
safely and effectively reach depths of over 100 metres. The mean depth of the Baltic Sea is only 
54 metres; in the EEZ in the Gulf of Finland the depth varies roughly between 50 and 100 
metres, making it accessible to all trained technical divers.  
 
The badly damaged conning tower of German World War II submarine U-479. She was sunk by a mine in the late autumn of 1944 
and rests on the seabed at 95 metres. (Picture: Jouni Polkko, courtesy of badewanne.fi, 2015.) 
While virtually all Nordic and Baltic States have relatively well-developed cultural heritage 
laws, the issue of sunken warships remains an unsolved problem especially at the international 
level. Beyond the territorial seas, most of the Baltic Sea and the Gulf of Finland fall under the 
regime of the EEZ — there are no high seas. As a result, a significant proportion of the Baltic 
Sea consists of waters beyond territorial jurisdiction, where legal protection is very weak or 
non-existent. The geographical location of a shipwreck does not determine its cultural or 
historical value; however, the location does have substantial impact on which level of 
protection coastal or flag States8 can enforce. Most of the warships from the World War I and 
II rest outside territorial waters, and so the question is: How can they be protected from 
unwanted disturbance — namely looting and unwanted salvage? The only thing authors and 
                                                
8 A flag State is a State whose flag a ship flies and is entitled to do so under the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea, see infra note 11.  
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scholars seem to generally agree on, is that the legal regime surrounding sunken warships is 
rather ambiguous. 
Before the 21st century no international treaty or convention addressed the issue of 
property rights over warships that were captured or sunk during wartime or otherwise, leaving 
matters primarily to be decided by the customary rules of international law.9 The situation has 
not improved much since then. Today, some conventions do mention warships (i.e. 
operational warships), but typically only as exclusions to the scope and framework provided 
for other vessels. However, these conventions neither address the issue of sunken warships (i.e. 
non-operational warships), nor the protection of these wrecks as cultural or historical 
monuments.  
One solution for an applicable and comprehensive protective framework is the ratification 
of the CPUCH, which was designed to provide better mechanisms for States to regulate 
activities on shipwrecks and underwater cultural heritage beyond the territorial sea.10 However, 
in order to achieve effective results, the Convention would require wide support and 
implementation. Furthermore, pursuant to Article 1 of the CPUCH, it covers only the UCH 
that has been underwater for more than 100 years. Many of the shipwrecks from World War I 
(1914–1918) and all shipwrecks from World War II (1939–1945) currently fall outside the 
scope of the CPUCH. 
Given that in the Baltic Sea only Lithuania has currently ratified the CPUCH, this paper 
will study the implications of modern law of the sea, namely the influence of the 1982 United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC),11 on the protection of sunken warships. It 
has been generally recognised that the LOSC does not provide any working framework for 
States, since the LOSC deals with more general issues of the attribution of rights and 
jurisdiction in different maritime zones established in the Convention. Despite the lack of 
specific provisions in the LOSC, the Convention can still provide tools for coastal States to 
regulate activities on shipwrecks. However, there is a need for new legal frameworks for the 
protection of historical shipwrecks; rules on the allocation of State jurisdiction beyond the 
territorial sea; guidelines for uniform national standards; and provisions for the settlement of 
international disputes.
  Research Question, Objective and Structure 
This paper evaluates the mechanisms coastal States have to regulate activities on shipwrecks, in 
particular sunken warships, taking into consideration that the Baltic Sea is a semi-enclosed sea 
                                                
9 J. A. Roach and R. W. Smith, Excessive Maritime Claims (3rd edn, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers: Leiden, 2012) at 543. 
10 Sarah Dromgoole, ‘Revisiting the Relationship between Marine Scientific Research and the Underwater 
Cultural Heritage’, 25 International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law, no. 1 (2010) 33–61 at 35. 
11 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 December 1982, in force 16 November 1994, 1834 
UNTS 397. 
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where cooperation between coastal States already exists for the protection of the marine 
environment and other uses of the sea. The evaluation focus is on the legal framework of the 
LOSC and the effects this Convention has on sunken warships beyond the territorial waters of 
a coastal State. 
The principal research question is:  
What are the implications and effects of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea on the protection of sunken warships in the Gulf of Finland that have been lost during the 
past two World Wars? 
This question is answered by examining the history and contents of the relevant provisions 
of the LOSC for how the attribution of rights and jurisdiction affects the protection of sunken 
warships in the Gulf of Finland as archaeological and historical objects. An analysis of the 
findings follow each area of examination. This paper is based on the premise that all coastal 
States of the Baltic Sea have interest in the cultural heritage from the past World Wars, as 
many States share a historical connection with these wrecks, either as the original flag State, 
owner or builder of the ship, or simply as a party to the dispute. The paper concentrates on the 
Gulf of Finland — especially on the EEZ between Finland and Estonia — and focuses on 
sunken warships that have been lost during the past two World Wars, thus excluding airplanes 
and other forms of State craft. 
This paper specifically reviews the LOSC in order to identify various mechanisms coastal 
States have at their disposal outside of the framework provided by the CPUCH. This approach 
is taken for two particular reasons. First, only one State has currently ratified the CPUCH in 
the Baltic Sea, which makes further study of the CPUCH within this paper unnecessary. 
Second, the CPUCH only covers shipwrecks that were sunk over 100 years ago, thus presently 
excluding the last shipwrecks from World War I (1914–1918) and all shipwrecks from World 
War II (1939–1945). Thus, there are currently no existing regulatory frameworks in a 
conventional form for coastal States to apply. The fundamental issue was well-phrased by the 
Polish delegation during the negotiations at UNESCO regarding the CPUCH: 
The discussion of a time-limit came to no conclusion. In central Europe there has been a general 
tendency for objects older than the end of the Second World War to be protected. There would 
seem to be a good case for protection of the relics of the period of the Second World War since 
wrecks of ships and aircraft of this period and in many cases war graves are also being looted for 
collections of military items. This view may be regarded as Eurocentric, but the Second World War 
is a meaningful cultural horizon over most of the hemisphere. Warships of the period before 1945 
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(at least) contain historical information unobtainable from other sources and must be preserved 
and protected from looting and uncontrolled ‘salvage’ operations.12 
The historical importance of sunken warships in the Baltic Sea is introduced in Part I in 
order to explain the legal settings and what makes protection of sunken warships important. 
Furthermore, it is explained why sunken warships should be included in the notion of objects 
of an archaeological and historical nature. Part II explains the relevant terms and associated 
disciplines by analysing the history and development of these terms and legal doctrines. Their 
importance and possible problems for the subject matter are also identified. Part III explains 
the history and recent developments in the law of the sea and relevant provisions of the LOSC. 
This part also explains the current maritime delimitation and introduces the differences 
between present maritime zones. This paper concludes with a summary of findings in order to 
establish whether a basis and necessary support exist for developing possible further regional 
agreements. The principal research question is answered through an analysis of what the lex 
lata13 is, and whether there is room for improvement. As far as possible this paper reflects the 
law and State practice as it was in April 2016. 
  About the Source Material 
The subject of this paper goes beyond the borders of traditional disciplines of international 
law. Shipwrecks involve many interest groups, such as coastal and flag States, scientific 
institutions and organisations, archaeologists, historians, divers, salvors and the general public, 
which all have their own traditions, motives and languages. Therefore the literature on the 
subject can sometimes be rather varied. The values and ethics of an archaeologist and those of 
an admiralty lawyer are simply different. The same applies to the views of different coastal 
States. The juxtapositions are sometimes obvious — what is absurd and totally inapplicable to 
one group, can be generally accepted rules of international law to others. Therefore the reader 
should proceed with some caution due to the rather biased opinions of some scholars and 
authors. However these viewpoints form academic opinions and state Practice, and should be 
equally respected. 
  Source Material 
There is a vast amount of literature on the law of the sea, but books and studies concentrated 
around the issues associated with legal matters surrounding sunken warships are scarce. The 
most important works on the law of the sea are probably the two extensive volumes written by 
                                                
12 Report by the Director-General on Action Taken Concerning the Desirability of Preparing an International 
Instrument for the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage, Paris, 5 August 1997, UNESCO Doc. 
29C/22, 5–6 in Annex II. 
13 Latin, ‘the law as it exists’. 
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Professor Daniel Patrick O’Connell;14 the work of Professors Robin Churchill and Vaughan 
Lowe QC;15 and the two-volume multi-author handbook published under the editorship of 
René-Jean Dupuy and Daniel Vignes.16 The negotiations and drafting history of the LOSC is 
put together in the massive seven-volume commentary on the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea edited under the supervision of Myron H. Nordquist.17 The Convention 
itself however has no official travaux préparatoire.18 
From the field of underwater cultural heritage law, the seminal works of Dr Anastasia 
Strati,19 Eke Boesten,20 and Professor Sarah Dromgoole21 are of great value to the general 
subject of shipwrecks in international law. Anyone interested in the national perspectives 
should look at the two collections of national essays published under the editorship of 
Dromgoole.22 European perspective on the protection of UCH can be found from the report 
prepared by John Roper for the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on the issue 
of underwater cultural heritage.23 The report is widely referred to as the ‘Roper Report’ and, 
even after almost 40 years since being first published, its influence is still seen, and its 
approach is still considered very modern.24 The most comprehensive reviews of the CPUCH 
and associated legal issues include the commentary written by Professor Patrick O’Keefe25 and 
the book published under the editorship of Roberta Garabello and Professor Tullio Scovazzi.26 
                                                
14 See D. P. O’Connell, The International Law of the Sea Volume I (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1984); D. P. 
O’Connell, The International Law of the Sea Volume II (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1984). 
15 See Robin Churchill and Vaughan Lowe, The Law of the Sea (3rd edn, Manchester University Press: 
Manchester, 1999). 
16 See René-Jean Dupuy and Daniel Vignes (eds), A Handbook on the New Law of the Sea, Volume I (Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers: Dordrecht, 1991); René-Jean Dupuy and Daniel Vignes (eds), A Handbook on the New Law of 
the Sea, Volume II (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers: Dordrecht, 1991). 
17 See Myron H. Nordquist (ed.) United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982: A Commentary, Volumes 
I–VII (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers: Dordrecht, 1985–2011). 
18 French, ‘preparatory works’. 
19  See Anastasia Strati, The Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage: An Emerging Objective of the 
Contemporary Law of the Sea (Brill: The Hague, 1995). 
20 See Eke Boesten, Archaeological and/or Historic Valuable Shipwrecks in International Waters: Public International 
Law and What it Offers (T.M.C. Asser Press: The Hague, 2002). 
21 See Dromgoole, Underwater Cultural Heritage and International Law, supra note 1. 
22 See Sarah Dromgoole (ed.) Legal Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage: National and International 
Perspectives (Kluwer Law International: London, 1999); Sarah Dromgoole (ed.) The Protection of the Underwater 
Cultural Heritage: National Perspectives in Light of the UNESCO Convention 2001, Publications on Ocean 
Development, vol. 55 (2 edn, Brill: Leiden, 2006). 
23  See John Roper, The Underwater Cultural Heritage: Report of the Committee on Culture and Education 
(Rapporteur Mr John Roper) (Council of Europe: Strasbourg) Doc. 4200 - E.  
24 Dromgoole, Underwater Cultural Heritage and International Law, at 36–37, supra note 1.  
25 See Patrick J. O’Keefe, Shipwrecked Heritage: A Commentary on the UNESCO Convention on Underwater 
Cultural Heritage (Institute of Art and Law: Leicester, 2002). This commentary has been updated recently, see 
Patrick J. O’Keefe, Shipwrecked Heritage: A Commentary on the UNESCO Convention on Underwater Cultural 
Heritage (2nd edn, Institute of Art and Law: Builth Wells, 2014). Due to practical reasons this paper will refer to 
the first published edition. 
26 See Roberta Garabello and Tullio Scovazzi (eds), The Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage: Before and 
After the 2001 UNESCO Convention (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers: Leiden, 2003). 
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Reference has also been made to other relevant publications, the writings of recognised 
scholars and authors, relevant court decisions and journal articles. 
  Previous Studies on the Subject 
In 2015, the 9th Commission of the Institute of International Law (IIL) concluded its work 
on the Legal Regime of Wrecks of Warships and Other State-owned Ships in International 
Law. The general subject of ‘ownership and protection of wrecks beyond the limits of national 
maritime jurisdiction’ was also included in the long-term program of the International Law 
Commission (ILC) in 2012 after being first outlined by Sir Derek Bowett in 1993.27 
The 9th Commission was created in 2007 and a preliminary report was published after the 
IIL’s 2011 session in Rhodes.28 Based on the work of the 9th Commission, a Resolution was 
adopted on 29 August 2015 and some preparatory works were published.29 The Commission 
wanted to contribute to the clarification of international law, being aware of the uncertainties 
that continue to surround the question of wrecks of warships.30 The Resolution deals with the 
theoretical questions of State ownership and sovereign immunity,31 and recognises that ‘sunken 
State ships are immune from the jurisdiction of any State other than the flag State’.32 However, 
it does not focus on practical matters such as coastal or flag State jurisdiction. Furthermore, 
the Resolution applies the status of ‘underwater cultural heritage’ to wrecks that have been 
underwater for more than 100 years — thus excluding wrecks from the Second World War — 
but it does not deal with the protection of such wreck sites and UCH. The Resolution also 
adopted a set of provisions in Articles 7–10 with regards to sunken warships in different 
maritime zones. The IIL Report concluded that State practice is oriented towards, and 
decisively endorsing, the recognition of sovereign immunity to sunken warships.33 It is argued 
however, that this immunity is rendered virtually useless if States cannot enforce protective 
legislation beyond the territorial sea in cases of looting or unwanted salvage. Professor Lowe 
                                                
27 See Outlines prepared by members of the Commission on selected topics of international law (1993), A/CN.4/454, in 
Yearbook of the International Law Commission, vol. II (Part I) (1993) at 211–213. On the selection of topics, see 
<legal.un.org/ilc/programme.shtml>. 
28 Natalino Ronzitti, ‘The Legal Regime of Wrecks of Warships and Other State-owned Ships in International 
Law’ in 74 Yearbook of Institute of International Law (2011), 133–177. 
29 For the preparatory works, see Natalino Ronzitti, The Legal Regime of Wrecks of Warships and Other State-owned 
Ships in International Law (Institut de droit international) 9th Commission. For the Resolution, see The Legal 
Regime of Wrecks of Warships and Other State-owned Ships in International Law (IIL Resolution), 29 August 
2015. Both available at <justitiaetpace.org/resolutions.php>. 
30 See the preamble of the IIL Resolution, ibid. 
31 Sovereign immunity can be defined as the immunity a State enjoys, in respect of itself and its property, from 
the jurisdiction of the courts of another State. See Article 5 of the United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional 
Immunities of States and Their Property 2 December 2004, not yet in force, UN General Assembly 
A/RES/59/38. Sovereign immunity of sunken warships refers generally to immunity from the exercise of 
enforcement jurisdiction, i.e., their immunity from arrest, attachment, or execution in the territory of any other 
State than the flag State. Regarding sovereign immunity and sunken ships in general, see Roach and Smith, 
Excessive Maritime Claims, at 536–558, supra note 9. 
32 See Article 3 of the IIL Resolution, supra note 29. 
33 Preparatory works of Tallinn Session, at 28 and 30, supra note 29. 
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pointed out correctly in correspondence within the IIL that ‘[d]oes immunity not flow from 
the relationship with the State whose immunity applies to the ship/wreck, rather than from 
anything to do with its character as a ship?’ and ‘[c]ould the flag State have immunity in 
respect of the wreck without having jurisdiction over it?’.34 While the works of the IIL are of 
significant interest, it falls partly beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless Professor Lowe 
made perhaps one of the most important observations of the whole work done in the IIL: 
I wonder if there is not a case for pausing our work and trying to engage in detail with one of the 
other professional groups concerned — such as the marine archaeologists — to see what changes 
(if any) in the international legal framework are necessary to accommodate the conduct of their 
work according to their own best practices and professional standards.35 
  
                                                
34 Ibid., at 14. 
35 See the subsequent comments of Professor Lowe in ibid., at 59. 
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PART I 
THE HISTORICAL IMPORTANCE OF  
SUNKEN WARSHIPS IN THE BALTIC SEA  
 
  The Value of Sunken Warships 
The history of mankind is unfortunately a long history of war. As wars and conflict have 
shaped our society, records of these events have been written and preserved for the future. 
However, the further in time we move from an event, the further these written records are 
from giving a complete and full account. Crucial contextual information, that a contemporary 
reader would be expected to be aware of, may be obscured to a modern reader. At times the 
written records are misleading or incomplete. Deep comprehension of the events of the past 
can only be gained through the complementary study of unwritten records — the material 
remains of the period under investigation. 
Marine archaeologist Niklas Eriksson explains, ‘the basic facts of history and the important 
questions about the past tend to be established by historians from the written sources’ whereas 
‘[t]he role of the material remains, the things dug up from the soil or salvaged from the seabed, 
tends to be an ancillary or supportive role only, basically reduced to illustrations’.36 Eriksson’s 
observation was that as historical events can be told by written sources, shipwrecks that result 
from those events are seldom documented at all. Anthropologist Richard A. Gould came to 
the same conclusion. He adds that wrecks and wreck sites, ‘[a]s “documents”,[…] are subject 
to various kinds of alterations arising from circumstances of deposition as well as human 
behaviour which differ significantly from the literacy and ideological editing process that affect 
historic documents’.37 Thus, both physical and written histories can demonstrate flaws and 
incompleteness, though of different natures. Individually, each source can only tell part of the 
story. It is only through the complement of one to the other that significant information may 
be uncovered, and historical texture may be better understood. 
                                                
36 Niklas Eriksson, Urbanism Under Sail: An archaeology of fluit ships in early modern everyday life (Södertörn 
University: Huddinge, 2014) at 31. 
37 Richard A. Gould, ‘The Archaeology of War: Wrecks of the Spanish Armada of 1588 and the Battle of Britain, 
1940’ in Richard A. Gould (ed.) Shipwreck Anthropology (University of New Mexico Press: Albuquerque, 1983), 
105–142 at 105 citing Michael B. Schiffer, ‘Behavioral Archaeology’ (Academic Press: New York, 1976) at 14–16. 
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  Technological developments 
Before the new millennium, the equipment commonly used for navigation and finding 
shipwrecks was relatively expensive and out of reach of the general public. During the Third 
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), which concluded in 1982, 
satellite navigation technology was not yet in mainstream use. 
Most of the technical and technological equipment commonly in use today was developed 
during and after the Second World War, including sonar and radar, which were developed by 
the Allies for anti-submarine warfare.38 Later followed scuba technology, and subsequently 
improved diving equipment and accessories suitable for use in depths over 100 metres. What 
we know today as the Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) was created by the US 
military in the 1960s. The most well-known version, the Global Positioning System (GPS), 
became fully operational for civilians and globally available in 1995.39 The first pronounce-
ment from the United States regarding the civil use of GPS came in 1983 after Korean Air 
Lines Flight 007 was shot down by the Soviet Union when the plane strayed into Soviet 
territory.40 President Ronald Reagan announced in September 1983 that the United States 
would make the Standard Positioning Service of GPS available for use by civilian aircraft free 
of charge, once the system became operational.41 However, the GPS signal was deliberately 
degraded by the United States through a feature called Selective Availability (SA), which 
introduced a random error of up to 100 metres, making GPS technology less useful for civilian 
use. As of 1 May 2000, at the direction of President Bill Clinton, the United States 
government discontinued the use of SA.42 
The traditional sonar, or depth sounder, has also seen important technical developments: 
the side-scan sonar, and the multibeam echosounder (MBES). Generally, echosounding is 
based on transmitting acoustic pulses from the ocean surface or water column to the ocean 
floor and recording the reflection (i.e. echoes) of these pulses. The side-scan sonar is a device 
that uses acoustic sound pulses for mapping of the ocean floor.43 The pulses are reflected back 
and processed to produce an image. Different colours are used to illustrate the hardness of the 
material that has reflected the pulse back to the receiver. In the most typical configuration, the 
side-scan unit is operated as a ‘towfish’, towed from a boat. Practical and environmental 
                                                
38 It is worth mentioning that these inventions actually turned the course of the war from the so-called ‘happy 
time’ or ‘golden days’, terms commonly used by German U-boat crews during the first years of the war till August 
1942 describing their significant success during the Battle of the Atlantic. 
39 Scott Pace (et al.), The Global Positioning System: Assessing National Policies (RAND: Santa Monica, 1995) at 2. 
For more information on GPS, see <www.gps.gov>. Today a fully operational alternative to GPS is the Russian 
GLONASS. For more information on GLONASS, see <www.glonass-iac.ru/en>. 
40 Ibid., at 247–248. 
41 Ibid., at 263. 
42 Office of the Press Secretary, Statement by the President Regarding the United States’ Decision to Stop 
Degrading Global Positioning System Accuracy, 1 May 2000. 
43 See, generally regarding the capabilities of side-scan sonar surveys and applications, Mark W. Atherton, Echoes and 
Images: The Encyclopedia of Side-Scan and Scanning Sonar Operations (OysterInk Publications: Vancouver, 2011). 
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limitations such as ambient noise, water conditions and depth, and the drag caused by the 
towfish cable, make side-scan sonars typically most cost-effective in shallow depths, such as in 
the Baltic Sea. Modern side-scan sonars are theoretically accurate to one centimetre in ideal 
conditions.44 
 
A side-scan sonar image of the wreck of the German U-479 (Type VII/C) on the Estonian EEZ. (Courtesy of Estonian 
Maritime Administration, 2013.) 
An MBES is a type of sonar that transmits multiple pings in order to create a three-
dimensional point cloud of the ocean floor. Multibeam solutions are commonly used in ocean 
exploration bathymetric surveys because of their effectiveness and multipurpose application. 
Multibeams can also be used to create clear images of shipwrecks and their condition.45 
 
A multibeam sonar image of the wreck of the German U-576 (Type VII/C) on the ocean floor. (Copyright NOAA & SRI 
International, 2014.) 
There is a wide range of other tools and equipment that can be used for the search and 
recovery of shipwrecks. These include autonomous underwater vehicles (AUV), remotely 
operated vehicles (ROV), magnetometers, sub-bottom profilers, and manned and unmanned 
(deep sea) submersibles. We have reached a point where anything on the ocean floor can be 
located, and search efforts are ‘only restricted by cost alone’.46 However, side-scan sonars and 
technical diving equipment — along with appropriate training to use these items — remain 
                                                
44 For example the Swedish made 680 kHz Deepvision DE680D side-scan sonar has a resolution of 1 cm and an 
operational range up to 100 metres. See further <deepvision.se>. 
45For different commercial MBES applications, 3D images and bathymetry, see e.g., <www.adusdeepocean.com> 
and <www.ngdc.noaa.gov/mgg/bathymetry/multibeam.html>. 
46 Gillian Hutchinson, ‘Threats to underwater cultural heritage: The problems of unprotected archaeological and 
historic sites, wrecks and objects found at sea’, 20 Marine Policy, no. 4 (1996) 287–290 at 288. 
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the most essential elements in the Baltic Sea needed for the search for shipwrecks, and are 
widely available for a reasonable price and are commonly used by recreational divers and dive 
clubs. 
  The Threats 
The threats posed to historic shipwrecks are relatively new and have surfaced as a consequence 
of the technological developments that allowed sophisticated search, location and exploitation 
of shipwrecks.47 These threats can be split into three categories. The first is of human-sourced 
activities that are directed at shipwrecks and have shipwrecks as their primary target. This 
category includes commercial treasure hunting and salvage, looting and souvenir collecting. 
The second category is of human-sourced indirect activities that do not have shipwrecks as 
their primary target. This category includes commercial fishing and off-shore projects such as 
lying underwater cables, the building of pipelines and other structures that are placed on the 
seabed. The third category is of natural impacts, which include deterioration caused by time, 
currents, tidal movements, corrosion and other natural physical, chemical, biochemical and 
biological processes. This paper addresses category one activities of commercial treasure 
hunting and looting. Environmental issues, namely oil and other harmful substances, are also 
discussed briefly, due to the serious threat they pose for the future.  
  Commercial Treasure Hunting 
Commercial treasure hunting traditionally refers to a business model employed by companies 
such as the Florida-based Odyssey Marine Exploration (OME), and individuals such as the 
late Mel Fisher. In the wider sense, this business model ‘can encompass any form of money-
making enterprise derived from [cultural material]’.48 Perhaps more commonly the business 
model ‘carries with it the implication that the sale of cultural material is involved’, which 
traditionally leads to the irretrievable dispersal of cultural objects and related information.49 So 
far commercial treasure hunting has not emerged in the Baltic as a professional activity — 
presumably due to the lack of sites possessing sufficient economic value, i.e., valuable metals 
such as gold, silver or copper. However, the illegal and unwanted activities of looting and 
souvenir collecting have been present since the introduction of scuba, and pose one of the 
most serious threats to shipwrecks in the Baltic. 
Weighing in on the debate against commercial treasure hunting, is the question of whether 
the dignity of the fallen should be more valuable than the resale price of their personal 
belongings. The demand for maritime antiques is considerable, and subsequently the prices for 
                                                
47 Ibid., at 287. 
48 Dromgoole, Underwater Cultural Heritage and International Law, at 210, supra note 1. 
49 Ibid. For different business models and suggestions, see further ibid., at 210–240. See also Tatiana Villegas 
Zamora, ‘The Impact of Commercial Exploitation on the Preservation of Underwater Cultural Heritage’, 60 
Museum International, no. 4 (2008) 18–30. 
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items found at wreck sites are high. A treasure hunter can make a small fortune selling artefacts 
— such as plates with Nazi imprints, and other articles associated with the Third Reich. Many 
experts question the acceptability of salvaging items, which could have a monetary value 
amongst private collectors, when these items originate from war graves. In Poland, Professor 
Wojciech Kowalski explains ‘[t]hese wrecks have attracted considerable attention from amateur 
divers [...] in search of various artefacts which then emerge on the German antiquities 
market’.50 
  Looting and Souvenir Collecting 
The wreck of First World War-era Russian armoured cruiser Pallada was found in 2000. She 
was sunk with all hands on deck on 13 October 1914 by the German U-boat SM U-26. Over 
the next twelve years the wreck site was carefully mapped and documented through still 
photography, video and illustrations. Over a hundred exploration dives later, the story of the 
Pallada was published in print by Helsingin Sanomat in the October 2012 issue of Kuukausi-
liite monthly supplement.51 
The Pallada sunk in less than six minutes and became the first loss of the Imperial Russian 
Fleet during World War I. The wreck site is the final resting place of 597 Russian sailors, and 
for almost a hundred years they had been resting in peace. However, during the research field 
season in 2013 it was discovered that the wreck site had been plundered. Equipment had been 
removed from the armoured command bridge and some items had been moved to a more 
favourable location at the site, presumably for future recovery. Those responsible are yet — if 
ever — to be found, but it is clear the items were taken either for personal amusement, or 
more probably for a future sale on the black market. Among the missing items were the ship’s 
engine telegram, radio equipment and other control devices whose meaning and functions 
were yet to be discovered. 
 
The fire control tower of Pallada on the left, as it was discovered in 2000. On the right, the situation as it was observed in 2013. The 
missing items include at least two telegrams and a radio ‘box’ (Pictures: Jouni Polkko, courtesy of badewanne.fi, 2001 & 2013.) 
                                                
50 See Wojciech Kowalski, ‘Chapter 11: Poland’ in Sarah Dromgoole (ed.) The Protection of the Underwater 
Cultural Heritage: National Perspectives in Light of the UNESCO Convention 2001 (2nd edn, Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers: Leiden, 2006), 229–246 at 235–236 and 241.  
51 Unto Hämäläinen, ‘Juuri tässä paikassa’, Helsingin Sanomat Kuukausiliite 10/2012, at 31–42. 
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The wreck site of Pallada lies within the Finnish EEZ. The 100th anniversary of the 
sinking of Pallada, and the centenary of World War I, were marked in 2014. The wreck site of 
the SM U-26, that sunk Pallada, was located in May 2014. After October 2014 Pallada would 
have been protected by CPUCH, and protection of the wreck of SM U-26 would have 
followed in 2015. However, Finland is not a party to the Convention. 
 
The wreck site of Pallada in situ in 2002. (Courtesy of Juha Flinkman, 2002.) 
The Pallada is a good example of a clearly planned mission to remove objects from a 
shipwreck. The way in which the removal had been executed illustrates that professional tools 
and equipment were used in order to remove the looted objects from the bridge. 
  Other Human Impacts 
One of the best resources for divers is the local fishing community. Fishermen know where 
you should not fish, and where your nets get stuck. Sometimes the causes are natural 
formations, but especially at the open sea nets are caught on wrecks. This is always 
unintentional, but still an indirect activity that has a direct effect on shipwrecks. It is listed 
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among the threats not only because it destroys underwater sites, but also because of the 
possible future necessity for removal of these nets. 
One of the most tragic consequences of indirect human interference to wrecks in the Baltic 
— and around the globe for that matter — has been caused by commercial fishing, and 
trawling in particular. Almost all shipwrecks resting in deeper waters in the Gulf of Finland 
have been damaged by trawl nets to some extent. On the Estonian side, this has been caused 
mostly by the local Soviet-era fishing cooperative. Whereas wooden wreck structures usually 
give up and collapse, metal wreck structures do not. The result is a super-structure covered in 
intertwined trawl nets, which have been pulled to every possible direction by the trawler in a 
desperate attempt to free the net. In the process, many lighter structures such as cabins, 
railings, antennas, telegrams, wheels and even deckhouses can be destroyed or wiped from the 
decks.  
However, the worst impact of these abandoned trawl nets, and other derelict fishing 
equipment, has been on the marine environment, especially on fish and marine mammals. 
This phenomenon is called ‘ghost fishing’ and it is what happens when derelict fishing gear 
continues to fish.52 The issue of abandoned, lost or otherwise discarded fishing gear (ALDFG) 
has recently been recognised by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) as well 
as by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the US 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). 53  As a result, non-profit 
organisations — such as Ghost Fishing, founded by enthusiastic divers of the Dutch North 
Sea — have started to fight the problem. While this subject is beyond the scope of this paper, 
it is worth mentioning because it is present at every single wreck site. 
  Wreck-Sourced Pollution and (Dumped) Munitions 
An emerging threat that has been given relatively little attention is wreck-sourced pollution. 
An issue paper from the 2005 International Oil Spill Conference demonstrated that wrecks 
associated with World War II comprised the largest group of potentially polluting shipwrecks, 
and were of particular concern because of their age.54 Many warships that sunk in the Baltic 
were carrying tonnes of bunker oil and were heavily armed. These shipwrecks are still full of oil 
and other harmful substances such as naval mines, depth charges and other ammunition. 
Numerous wrecks have leaked small amounts of oil for years. While bigger leaks have so far 
been avoided, the risk of a catastrophic discharge of oil is real. Most of this oil is still trapped 
                                                
52 See <www.ghostfishing.org> for more information. 
53 See especially Graeme Macfadyem, Tim Huntington, and Rod Cappell, Abandoned, lost or otherwise discarded 
fishing gear (UNEP/FAO: Rome) UNEP Regional Seas Reports and Studies, No. 185; FAO Fisheries and 
Aquaculture Technical Paper, No. 523. See also NOAA Marine Debris Program. 2015 Report on the Impacts of 
“Ghost Fishing” via Derelict Fishing Gear (NOAA: Charleston).  
54 Jacqueline Michel (et al.), Potentially Polluting Wrecks in Marine Waters (An Issue Paper Prepared for the 2005 
International Oil Spill Conference), at 14. 
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inside oil tanks, but some has saturated the seabed. For example, at the site of the SM U-26 
the layered clay of the seabed is saturated with oil that has been released from the wreck, either 
when she sunk or slowly over the past 100 years. 
Another issue that has received emerging attention55 is the amount of dumped munitions 
and chemical warfare materials in the Baltic Sea. After the end of World War II the US, 
British, French and Soviet authorities reported that a total of some 300  000 tonnes of chemical 
warfare materials had been found in the different occupation zones in Germany.56 According 
to HELCOM (the Baltic Marine Environment Protection Commission, or the Helsinki 
Commission), the disposal of these munitions was dealt with in different ways in accordance 
with the Potsdam Agreement of 1945: bulk quantities were either destroyed and recycled on 
land, or dumped at sea.57 Today we know that, while the US and Britain dumped munitions 
found in their respective occupation zones in areas of the Skagerrak, a large part of the stocks 
found in the Soviet occupation zone were dumped into the Baltic Sea.58 Furthermore, even 
before the end of the Second World War, and for decades after, dumping activities of 
dangerous and obsolete munitions were conducted at sea.59 
HELCOM has estimated that at least 40  000 tonnes of chemical warfare materials were 
dumped after World War II, and that out of this amount some 13  000 tonnes are of chemical 
warfare agents. While in some cases these munitions were dumped at sea item-by-item, many 
others were loaded in various types of unseaworthy vessels available after the war, and then 
sunk loaded to their maximum capacity. The locations of the main dumping areas are well 
known and include the southeast of Gotland, east of Bornholm and south of Little Belt.60 
  
                                                
55 The issues regarding the environmental effects and general awareness related to chemical munitions dumped at 
sea has also received attention from the UN. See UNGA, Cooperative measures to assess and increase awareness 
of environmental effects related to waste originating from chemical munitions dumped at sea, GA Res. 68/208, 
20 December 2013. 
56 HELCOM, Chemical Munitions Dumped in the Baltic Sea. Report of the ad hoc Expert Group to Update and 
Review the Existing Information on Dumped Chemical Munitions in the Baltic Sea (HELCOM: Helsinki) Baltic Sea 
Environment Proceeding (BSEP) No. 142, at 28. For a list of the chemical warfare agents and associated 
compounds, see ibid., at 99–111. 
57 Ibid., at 28. See generally the Berlin (Potsdam) Conference of 17 July–2 August 1945, (a) Protocol of the 
Proceedings, 1 August 1945, available at <avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/decade17.asp>. The Agreement was a 
settlement between the Soviet Union, USA and UK, in which the heads of the three respective governments 
decided on the policy for the occupation and reconstruction of Germany and other related issues after the 
German surrender and end of hostilities in the European Theatre of World War II.  
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid., at 10, 32–34.  
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PART II 
DEFINITIONS 
 
 
‘When I use a word,’ Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, 
‘it means just what I choose it to mean — neither more nor less.’ 
‘The question is,’ said Alice,  
‘whether you can make words mean so many different things.’ 
Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking Glass  
 
 
The subject of legal protection of sunken warships and underwater cultural heritage affects 
different academic traditions and disciplines — including maritime archaeology, history, and 
anthropology — and it can be argued that legal protection should exist to guarantee that there 
is something left to study. The principal research question will be examined from a multi-
disciplinary angle. Therefore all of the main concepts and terms are explained, as definitions 
can vary between, and even within, disciplines. Branches of law are also explained in order to 
understand the legal regime that will be analysed. These concepts, terms and branches of law 
cannot be fully understood without context, including that of the historical events which 
instigated and shaped them. 
  Warships 
It might seem that the task of defining a warship should not cause any trouble, but warships 
have existed for centuries, and these ships, their operations and types have changed radically 
over time. The modern notion of warship was established according to the 1856 Declaration 
of Paris61 (which abolished privateering) and the 1907 Hague Convention VII62 (regarding the 
                                                
61 See Paris Declaration Respecting Maritime Law, 16 April 1856, in force 16 April 1856.reproduced in Natalino 
Ronzitti (ed.) The Law of Naval Warfare: A Collection of Agreements and Documents with Commentaries (Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers: Dordrecht, 1988) at 61–75. See also Hisakazu Fujita, ‘1856 Paris Declaration Respecting 
Maritime Law’ in Natalino Ronzitti (ed.) The Law of Naval Warfare: A Collection of Agreements and Documents 
with Commentaries (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers: Dordrecht, 1988), 61–75 at 66. Privateering was ‘[t]he practice 
of arming privately owned merchant ships for the purpose of attacking enemy trading ships’ by commission of 
local governments through letters of marque issued to vessels in their merchant fleet. For belligerent powers, 
privateering was a common practice from the 15th century till the 18th century, and was generally recognised as 
lawful. See further Bryan A. Garner (ed.) Black’s Law Dictionary (8th edn, Thomson West: Eagan, 2004) at 1233.  
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conversion of private vessels into warships).  The modern definition of a warship is codified in 
Article 29 of the LOSC: 
For the purposes of this Convention, ‘warship’ means a ship belonging to the armed forces of a 
State bearing the external marks distinguishing such ships of its nationality, under the command of 
an officer duly commissioned by the government of the State and whose name appears in the 
appropriate service list or its equivalent, and manned by a crew which is under regular armed 
forces discipline.63 
The LOSC also acknowledges that for the purposes of the Convention there is a larger class 
of vessels belonging to the group of government-owned vessels which are not warships.64 Thus, 
warships can be seen as a subset of a larger class of different kinds of vessels or crafts that can 
be defined as owned or operated by a State and used, for the time being, only for government 
non-commercial service. 
Modern warships and other government ships operated for non-commercial purposes enjoy 
sovereign immunity, and this applies regardless of geographical or territorial location. 
However, whether this immunity continues after a warship has sunk is still under debate. This 
also raises the question of retroactivity, and whether rules of modern Conventions should be 
applied to warships that predate present definitions of a warship. The question remains open 
as to whether these ancient vessels enjoy sovereign immunity, and/or are still the property of 
the flag State. Most of the controversy surrounding sunken warships in international law is 
caused by the vessels that engaged in activities and naval warfare prior to or during the 19th 
century.65 Substantial issues arise when the modern definition of a warship is applied to sunken 
warships predating the World Wars. According to Professor Natalino Ronzitti, ancient ships 
did not necessarily comply with the distinctive modern features of warships. He mentions 
ships belonging to privateers as one example that would fall outside of the notion of modern 
warships. Other examples are Spanish galleons transporting goods from the colonies,66 and the 
ships of the Dutch East India Company (Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie or VOC).67 
                                                                                                                                              
62 See Convention (VII) relating to the Conversion of Merchant Ships into Warships, 18 October 1907, in force 
26 January 1910, 205 CTS 319. Reproduced in James Brown Scott (ed.) The Hague Conventions and Declarations 
of 1899 and 1907 (Oxford University Press: New York, 1915) at 146–150. 
63 An earlier version of this Article was codified in the Convention on the High Seas, see infra note 187. 
64 See e.g., LOSC Articles 31–32, 107, 110(5), 111(5) and 224, and David J. Bederman, ‘Rethinking the Legal 
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According to Lassa Oppenheim — regarded by many as the father of modern international 
law — warships remain State organs as long as they are manned, under the command of a 
responsible officer, and in the ‘service of a state’.68 A shipwrecked warship that is abandoned by 
her crew is no longer a State organ, but will still remain the property of that State.69 Using this 
logic, it would follow that a warship that has sunk with her crew would also fail to fulfil the 
functions of a State organ. Oppenheim did not, however, take a stance on sovereign immunity 
of sunken warships.70 While Ronzitti claims that the debate concerning the immunity of 
sunken warships is merely ‘academic’, it is worthwhile to understand that the practical 
difference between immunity and title71 is not necessarily significant. In theory, immunity goes 
undoubtedly further than title, giving the flag State more ‘tools’ to protect sunken warships. 
However in practice, immunity and property rights are rendered useless by the mere fact that 
there is no presence to apply or enforce this immunity. 
  The Law of the Sea 
The most important field of law in this context is that of the law of the sea, which has always 
been at the heart of international law. The law of the sea falls under public international law, 
‘that is generally concerned with relations between states’.72 Its deep relation and history with 
international law is perhaps best described by Professor O’Connell:  
The history of international law is the history of the law of the sea and vice versa, for the intellec-
tual character of international law, its techniques, and its philosophy, have been largely determined 
by the accommodations reached among nations respecting the use of the sea.73 
In essence the law of the sea encompasses ‘the rules and principles that bind States in their 
international relations concerning maritime matters’.74 It is only concerned with the laws of 
peace and generally excludes private matters such as the rules of private maritime law, 
maritime insurance, carriage of goods, and maritime liens.75 The law of the sea deals with 
matters on a State level, leaving private persons and international organisations mostly outside 
of its scope — although many matters regarding the law of the sea also have a direct or indirect 
effect on private persons and international organisations. According to Bowett, the evolution 
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of the law of the sea can be seen as ‘a response to, and a reconciliation of, the conflicting 
interests of the Members of the international community’.76 He continues that the balance of 
interests ‘could perhaps be most dramatically illustrated by reference to the law of the sea in 
time of war: the exercise of belligerent rights in the twentieth century changed almost beyond 
recognition from that accepted as legitimate in the nineteenth century’.77 
The law of the sea plays a vital role in the protection of cultural heritage, because all 
shipwrecks are inherently linked to this law due to their location. None of the Conventions 
regarding the law of the sea were designed for the preservation of UCH or shipwrecks, but 
because these rules, most importantly those of the LOSC, concern the uses of the sea and the 
resources on the seabed, everything situated there is affected by them. While the LOSC is 
generally seen as the ‘constitution of the oceans’,78 no single text contains the whole of the law 
that falls under the umbrella of the law of the sea.79 The law of the sea, as it stands after the 
adoption of the LOSC, is sometimes also called the ‘new law of the sea’ or the ‘modern law of 
the sea’. 
  Maritime and Admiralty Law 
Maritime law, also commonly referred to as ‘rules of admiralty’ or ‘admiralty law’, is ‘[t]he 
body of law that governs marine commerce and navigation, the carriage at sea of persons and 
property, and marine affairs in general [...] or relating to commerce on or over water’.80 One of 
the main differences between maritime law and the law of the sea is that, while the law of the 
sea deals almost exclusively with matters between States, maritime law mainly regulates 
activities between private individuals and registered legal entities.81 
During UNCLOS III, the President of the UN General Assembly, Hamilton Amerasinghe, 
reported on the work of the informal plenary meeting of the Conference on general provisions, 
wherein it was decided that ‘in translating the term “rules of admiralty” from the original 
English into other languages account should be taken of the fact that this was a concept 
peculiar to Anglo-Saxon law and the corresponding terms in other legal systems should be 
used to make it clear that what was meant was commercial maritime law’.82 However as 
Professor Scovazzi points out, ‘bodies of “the law of salvage and other rules of admiralty” are 
today typical of a few common law systems, but are complete strangers to the legislation of 
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other countries. Yet, because of the lack of corresponding concepts, the very words “salvage” 
and “admiralty” cannot be properly translated into languages different from English’.83 
While maritime law is certainly of an international character, it is applied in different ways 
depending on whether the domestic legal system is based on common law or civil law, and 
whether that particular legal system has adopted the dualist or monist approach. Due to the 
absence of clear guidelines in international law, domestic courts have applied whatever 
domestic law has been available, or, as has been the case in the US, a freely interpreted version 
of admiralty law.84 Due to the disparities in the domestic legal systems, and the dominant 
presence of US-based case law, one should be careful before jumping to any conclusions based 
on the legal literature on the subject. Many scholars tend to review only case law from the US 
and from other common law jurisdictions, claiming its universality, without realising that 
admiralty law — in the form that it exists in within the common law jurisdictions — does not 
exist within the civil law jurisdictions of most of Europe. The application of rules regarding 
salvage differs even between the common law jurisdictions, such as between American and 
English law.85 
Most of the case law that exists is not relevant at all to cases in the Baltic. Because of the 
current absence of commercial salvage in the Baltic Sea, issues regarding admiralty law are not 
covered any further in this paper. 
  What Constitutes a Wreck 
Within the sphere of commercial treasure salvage, it is usually the cargo and associated objects 
of monetary value that the salvor is interested in, not the hull or other vessel fittings. Thus it 
needs to be considered whether the shipwreck, its cargo and other associated objects are to be 
treated separately or as an interlinked whole. The distinction becomes clearly relevant in cases 
where vessels, such as the Spanish galleon Nuestra Señora de las Mercedes, were carrying cargo 
that was not the property of the flag State. 
The term ‘wreck’ can have many different meanings, depending on the context and the 
jurisdiction concerned.86 It is notable that the only international Convention that sets out a 
definition for ‘wreck’ is the 2007 Nairobi International Convention of the Removal of Wrecks 
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(WRC).87 The definition provided by the WRC is very broad, as the Convention’s aim is the 
removal of objects that may constitute a hazard to navigation or to the marine environment. 
Article 1(4) of the WRC states: 
‘Wreck’, following upon a maritime casualty, means: 
(a) a sunken or stranded ship; or 
(b) any part of a sunken or stranded ship, including any object that is or has been on board such a 
ship; or 
(c) any object that is lost at sea from a ship and that is stranded, sunken or adrift at sea; or 
(d) a ship that is about, or may reasonably be expected, to sink or to strand, where effective 
measures to assist the ship or any property in danger are not already being taken.  
The LOSC does not even mention the term ‘wreck’; nor does the 1989 International 
Convention on Salvage.88 The former is not concerned with maritime casualties in any form, 
and the latter uses the terms ‘vessel’ and ‘ship’. A recent definition for ‘wreck’ and ‘sunken 
State ship’ can, however, be found in the IIL Resolution. Article 1 of the Resolution provides 
that, for the purposes of the Resolution: 
1. ‘Wreck’ means a sunken State ship which is no longer operational, or any part thereof, including 
any sunken object that is or has been on board such ship. 
2. ‘A sunken State ship’ means a warship, naval auxiliary or other ship owned by a State and used at 
the time of sinking solely for governmental non-commercial purposes. It includes all or part of any 
cargo or other object connected with such a ship regardless of whether such cargo or object is 
owned by the State or privately. This definition does not include stranded ships, ships in the 
process of sinking, or oil platforms. 
Within the context of this paper, the term ‘wreck’ refers to any sunken vessel or craft 
capable of navigation (i.e. ships, vessels and aircraft) that has been lost and is situated on the 
seabed.  
  Laws of Salvage under Admiralty 
The history of salvage law and the law of finds is well documented by the Attorney–Advisor of 
NOAA, Ole Varmer, in the 2014 gap analysis made by US Department of the Interior, and 
thus it will not be reproduced here. 89  However, some general observations are made. 
Dromgoole explains that, initially, the only legislation applicable to interference with material 
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found in the marine environment — namely the law of salvage and finds — was designed to 
deal with recent maritime casualties, and thus had rather different aims and objectives than the 
protection of UCH.90 The original purpose of salvage was the saving of asset values, i.e. 
safeguarding of the rights of the person or persons having the title in the salved property, and 
returning them back to the stream of commerce. Due to this, a debate exists around whether 
the rules of salvage should or should not be applied to the salvage of less recent maritime 
casualties. This debate has its roots in the United States and commercial treasure hunting, 
mostly based in Tampa Florida, where treasure hunters have been after everything that remains 
of the Spanish warships transporting gold and other valuables from the Spanish Caribbean to 
Spain. These include the Nuestra Senõra de Atocha,91 sunk in a hurricane in 1622 — the 
famous find of Mel Fisher — and the eleven out of twelve ships of the ‘1715 treasure fleet’ 
which sunk in the hurricane of 30 July 1715. 
There are two distinct kinds of salvage: contract salvage and pure salvage. In contract 
salvage, ‘the reward is agreed upon before assistance is given to the distressed vessel’ and the 
salvor has no right to additional compensation or lien.92 In pure salvage, ‘a voluntary service is 
rendered to imperiled property on waters that are navigable by commercial ships with 
compensation dependent upon success and without prior agreement having been made 
regarding the salvor’s compensation’.93 Within the scope of this paper, pure salvage is the most 
important. What has been called ‘historic salvage’ or ‘treasure salvage’ generally falls under the 
concept of pure salvage. According to Varmer,94 pure salvage has been characterised best in the 
1879 US Supreme Court case of the Sabine, where the court stated that: 
Salvage is the compensation allowed to persons by whose voluntary assistance a ship at sea or her 
cargo or both have been saved in whole or in part from impending sea peril, or in recovering such 
property from actual peril or loss, as in cases of shipwreck, derelict, or recapture.95 
The factors that were listed by the Court in the Sabine case are also the general requirements 
for a salvage award. These include first, a marine peril; second, service voluntarily rendered 
when not required as an existing duty or from a special contract; and third, success in whole or 
in part, or that the service rendered contributed to such success. 96  From the salvor’s 
perspective, the whole point of the salvage service rendered is crystallised in the salvage award. 
Boesten is of the opinion that ‘[t]he protection of underwater cultural heritage versus economic 
considerations seem to be mutually exclusive and raise additional questions as a balance has to 
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be found between allocating public financial resources to protect a wreck and, for example, the 
interest of those who want to commercially explore and exploit shipwrecks’.97 The laws of 
salvage were, however, never designed, born nor intended for submerged archaeological sites or 
ancient shipwrecks ‘which, far from peril, have been definitively lost’.98 
The salvage award is not always easily calculable and a court will always consider it based on 
the merits of each individual case. In 1869 the US Supreme Court based its ruling on several 
factors, which are known today as ‘the Blackwall Factors’.99 These include: 
1) The labor expended by the salvors in rendering the salvage service; 
2) The promptitude, skill and energy displayed in rendering the service and saving the property; 
3) The value of the property employed by the salvors in rendering the service and the danger to which  
   the property was exposed; 
4) The risk incurred by the salvors in securing the property from impending peril; 
5) The value of the property saved; and, 
6) The degree of danger from which the property was rescued.100 
The general problem of the application of salvage law — as it is interpreted especially in the 
federal admiralty courts of the United States — is nailed down by Scovazzi and deserves to be 
quoted in full: 
The fact remains that the body of ‘the law of salvage and other rules of admiralty’ is today typical 
of a few common law systems, but is a complete stranger to the legislation of the majority of other 
countries. For instance, no Italian lawyer (with the laudable exception of a few scholars) would 
today know what the ‘law of salvage and finds’ is, despite the fact that the cities of Rome and 
Trani, which are said to have contributed to this body of ‘venerable law of the sea’, are located 
somewhere in the Italian territory. Nor is it clear how a ‘venerable’ body of rules, which is believed 
to have developed in times when nobody cared about the underwater cultural heritage, could 
provide any sensible tool today for dealing with the protection of the heritage in question. Yet from 
the conclusions reached in their decisions on underwater cultural heritage, it would seem that 
some American judges are much better than normal human beings: they do have an access to all 
the ancient sources whence such a ‘venerable law of the sea’ can be inferred, they do know all the 
mysterious languages in which the relevant rules have been written, they are able to interpret such 
rules correctly, they do seize the intrinsic consistency between one source and the other and, 
finally, they can explain to the rest of the world why salvage law is the best way to deal with the 
subject of underwater cultural heritage. This is impressive indeed.101 
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While there are varying opinions on the matter, Scovazzi is nevertheless right that the laws 
of salvage and admiralty are total strangers to many other jurisdictions. Proceedings in rem102 
— in other words against the wreck itself as the defendant, rather than against a legal person 
— are alien to civil law jurisdiction. In Finland, an in rem action is not even recognised by the 
applicable legal doctrines because ‘a thing’ cannot be party to a suit. Finnish national courts 
apply Chapter 16 of the Finnish Maritime Act, which was amended in 2006 after Finland 
ratified the 1989 International Convention on Salvage.103 The only two cases concerning 
‘historic salvage’ in Finland are the litigation concerning the wreck of Vrouw Maria, sunk in 
1771, and the dispute between competing salvors regarding the cargo of Jönköping, sunk in 
1916.104
  Maritime Archaeology and Underwater Cultural Heritage 
Archaeology can be defined as ‘the study of the human past from material remains’, and it is 
inherently linked to anthropology, the study of humans.105 In archaeology the researcher seeks 
to understand the reasons, causes and motives behind past events, based on the surviving 
documentary evidence. The only difference between land and maritime archaeology106 is that 
maritime archaeology is focused on activities that took place in the marine environment. As 
O’Keefe has explained, archaeology is a method, and items as such cannot be ‘archaeologi-
cal’.107 Anything can be studied using archaeological methods. Archaeology and anthropology 
both share the same subject (i.e., humans), methods, and ethics. Archaeology should not be 
confused with antiquarianism. As archaeologist Joe Flatman explains, ‘maritime archaeology is 
still perceived — at least by some — to be engaging in antiquarianism, with greater interest in 
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the material remains uncovered (particularly precious or technologically significant artefacts) 
than the use of these materials to help to understand the societies which created them’.108 
  Maritime Archaeology 
Maritime archaeology covers ‘the scientific study of the material remains of man and his 
activities on the sea’.109 But the primary focus of archaeology is man, not the ships, cargoes, 
fittings, or instruments with which the maritime researcher is immediately confronted.110 So 
why would ships, or shipwrecks for that matter, be subjects of the study of humans? As pioneer 
of maritime archaeology Keith Muckelroy explains, in pre-industrial societies, boats and (later) 
ships were the largest and most complex machines produced.111 The 18th century first-rate 
naval ship — with its hundred-plus guns and crew of over 800 — exceeded several times over, 
in terms of constituent artefacts and power harnessed, the largest machines used on land for 
transport, manufacture, or mining.112 In 18th century England, the Admiralty was the biggest 
single employer of labour in manufacturing, and played no small role in determining the level 
of economic activity, and stimulating industrial innovation.113 The course of human history 
has been guided more than a little by maritime activities, and therefore their study constitutes 
an important element in the search for a greater understanding of man’s past.114 
  The Concept of Underwater Cultural Heritage 
There are no generally acceptable definitions for ‘cultural heritage’ or ‘cultural property’, even 
though the terms have appeared frequently in a number of UN and UNESCO conventions 
and recommendations.115  This lack of universal definition probably originates from the 
administration of cultural property traditionally being a matter of domestic legislation. States 
have mostly protected cultural heritage worthy of safeguarding from a national perspective, 
traditionally situated on land and/or within the physical limits of State territory and territorial 
waters. To examine the term ‘underwater cultural heritage’ word-by-word: ‘underwater’ poses 
no complications, it just indicates that something is or has been underwater; ‘cultural’ suggests 
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that it is related to us, humans; and ‘heritage’ implies an inherent or otherwise measurable 
value or quality which is worthy of passing to future generations and thus entitled to special 
protection.116 In light of this — and taking into account that national legislation, as well as 
international conventions and recommendations, vary in their scope, focus and definitions — 
it comes apparent that what we value as historical or cultural heritage is eventually a matter of 
circumstance. Therefore cultural heritage will mean different things in different societies. 
General observations can be made, but exact definitions will always be limited by their 
conventional or national frameworks. 
Within a conventional framework, the concept of ‘underwater cultural heritage’ first 
appeared in 1978 in the Council of Europe’s Recommendation 848, 117  and was later 
elaborated on in 1985 in the Draft European Convention on the Protection of the Underwater 
Cultural Heritage.118 This progress followed after debates on UCH during UNCLOS III, 
when the issue was raised by John Roper in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe.119 As a result, the Assembly instructed Roper, who was, at the time, the Vice 
Chairman of the Committee on Culture and Education, to prepare a report on the issue of 
underwater cultural heritage.120 This report founded the basis for Recommendation 848.121 
Even though the ‘Roper Report’ did not focus on sunken warships, it made observations 
that are noteworthy within the context of this paper. Roper noted that the problems regarding 
UCH were to a large degree regional, determined by the waters where the heritage was 
situated.122 He also saw that even though there were differences within Europe — for example 
between the Mediterranean, the North and the Baltic Seas — in general terms the interests of 
most European states would probably meet in a way that recommendations or even a wider 
international agreement might be successful.123 
Roper did not try to rigorously define ‘cultural heritage’; instead he pointed out that a 
certain degree of flexibility was required in order to investigate, declare and justify what would 
be important.124 This means that whatever the scope of cultural heritage would be, it should be 
backed up by sound arguments that would explain why such property was to be included in 
the definition of cultural heritage, and the reasons to justify it.  
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While the annex of Recommendation 848 stated that ‘[p]rotection should cover all objects 
that have been beneath the water for more than 100 years’, the Draft Convention put forward 
a different basis for protection: ‘being at least 100 years old’.125 By these guidelines, it could be 
interpreted that a vessel that operated for 30 years, then sank and remained underwater for 70 
years, would be protected by the Draft Convention, but not by Recommendation 848. 
Ultimately, the Draft was never adopted due to the objections of Turkey.126 According to 
Dromgoole only two studies that focused on UCH existed prior to Recommendation 848.127 
The 100-year cut-off introduced in both the Recommendation and the Draft was widely 
adopted in Nordic domestic legislation, although it can mostly be said to have served 
administrative purposes and does not really define cultural or historical importance. While 
perhaps the most well-known part of UCH consists of shipwrecks, it also covers submerged 
landscapes, prehistoric settlements and any kind of object that can be found in the water 
element, embedded or lying in sediment, including the sea, lakes and rivers. Thus it should be 
recognised that the term ‘underwater cultural heritage’ covers more than just objects that are 
commonly found in the sea. Since this paper is focused on the law of the sea, inland waters 
and waterways are excluded. 
  
                                                
125 Dromgoole, Underwater Cultural Heritage and International Law, at 41 and fn. 64, supra note 1. 
126 As Dromgoole explains, at that time the Council of Europe had a treaty adoption system under which it was 
possible for one State to block the signature process simply by objecting to the Draft. It is noteworthy that Turkey 
did not object to the Draft as such; the only opposition was relating to the territorial scope of the Convention 
that might have caused difficulties in Aegean Sea due to the territorial dispute between Turkey and Greece. See 
ibid., at 40–44. 
127 See ibid., at 37 fn. 40. These include studies published by UNESCO in 1972 and Crane Miller in 1973.  
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PART III 
LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND 
APPLICABLE RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
 
The problem of treaty interpretation [...] is one of ascertaining the logic inherent in the treaty, and 
pretending that this is what the parties desired. Insofar as this logic can be discovered by reference 
to the terms of the treaty itself, it is impermissible to depart from those terms. Insofar as it cannot, 
it is permissible. These two propositions underlie the so-called ‘canons’ [i.e., principles] of treaty 
interpretation, which are no more than logical devices for ascertaining the real area of treaty 
operation. Writers have divided into those who believe it is possible to formulate definite rules for 
interpretation and those who believe that this is a delusion. In several decided cases, the courts 
have prefaced their remarks by laying down rules for interpretation and have immediately departed 
from them because it was found that the text required it.128 
D. P. O’Connell 
 
  The Significance of Jurisdiction 
This paper is focused on the implications and effects of the 1982 United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea on the protection of sunken warships that have been lost during the past 
two World Wars beyond the present territorial jurisdiction of coastal and flag States. To a large 
extent, these implications are embodied in the existence or absence of jurisdiction.  
Jurisdiction — for the purposes of this paper — essentially concerns ‘the extent of each 
[S]tate’s right to regulate conduct or the consequences of events’.129 In other words jurisdiction 
describes ‘the limits of the legal competence of a State or other regulatory authority (such as 
the European Community) to make, apply, and enforce rules of conduct upon persons’.130 
However, ‘[j]urisdiction is not coextensive with [S]tate sovereignty, although the relationship 
between them is close’131 because traditionally the State’s ‘title to exercise jurisdiction rests in 
its sovereignty’.132
                                                
128 D. P. O’Connell, International Law (2nd edn, Stevens & Sons Ltd: London, 1970) at 253. 
129 Sir Robert Jennings and Sir Arthur Watts (eds), Oppenheim’s International Law: Volume 1 Peace (Introduction 
and Part I) (9th edn, Longman Group: London, 1992) at 456, § 136. 
130 Vaughan Lowe, ‘Jurisdiction’ in Malcolm D. Evans (ed.) International Law (2nd edn, Oxford University Press: 
Oxford, 2006), 335–360 at 335. 
131 Jennings and Watts (eds), Oppenheim’s International Law, at 457, § 136, supra note 129. 
132 The Case of the SS Lotus (France v. Turkey), PCIJ Series A, No. 10, at 19. 
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 In order to avoid confusion, it is noted that the term ‘jurisdiction’ is also commonly used 
to describe the judicial powers of international courts and tribunals to adjudicate upon cases. 
These two forms of jurisdiction should be kept and treated as separate.133 Jurisdiction of 
international and domestic courts and tribunals is not treated extensively in this paper; 
however, occasional reference will be made to issues relating to the jurisdiction of domestic 
courts, different court decisions and relevant cases. The jurisdiction of domestic courts is 
inherently linked to jurisdiction of States. When States regulate different matters through their 
jurisdiction, this legislative power will eventually be exercised through the enforcement of 
domestic court decisions. 
In matters regarding the law of the sea, jurisdictional rights of States generally vary in 
different maritime zones. Moreover, sovereignty does not mean to entail that States have a 
sovereign right to exercise jurisdiction in whatever circumstances they choose. 134  These 
limitations can be observed, for example, on the territorial sea with regards to sunken warships 
of States other than the coastal State. As Dromgoole has explained, political tensions are most 
likely to arise when there is conflict between sovereignty of the coastal State and the notion 
that sunken warships still enjoy sovereign immunity and are thus subject to the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the flag State.135 Furthermore, problems can also arise when a State seeks to 
assert its authority over persons, property or circumstances which occur abroad, for example in 
the EEZ.136 
While there are varying opinions on the topic of jurisdiction in international law — and 
especially regarding the extent of such jurisdiction — one treatment of the bases of jurisdiction 
can be found in Part Eight of the 1997 Council of Europe Amended Model Plan for the 
Classification of Documents Concerning State Practice in the Field of Public International 
Law.137 It is reproduced below for illustrative purposes. 
Part Eight: Jurisdiction of the State 
I.   Bases of jurisdiction 
a.   Territorial principle 
b.   Personal principle 
c.   Protective principle 
d.   Universality principle 
e.   Other bases 
II.   Types of jurisdiction 
a.   Jurisdiction to prescribe 
b.   Jurisdiction to adjudicate 
                                                
133 Lowe, Jurisdiction, at 336, supra note 130. 
134 Jennings and Watts (eds), Oppenheim’s International Law, at 457, § 136, supra note 129. 
135 Dromgoole, Underwater Cultural Heritage and International Law, at 139, supra note 1. 
136 Jennings and Watts (eds), Oppenheim’s International Law, at 457, § 136, supra note 129. 
137 Recommendation No. R (97) 11 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on the Amended Model 
Plan for the Classification of Documents Concerning State Practice in the Field of Public International Law of 12 
June 1997 (Council of Europe). 
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c.   Jurisdiction to enforce 
III.   Extra-territorial exercise of jurisdiction 
a.   General 
b.   Consular jurisdiction 
c.   Jurisdiction over military personnel abroad 
d.   Others (artificial island, terrae nullius etc.) 
IV.   Limitations upon jurisdiction (servitudes, leases, etc.) 
V.   Concurrent jurisdiction 
The bases and types of jurisdiction summarised by the Model Plan are generally recognised 
among distinguished scholars.138 Consequently, if a State wishes to enforce rules on any subject 
at sea, enforcement action and jurisdiction has to be founded on an accepted basis and 
principles of international law. These will depend on the nationality of the parties involved, 
the location (i.e. the maritime zone) of the incident, status of the vessel(s), and the activity of 
the vessel(s) and individual(s) concerned. 
The current delimitation of maritime zones and boundaries is based on the framework set 
out by the LOSC. Pursuant to the LOSC, sovereignty of the coastal State is limited to internal 
waters, or to archipelagic waters if the State in question is an archipelagic State, and to the 
territorial sea. The territorial sea has a maximum limit of twelve nautical miles (22  244 metres) 
when opposite or adjacent geographical features do not cause any limitations. The LOSC also 
recognises three zones of ‘functional jurisdiction’ — the contiguous zone, the exclusive 
economic zone, and the continental shelf — which all extend seaward from the outer limits of 
the territorial sea. 
For a State to regulate matters which take place beyond the territorial sea, and thus beyond 
the sovereignty of the State, jurisdiction has to originate from something other than the 
territorial principle. Thus, if the State wishes to act, intervene, prescribe rules or enforce these 
rules on the contiguous zone, EEZ, continental shelf or beyond, jurisdiction has to be 
established on an internationally accepted basis. If a State has sovereign interests outside its 
territorial sovereignty, it is bound by the interests that other States enjoy on that particular 
area. While any State can generally enforce and extend its domestic legislation to cover its own 
nationals and registered legal entities, a comprehensive protective framework for sunken 
warships would in practice require that it be applicable to all persons, whether legal, public or 
private, that operate in all of the maritime zones. Unless the State has a jurisdictional basis in 
international law, it lacks enforcement jurisdiction outside the scope of its territorial 
                                                
138 Regarding maritime law enforcement in general, see Roach and Smith, Excessive Maritime Claims, at 559–630, 
supra note 9. Regarding jurisdiction in general, see Jennings and Watts (eds), Oppenheim’s International Law, at 
456-498, supra note 129; Lowe, Jurisdiction, at 335–358, supra note 130 and Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public 
International Law (7th edn, Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2008) at 299–321. Regarding functional 
jurisdiction, see Maria Gavouneli, Functional Jurisdiction in the Law of the Sea (Brill: Leiden, 2007). Regarding 
the theory of maritime jurisdiction, see O’Connell, The International Law of the Sea Volume II, at 733-746, supra 
note 14. 
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sovereignty. Where the State lacks enforcement jurisdiction, it cannot enact effective protective 
measures to safeguard sunken warships. These limits restraining the reach of territorial 
sovereignty originate from the fundamental struggle of mare liberum and mare clausum. 139 
  Mare Liberum vs Mare Clausum 
The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) took place 
between 1973 and 1982. UNCLOS III ended on 10 December 1982 and the end product — 
the LOSC — is one of the most ratified conventions ever, with 167 State parties.140 The 
negotiations that took place during UNCLOS III have probably been some of the longest ever 
in international law-making, and many of the matters at the heart of the debate have a long 
history dating back to the early 17th century (and even earlier), and to the struggle between 
mare liberum and mare clausum.141 
The concept of mare clausum originates from the time of the Roman Empire, when the 
term was used to denote a ‘closed sea’ during periods of bad weather. Over time, mare clausum 
came to mean any part of a sea, ocean or other body of water that falls under a State’s 
jurisdiction, and is not freely accessible by other States. Mare clausum and the notion of ‘closed 
seas’ is an exception to mare liberum, the ‘free sea’. 
Prior to the World War II, most of the oceans were free for use by all States, and coastal 
State sovereignty was most commonly limited to three nautical miles (5  556 metres). Until the 
end of the World War II, the very foundations of the public international law of the sea were 
based on the traditional principle of the ‘free sea’ or ‘the freedom of the seas’ as introduced by 
Hugo Grotius in 1609 in his aptly-named publication Mare Liberum. According to 
O’Connell, the freedom of the sea is undeniable.142 While this 400-year-old argument is 
accepted today, a full appreciation of it requires some understanding of the events and the 
context that led to this axiom of international law. 
Grotius’ Mare Liberum was written in order to support the Dutch East India Company 
(VOC) and dispute the self-proclaimed trade monopoly in the East Indies by the Spanish and 
the Portuguese.143 The history and origins of the ‘free seas’ date back to the early morning of 
                                                
139 Latin, ‘free sea’ and ‘closed sea’. 
140 The  chronological  list  of  ratifications,   accessions and successions to the Convention  and  the  related  Agreements 
as of 2  January  2015,  is at  <www.un.org/depts/los/reference_files/chronological_lists_of_ratifications.htm>. 
141 See e.g., R. P. Anand, Origin and Development of the Law of the Sea: History of International Law Revisited 
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers: The Hague, 1983) at 72–123. 
142 O’Connell, The International Law of the Sea Volume I, at 33, supra note 14. 
143 Churchill and Lowe, The Law of the Sea, at 4, supra note 15. The original publication was in fact published 
anonymously because Grotius felt it would be safer, and in order to ‘find out judgement of others and to consider 
more carefully anything that might be published to the contrary’. See David Armitage (ed.) Hugo Grotius, The 
Free Sea, trans. Richard Hakluyt, with William Welwod’s Critique and Grotius’s Reply (Liberty Fund: Indianapolis, 
2004) at xi. However, Grotius’ employment by VOC and his presumed partiality in the matter might have been 
defining factors in the decision to publish Mare Liberum anonymously. Mare Liberum should be understood 
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25 February 1603, when Dutch captain and admiral Jacob van Heemskerck attacked 
Portuguese merchantman Santa Catarina in the Strait of Malacca.144 The prize of Santa 
Catarina’s very wealthy cargo was auctioned in Amsterdam during the autumn of 1604. The 
gross proceeds amounted to more than three million Dutch guilders, which was equivalent to 
just less than the annual revenue of the English government at that time.145 However, van 
Heemskerck — a captain working for VOC146 — did not possess any privateering commission 
at the time, and the magnitude of the prize caused an instant debate on the legitimacy of such 
an action occurring in the distant seas of the East Indies. In addition, even if the Dutch 
Admiralty Board had authorised this kind of action, it has been argued that the validity of 
such a privateering commission would have been highly questionable even under the 
contemporary international law.147 
In September 1604, Jan ten Grootenhuys — the younger brother of VOC director Arent 
ten Grootenhuys — asked his friend Hugo Grotius to write an apology and a formal defence 
for VOC of van Heemskerck’s seizure of Santa Catarina.148 Apparently the directors of VOC 
were expecting a short pamphlet describing the inequities committed by the Portuguese, thus 
indicating they were deserving of punishment for the harassment and cruelty to which Dutch 
merchants had been subjected for some years.149 Grotius, however, ignored such requests and 
hopes for a quick publication and instead produced an in-depth study that resulted in a 
manuscript called De Jure Praedae, which was a very serious and thorough study of the 
matter.150 However, only an adaptation of chapter twelve of this manuscript was published at 
the time: Mare Liberum. 
De Jure Praedae itself remained totally unknown to the public until 1864 when Martinus 
Nijhoff (of Martinus Nijhoff Publishers) auctioned Grotius’ personal papers and the original 
manuscript was purchased by Grotius’ alma mater, the Leiden University.151 De Jure Praedae 
dealt with the questions of prize, booty, just war, trade and free access to the world’s oceans 
                                                                                                                                              
along with another important piece Grotius wrote, De Jure Praedae. See Martine Julia van Ittersum (ed.) Hugo 
Grotius, Commentary on the Law of Prize and Booty (Liberty Fund: Indianapolis, 2006).  
144 van Ittersum (ed.) Hugo Grotius, Commentary on the Law of Prize and Booty, at xiii, supra note 143. Regarding 
the capture of Santa Catarina, see especially Martine Julia van Ittersum, ‘Hugo Grotius in Context: Van 
Heemskerck’s Capture of the Santa Catarina and its Justification in De Jure Praedae (1604–1606)’, 31 Asian 
Journal of Social Science, no. 3 (2003) 511–548; Peter Borschberg, ‘The Seizure of the Sta. Catarina Revisited: The 
Portuguese Empire in Asia, VOC Politics and the Origins of the Dutch-Johor Alliance (1602 - C.1616)’, 33 
Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, no. 1 (2002) 31–62. 
145 Armitage (ed.) Hugo Grotius, The Free Sea, at xii, supra note 143. 
146 The Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC) was formed in March 1602 when the Holland and Zeeland 
overseas trading companies, including the United Amsterdam Company, merged together. See van Ittersum (ed.) 
Hugo Grotius, Commentary on the Law of Prize and Booty, at xiv, supra note 143. 
147 Ibid., at xiii. 
148 Ibid., at xiv–xv. 
149 Ibid., at xv. 
150 Ibid., at xvi–xvii. 
151 Ibid., at xxiii. 
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after the Santa Catarina incident.152 Grotius’ point in De Jure Praedae was that the systematic 
Portuguese brutality prevented the Dutch from exercising their natural right to trade.153 The 
basis of Grotius’ defence was two primary natural laws derived from the divine will: self-
defence and self-preservation.154 Along with these two ‘God-given rights’, one of Grotius’ 
central arguments was that ‘it is lawful for any nation to go to any other and to trade with it’ 
because the sea was publica juris gentium, i.e. common to all and proper to none.155 
While Grotius’ work was based on the incident of Santa Catarina, the published version of 
Mare Liberum made no reference to it or the alleged Portuguese aggression.156 Instead, it was a 
general statement on the right to freedom of trade and navigation, and it caused a lot of 
controversy within the contemporary foundations of international law.157 However the dispute 
with the Portuguese — and the Spanish, as Portugal was under Spanish dominion at that time 
— was an important part of and the whole purpose of the-then unpublished manuscript of De 
Jure Praedae. 
Dr Martine Julia van Ittersum has argued that historians have failed to recognise that 
Grotius’ conceptualisation of natural rights and natural law in De Jure Praedae was based 
largely on van Heemskerck’s own justification of privateering.158 Grotius’ defence rested on the 
assumption that van Heemskerck had the individual’s right to punish transgressors of the 
natural laws in the absence of an independent and effective judge — and had been forced to 
do so in revenge for Portuguese mistreatment of Dutch merchants in the East Indies.159 The 
trade and colonisation in the East Indies was vital to the Habsburg kings of Spain and Portugal 
— but also to the Dutch, and especially to the VOC. The dispute over the trade monopolies 
was not new: in 1494 Spain and Portugal signed the Treaty of Tordesillas,160 which sought to 
divide rights to the ‘new’ world between the two countries.161 However, as the Treaty excluded 
other European powers, it was generally either ignored and thus a source of conflict. 
As Churchill and Lowe have demonstrated, ‘[e]arly treatises on the law of the sea were often 
written in the context of particular disputes, as were tracts on other subjects of international 
                                                
152 Grotius originally named the chapter De rebus Indicis, meaning ‘On the Affairs of the Indies’. See further 
Armitage (ed.) Hugo Grotius, The Free Sea, at xiii, supra note 143. 
153 van Ittersum, ‘Hugo Grotius in Context’, at 521, supra note 144. 
154 van Ittersum (ed.) Hugo Grotius, Commentary on the Law of Prize and Booty, at xiii, supra note 143 citing 
Richard Tuck, Philosophy and Government 1572–1651 (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1993) at 169–179. 
155 Armitage (ed.) Hugo Grotius, The Free Sea, at 10 and 25, supra note 143. 
156 Ibid., at xiv. 
157 Ibid., at xv. 
158 van Ittersum, ‘Hugo Grotius in Context’, at 513, supra note 144. 
159 Ibid., at 514. 
160 Treaty between Spain and Portugal concluded at Tordesillas, 7 June 1494, ratified by Spain 2 July 1494 and by 
Portugal 5 September 1494. Reproduced and translated in Frances Gardiner Davenport (ed.) European Treaties 
bearing on the History of the United States and its Dependencies to 1648 (Carnegie Institution of Washington: 
Washington, 1917) at 84–100. 
161 See Davenport (ed.) European Treaties to 1648, at 88, ibid., and Ann L. Hollick, U.S. Foreign Policy and the 
Law of the Sea (Princeton University Press: Princeton, 1981) at 5. 
37 
 
law’.162 Grotius’ Mare Liberum was not any different. Thus, within the context that created the 
‘axiom’ O’Connell argues exists, it should always be remembered that the birth of the free seas 
was not an effort to contribute to humanity as a whole — it was an attempt to argue in favour 
of something that would support private economical gain.
After the publication of Mare Liberum, the English and the Scots felt that their fishing 
rights in the North Sea were assaulted, as did the Spanish, who felt that their overseas empire 
was now threatened.163 Therefore Mare Liberum received many written responses and spurred 
vigorous debates — the intellectual duel of Grotius and John Selden being the most well-
known.164 The concept of the free seas has managed to persist and keep its status as one of the 
core principles of the public international law of the sea till the present. However, what is 
retained by the law of the sea has grown apart from the historical concept of the free seas, and 
the intellectual foundations upon which these early concepts were built — namely natural law 
and divine will — have been completely abandoned.165 
As the enforcement of unilateral claims of dominion over the oceans was a practical 
impossibility, it is not surprising that the freedom of the seas gained universal acceptance. 
Another factor was that the concept did not really have any negative impact to other States — 
it merely made global trade a possibility for everyone. The initial balance between minimal 
national authority and maximum freedoms on the high seas persisted until the turn of the 
20th century, when major shifts in world politics and advances in technology occurred.166 The 
long-accepted principles began to erode after the discoveries of vital resources, such as oil and 
deep sea minerals, and the emerging problems with depleting fish stocks. The notion of mare 
liberum the free seas, is an important and perhaps essential part of the law of the sea. However, 
it cannot exist to the total exclusion of mare clausum, the closed seas. A balance between the 
two must be struck.167 
  A Short History of the Modern Law of the Sea 
The law of the sea relates to the seventy per cent of our planet comprised of seas and oceans, 
providing regulatory framework for a number of human activities that take place in the marine 
                                                
162 Churchill and Lowe, The Law of the Sea, at 4, supra note 15. 
163 Armitage (ed.) Hugo Grotius, The Free Sea, at xi, supra note 143. 
164 See John Selden, Mare Clausum seu, De Dominio Maris (Printed by William Du-Gard: London, 1652). The 
other famous commentators are the Scot William Welwod, An Abridgement of All Sea-Lawes [1613]; De Dominio 
Maris [1615], the Portuguese Justo Seaphim de Freitas, De Justo Imperio Lusitanorum Asiatico [1625] and the 
Spanish Juan Solórzano Pereira, De Indiarum Jure [1629]. See Armitage (ed.) Hugo Grotius, The Free Sea, at xviii, 
supra note 143. 
165 Churchill and Lowe, The Law of the Sea, at 4–5, supra note 15. 
166 For example, the world fish catch and the gross tonnage of merchant ships quadrupled between 1950 and 
1975. See e.g., Scott G. Borgerson, The National Interest and the Law of the Sea, Council Special Report No. 46, 
May 2009 (Council on Foreign Relations: New York), at 7. 
167 Helmut Tuerk, Reflections on the Contemporary Law of the Sea (Brill: Leiden, 2012) at 8. 
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environment.168 On top of their political and strategic importance, our seas and oceans are 
vital for offshore industries, seaborne trade and commercial fishing. The transition away from 
the ‘pure’ free seas began after use of the oceans increased to the point where different 
maritime activities started to affect one another. According to the United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), around eighty per cent of global trade by volume, 
and over seventy per cent by value, is carried by sea today.169 In short, these are the interests 
that shape domestic and international policies regarding the modern law of the sea. 
The history and development of the law of the sea is well documented.170 The first major 
changes took place after World War I reshaped the political geography of the world — that is, 
after the four defeated empires were broken up and new nations were born.171 Finland, Latvia, 
Estonia, Lithuania and Poland, among others, became independent and the League of Nations 
was established. A gradual pressure for wider belts around coastlines was now building.172 In 
1930, The Hague Conference for the Codification of International Law — including that of 
the law of the sea — was convened under the auspices of the League of Nations. However, the 
conference was unable to reach an agreement on any of the agenda issues. The state of affairs 
remained largely unchanged until the end of World War II. David Anderson, a former judge 
of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), has summarised the law of the 
sea till the early 20th century as follows: 
Coastal States had territorial waters extending to three nautical miles, subject to insignificant 
exceptions, and measured in a belt around the coasts. Beyond that limit, the seas and oceans had 
the status of high seas. Maritime law was based upon relatively simple foundations: international 
custom derived from the practice of States, among which maritime powers loomed large; a few 
conventions on technical matters; the writings of professors; and a few arbitral decisions. No inter-
governmental organizations with maritime mandates existed and there was no forum for discussing 
maritime questions. Maritime disputes were justiciable only with the consent of the States con-
cerned.173 
                                                
168 David Anderson, Modern Law of the Sea: Selected Essays (Brill: Leiden, 2008) at 3. 
169 See the UNCTAD online Statistical Annexes available at <unctad.org>, UNCTAD, Review of Maritime 
Transport 2014 (United Nations: Geneva). See also UNCTAD, Key Statistics and Trends in International Trade 
2014 (United Nations: Geneva).  
170 For a compact presentation, see Anderson, Modern Law of the Sea, at 3-22, supra note 168. For a detailed 
history of the law of the sea, see Jennings and Watts (eds), Oppenheim’s International Law, chapters 5 and 6, supra 
note 129, O’Connell, The International Law of the Sea Volume I, and especially suggested further reading at 25, 
supra note 14 and Anand, Origin and Development of the Law of the Sea: History of International Law Revisited, 
supra note 141. For the recent developments, see James Harrison, Making the Law of the Sea: A Study in the 
Development of International Law (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2011). For a comprehensive list of 
treaties and studies regarding the evolution of the modern law of the sea, see Appendix 12, in Roach and Smith, 
Excessive Maritime Claims, at 845-860, supra note 9. 
171 Tommy T. B. Koh, ‘The Origins of the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea’, 29 Malaya Law Review, no. 1 
(1987) 1–17 at 6. 
172 Anderson, Modern Law of the Sea, at 6, supra note 168. 
173 Ibid. 
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After World War II the United Nations was established and the League of Nations saw its 
demise. There was now — again — a wholly new world order, and the number of newly 
independent States continued to rise, this time as a result of decolonisation. After the war, the 
traditional division of territorial seas and the high seas started to shift slowly towards what can 
be called a ‘functional and resource-oriented’ division of the seas.174 As Professor Maria 
Gavouneli explains, ‘[t]he “unlimited expanse” of Grotius has been converted into tidy stripes 
of jurisdiction, often vying for the same territory’.175 Increased demand for oil and other 
resources, and technological advances opening up new uses of the sea, propelled these changes 
forward.176 Bernhard Oxman, who served as the Vice-Chairman of the US delegation to 
UNCLOS III, calls this trend ‘territorial temptation’,177 and it accelerated after the Truman 
Proclamations of 1945.  
US President Harry S. Truman made two presidential proclamations concerning fisheries 
and the jurisdiction and rights of the United States over natural resources on the continental 
shelf.178 The original thought came from the US Secretary of the Interior, Harold Ickes, who 
recommended President Roosevelt to consider ways in which the United States could lay 
claims to resources off the coast, due the increased need for raw materials following the war.179 
After the Truman Proclamations, other coastal States were encouraged to make corresponding 
claims, spurred on by both growing interest in the living resources within the water column 
above the continental shelf, and the US’s encouragement to do so. Political scientist Zdenek 
Slouka suggests that the US’s encouragement ‘indicated the existence of a deliberate intention 
to initiate the development of a rule of customary law’.180 
                                                
174 Malcolm D. Evans (ed.) International Law (2nd edn, Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2006) at 623. 
175 Gavouneli, Functional Jurisdiction in the Law of the Sea, at 3, supra note 138. 
176 Anderson, Modern Law of the Sea, at 7–8, supra note 168. 
177 Bernard H. Oxman, ‘The Territorial Temptation: A Siren Song at Sea’, 100 The American Journal of 
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178 President Harry S. Truman, Policy of the United States with Respect to the Natural Resources of the Subsoil 
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Donald Cameron Watt, ‘First steps in the enclosure of the oceans: The origins of Truman’s proclamation on the 
resources of the continental shelf, 28 September 1945’, 3 Marine Policy, (1979) 211–224. The policy however was 
already formulated during the administration of President Franklin D. Roosevelt and originated in the 1930s 
when the US sought to control different resources offshore by excluding foreign access. See Hollick, U.S. Foreign 
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179 Jean-François Pulvenis, ‘The Continental Shelf Definition and Rules Applicable to Resources’ in René-Jean 
Dupuy and Daniel Vignes (eds) A Handbook on the New Law of the Sea, Volume I (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers: 
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supra note 161. 
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In addition to the weight of the opinion of the US, there were two contributing factors to 
the wider international acceptance of the Proclamations. The first is that the Proclamations 
were ‘based on facts and goals of a general character, not applicable exclusively to the United 
States’ but to all coastal States. The second factor was that the Proclamations contained an 
element of reciprocity, in that to ‘have this right recognized by others, the United States was, 
implicitly, yet clearly, denying itself an opportunity to assert for itself or its national industries 
free access to resources hidden in about ten million square miles of the continental shelves off 
foreign coasts’, thereby calling other States ‘to adopt a corresponding policy’.181 Ironically the 
next decades — and continuing into the present — were spent by the US ‘trying to roll back 
and limit the expansive moves of other States’. 182  The chief scientist working at the 
Department of the United States Navy, Dr John Craven, was the first to predict that the 
sovereign rights claimed by coastal States over the seabed would soon be followed by similar 
claims over the water column above and to the subsoil below.183 He was right. The United 
States has ever since been in strong opposition of this ‘creeping jurisdiction’.  
Soon after the Truman Proclamations, in 1949 the International Law Commission (ILC) 
began its work. The law of the high seas was included on the list of topics of international law 
that were ready for codification and progressive development. The ILC studied the matter for 
six years and in 1955 presented draft articles to the UN General Assembly.184 In 1957 the 
General Assembly decided to convene the first United Nations Conference on the Law of the 
Sea to consider the newly revised draft articles.185 
  UNCLOS I and UNCLOS II 
The First United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS I)186 opened in 
Geneva in February 1958 and ended in April with the adoption of four conventions that 
created five legal zones in the sea: internal waters, territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the high 
seas and the continental shelf. These conventions — known together as the 1958 Geneva 
Conventions on the Law of the Sea — were: the Convention on the Territorial Sea and 
Contiguous Zone (TSC); the Convention on the High Seas (HSC); the Convention on the 
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Continental Shelf (CSC); and the Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living 
Resources of the High Seas (CFCLR).187 The Conference also adopted an Optional Protocol 
on the Settlement of Disputes (OPSD)188 and nine resolutions. While the Conference has been 
considered to be a success in its own right, it did not manage to define the breadth of the 
territorial sea or the breadth of any exclusive fishing zones (EFZ). The proposals on the limit 
of the territorial sea varied from three to 200 nautical miles (5  556 metres to 370.4 km) and 
none obtained the required two-thirds majority vote.189 Shipwrecks and underwater cultural 
heritage were far from being a concern at the time, since ‘the lack of adequate underwater 
technology made the search for, and removal of, underwater cultural property far too remote 
to create juridical problems’.190 
The Second United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS II) was held in 
1960 without reaching agreement on any of the issues on the table.191 The closest the 
conference ever came to an adoption was an amended joint proposal for a six-nautical-mile 
(11.1  km) territorial sea and a six-nautical-mile fishing zone that failed to obtain the required 
two-thirds majority by one vote.192 The four Conventions adopted in Geneva two years earlier 
came into force soon after UNCLOS II finished, but they never gained universal support and 
were always met with a degree of opposition.193 Furthermore, in 1969 the International Court 
of Justice (ICJ) decided in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases194 that Article 6 of the CSC 
(regarding the delimitation of the continental shelf) did not reflect customary international 
law, and that customary law required the application of the concept of ‘natural prolonga-
tion’.195 According to ITLOS judge Helmut Tuerk, natural prolongation was used to support 
claims to an ever-wider continental shelf.196 
Another of the major issues with the 1958 Geneva Conventions was that they were not part 
of a package acceptance deal. This meant that States could pick and choose between the four 
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Conventions, eliminating the possibility of universal acceptance.197 Furthermore, individual 
States were left with problems that the Conventions could not provide solutions for, indirectly 
encouraging them to take matters into their own hands. The CFCLR failed to provide 
solutions to problems that arose when fish stocks were exploited by multiple users and the 
sustainable yield was exceeded.198 Tuerk argues that this threat ‘prompted political pressure on 
coastal States to find ways to protect local fishing industries facing foreign competition for a 
limited resource’ and mounted pressure that ‘contributed to the claims to control the sea up to 
200 nautical miles and even beyond’.199 
Another problem related to the voting system. In both Conferences it was difficult to 
achieve the required two-thirds majority vote due the inherent conflicting interests of States. 
This issue was clearly demonstrated at UNCLOS II, where no agreements were reached. 
Bowett formulated the problem into a question: ‘Does it involve the proposition that if 70 
States prefer rule X, and 50 States rule Y, then rule X is the better rule? Surely not, for the real 
interests of these States may vary enormously, and conceivably the majority of the great 
maritime Powers could be in the minority which favoured rule Y’.200 In both Conferences the 
equality of voting between participating States illustrated this problem, as Bowett continues to 
explain: 
The argument that the majority vote must, in a democratic world community, be accepted as the 
better rule is based upon a false analogy with municipal systems. By and large, a municipal system 
operates upon the assumption that all citizens have an equal interest in the content of their legal 
system. This is plainly a false assumption on the international plane. How can one realistically 
equate the interests in the rule about the breadth of the territorial sea of, say, Burundi and the 
Soviet Union?201 
Around the time the Conferences were held, the composition of States was still changing 
after the last British, Dutch and French colonial territories gained independence. Among other 
things, these newly independent States had to consider the extent of their territorial seas.202 
According to Tommy Koh, President of the later UNCLOS III, by the mid-1960s big 
maritime powers and coastal States alike started to feel the need for a new legal order for the 
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oceans.203 The four 1958 Geneva Conventions had gained relatively few ratifications and were 
rapidly being overtaken by State practice.204 The last important step towards the new legal 
order was taken in 1967 when the-then Ambassador of Malta to the United Nations, Arvid 
Pardo, proposed that the resources of the seabed and ocean floor beyond the limits of national 
jurisdiction should be declared the ‘common heritage of mankind’, not subject to national 
appropriation, and reserved exclusively for peaceful purposes.205 Furthermore in 1967, the 
Soviet Union approached the United States and other States with a proposal of recognising a 
twelve-nautical-mile (22.2 km) territorial sea, provided that a high seas corridor was preserved 
in international straits.206 The decision was made on 17 December 1970 to convene the Third 
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea.207 
  UNCLOS III 
The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea lasted from 1973 to 1982.208
The outcome — after years of arduous and protracted negotiations — was a ‘package deal’.209 
Tullio Treves, a former judge of ITLOS, explains that the historic circumstances were complex, 
involving ‘momentous changes in the structure of international society and in the uses of the 
sea’.210 On the broad agenda were issues such as the common heritage of mankind, the 
expansion of coastal State sovereignty, and the protection of the marine environment. The 
need to protect the marine environment was an emerging issue in international law after the 
1972 United Nations Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment, and the adoption 
of conventions such as the London Convention of 1972 211  and the MARPOL 73/78 
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Convention of 1973 with later amendments.212 UNCLOS III started its work without the 
benefit of the previous work of experts and without a basic draft, unlike in the case of the 
1958 Geneva Conventions.213 
Following the lessons learned from the 1958 and 1960 Conferences, UNCLOS III adopted 
five distinct procedural techniques.214 The first was the consensus procedure, which meant that 
‘the Conference should make every effort to reach agreement on substantive matters by way of 
consensus and there should be no voting on such matters until efforts at consensus have been 
exhausted’.215 While the consensus procedure is preferable in order to secure the widest 
possible acceptance, a convention adopted by consensus is likely to be obscure because of the 
need for compromise.216 This consensus procedure should not be confused with unanimity —
adoption with unanimity means adoption by voting after all actors involved have agreed, but 
the consensus procedure precludes voting.217  The second procedural technique was the 
‘package deal’ approach. Under this approach the final treaty was to be accepted in its entirety, 
which also contributed to the adoption of a single treaty.218 The third procedural feature was 
that the discussions took place in a variety of interest groups.219 The fourth was that a 
substantive amount of the meetings were informal, without summary records, and many of the 
issues were resolved in privately-convened negotiating groups.220 The fifth feature was to 
formulate and adopt a Single Negotiating Treaty Text in each of the Committees. 
One of the biggest forces behind the negotiations was the growing realisation of the 
‘enormous resources and the great economic potential of the seas, growing concern over the 
toll taken on coastal fish stocks by long-distance fishing fleets and over the danger of pollution 
and wastes from transport ships and oil tankers carrying noxious cargoes which threatened 
coastal communities and all forms of ocean life’.221 Koh pointed out correctly that the old legal 
order collapsed under the weight of three issues: ‘first, the progress of technology; second, the 
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failure of the traditional law to deal adequately with the concerns of coastal [S]tates regarding 
the utilisation of oceanic resources; and third, the emergence of the developing countries’.222 
Ultimately, the LOSC was a compromise based on the fundamental premise that different 
ocean uses are closely interrelated and need to be considered as a whole — thus the 
Convention tried to strike a balance between the rights of the coastal States and the freedoms 
enjoyed by all other States.223 There was hope that the Convention would rein in territorial 
temptations, and address the issue of creeping jurisdiction, i.e. the extension of sovereign rights 
and national jurisdiction further over the seas.224 However, the LOSC did not provide an 
efficient scheme of protection of shipwrecks or underwater cultural heritage. Strati argues that 
this ‘is the result both of the manner in which the archaeological issue was dealt with during 
the negotiations of UNCLOS III and of the determination of the maritime powers to prevent 
the expansion of coastal competence over archaeological objects on the continental shelf’.225 
The LOSC was finally adopted at the resumed tenth session on 28 August 1981 and 
amended at the eleventh session in order to accommodate mostly the concerns of the United 
States.226 Nevertheless, the United States could not accept some of the major elements of the 
deep seabed mining regime and requested a vote on the final text.227 On 30 April 1982 the 
Conference adopted the Convention and four Resolutions as a package: 130 votes were in 
favour, 4 against, 18 abstained and 18 were unrecorded.228 
  1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
 
Like many of my generation of international lawyers, I spent the early days of my academic career 
poring over the successive proposals and negotiating texts that emerged from the Third UN 
Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III). Each small change in the language took on the 
sort of significance that shards of pottery or half-gnawed bones have for the archaeologist: a small, 
incomplete sign from which entire world-views could be inferred (or perhaps, upon which entire 
world-views could be imposed).229 
Vaughan Lowe QC 
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Today the modern law of the sea is understood within the framework established by the 
LOSC. The division of oceans into different zones, rights of coastal States and other States, 
and essential concepts incorporated in the framework of the LOSC are explained below. 
However, problems regarding maritime delimitation, defined as ‘the process of establishing 
lines separating the spatial ambit of coastal State jurisdiction over maritime space where the 
legal title overlaps with that of another State’, will be excluded.230 The following treatise 
identifies the relevant factors that have an effect on the jurisdictional powers coastal States and 
other States have in different maritime zones, and how provisions for these have developed 
over time. How these provisions affect the protection of sunken warships in different maritime 
zones is then analysed. 
 
Source: Figure 1-1. Legal Boundaries of the Oceans and Airspace from The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval 
Operations, edition July 2007 (US NAVY, NWP 1-14M). 
  Archaeological and Historical Objects Found at Sea 
Article 303, placed under Part XVI (General Provisions) of the LOSC, is concerned with 
archaeological and historical objects found at sea. According to Article 303: 
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1.  States have the duty to protect objects of an archaeological and historical nature found at sea 
and shall co-operate for this purpose. 
2. In order to control traffic in such objects, the coastal State may, in applying article 33, presume 
that their removal from the seabed in the zone referred to in that article without its approval would 
result in an infringement within its territory or territorial sea of the laws and regulations referred to 
in that article.  
3. Nothing in this article affects the rights of identifiable owners, the law of salvage or other rules 
of admiralty, or laws and practices with respect to cultural exchanges.  
4. This article is without prejudice to other international agreements and rules of international law 
regarding the protection of objects of an archaeological and historical nature.231 
Dromgoole observed that the placement of Article 303 under the general provisions of the 
Convention favours the assumption that Article 303 is generally applicable — with the 
exception of paragraph 2 relating to the contiguous zone — and it is thus not geographically 
restricted such as Article 149 is, which concerns solely the international seabed (the Area).232 
This is also supported by Professor Guido Carducci, who is of the view that in principle 
Article 303(1) as lex generalis233 covers UCH located anywhere within the scope of the 
LOSC.234 In contrast, Boesten was more doubtful, and she argues, ‘[a] duty to protect after all 
requires the means to protect, which could easily result in a requirement of legislative 
competence and extension of jurisdiction’ and ‘Article 303 cannot be interpreted as including 
any form of coastal State jurisdiction over such objects in the EEZ or on the continental 
shelf’.235 Nevertheless, she was of the view that Article 303 contained ‘the important statement 
that the protection of the objects amounts to a duty that needs to be achieved by co-
operation’.236 
The LOSC does not define what is meant by ‘objects’, ‘archaeological’ or ‘historical’. 
Furthermore, it is unclear from the wording of Article 303 whether the word ‘and’ 
(archaeological and historical) should be understood conjunctively, as it is in the Chinese, 
English and French translations, or disjunctively as in the Arabic, Russian and Spanish 
translations.237 It has been suggested that ‘[i]n many countries archaeology (antiquities) is 
regulated by law, and for that reason it may be suggested that exceptionally, in this context, the 
word may be read disjunctively, “historical” being more a matter of subjective appreciation’.238 
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Professor Lucius Caflisch is of the similar view that, since archaeological objects are a 
subcategory of objects of historical origin, there would be no case of an archaeological object 
that could not be considered as of historical origin.239 However, there are still remaining issues 
that can arise from the terms ‘archaeological’ and ‘historical’.240 Different interpretations of 
these terms are illustrated well by Oxman, in his discourse regarding the scope of Article 303, 
and by O’Keefe, in his commentary of the definition of UCH in the CPUCH. Oxman 
suggested that: 
[Article 303] is not intended to apply to modern objects whatever their historical interest. Reten-
tion of the adjective ‘historical’ was insisted upon by Tunisian delegates, who felt that it was 
necessary to cover Byzantine relics that might be excluded by some interpretations of the word 
‘archaeological’. Hence, the term historical ‘origin’, [sic] lacking at best in elegance, when used 
with the term ‘archaeological objects’ [...] does at least suggest the idea of objects that are many 
hundreds of years old. 
The article contains no express time limit. As time marches on, so does our sense of what is old. 
Nevertheless, given the purpose for using the term ‘historical,’ it may be that if a rule of thumb is 
useful for deciding what is unquestionably covered by this article, the most appropriate of the years 
conventionally chosen to represent the start of the modern era would be 1453: the fall of Constan-
tinople and the final collapse of the remnants of the Byzantine Empire. Everything older would 
clearly be regarded as archaeological or historical. A slight adjustment to 1492 for applying the 
article to objects indigenous to the Americas, extended perhaps to the fall of Tenochtitlán (1521) 
or Cuzco (1533) in those areas, might have the merit of conforming to historical and cultural 
classifications in that part of the world.241 
O’Keefe points out some of the problems that become quickly apparent from Oxman’s 
interpretation of the terms ‘archaeological’ and ‘historical’: 
Something may be of archaeological interest or significance but nothing is of an archaeological 
character. This was pointed out by the representative of ICOMOS and was clearly supported by 
many experts but unfortunately the word found its way into the text. Whether something is 
‘cultural’ or ‘historical’ cannot be objectively determined. There cannot be any trace of human 
existence which does not have a cultural element or an historical character. Even human remains 
qualify. Indeed, anything over 100 years of age may be said to have an ‘historical character’ by its 
very nature. Much of the opposition to this phrase centred on an argument that the cultural or 
historical importance of an object can often not be determined in advance of excavation. But the 
importance of something is very different to its character and the latter is the word used in the 
definition. The phrase ‘cultural, historical or archaeological character’ thus neither adds to nor 
detracts from the already established scope of the definition. It mirrors the wording of UNCLOS 
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in Articles 149 and 303 and is an unfortunate revival of a phrase which the [International Law 
Association] and UNESCO/DOALOS drafts carefully avoided.242 
Dromgoole went to suggest that Oxman and other delegates at UNCLOS III had been 
influenced by the drafting history of Article 303, and especially the views of Mediterranean 
States such as Greece and Turkey whose domestic legislation had been designed to protect ‘the 
treasures of antiquity’ from the times that predated the Middle Ages.243 Greece had been 
behind the original proposal that had, after many amendments, led to the adoption of Article 
303. Furthermore, there is nothing that would suggest, other than the restrictive view of 
Oxman, that the scope of Article 303 is limited to Byzantine relics or objects originating from 
before the fall of Tenochtitlan.244 According to Dromgoole, subsequent State practice has 
proven, in light of Article 31(3) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT),245 
that the restrictive view of Oxman has not prevailed.246 Furthermore, ‘it needs to be borne in 
mind that throughout the long gestation period of the LOSC in the late 1960s and 1970s, 
marine archaeology was barely a scientific discipline at all, and understanding of the potential 
historical and archaeological value of the underwater cultural heritage was limited and 
undeveloped’.247 
O’Keefe explained that archaeology is a process and a method, not a description or feature 
that an object can possess — anything can be studied using archaeological methods. According 
to Maria Christina Giorgi, ‘as the time limit for these objects is not set in a precise form, […] 
their prescription as archaeological or historical will depend on the attitude of the internation-
al community and of a given society towards the values to be protected and consequently on 
the assessment of the international and national authorities concerned’.248 This means that the 
interpretation and implementation of Article 303 is left to State parties to the LOSC, which 
entails that the definitions and criteria for any objects of an ‘archaeological and historical’ 
nature will differ depending on the domestic legislation and domestic criteria because there is 
no internationally agreed definition. 
Could sunken warships be included in the notion of objects of an archaeological and 
historical nature? The term ‘time capsule’ often comes up when maritime historians and 
archaeologists talk about shipwrecks — a shipwreck is seen as a single event with the 
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assumption that all objects on board the ship were deposited at the same time, and that ‘the 
event of a vessel’s loss encompasses a moment in time that produces a unit of contemporaneity 
in the archaeological record’.249 Thus it follows that an untouched shipwreck is a journey back 
in time to long-lost information that has not been significantly altered or changed after its 
deposition. While this informational richness is undoubtedly a gift in the Baltic Sea, it is also a 
big legislative challenge when it comes to preservation of this cultural heritage, especially for 
shipwrecks from the World Wars. If we fail to appreciate the value of our remaining cultural 
heritage today, the information it holds about our societies and history will be lost forever. The 
importance and potential of shipwrecks is not limited or defined by their age, because the 
historical gaps that these wrecks can fill cannot otherwise be explained without the resources 
we have waiting for us on the seabed. These precious sites will continue to slowly erode, 
increasing the pressure to protect and preserve them while it is still possible. Especially in the 
case of sunken warships, recent maritime casualties can provide information that is no longer 
available from any other source250 — their exclusion from the scope of ‘archaeological and 
historical’ objects would be simply absurd. For the archaeologist ‘the commonplace has the 
same value as the spectacular. What is important is not the recovery of spectacular items, but 
the acquisition of information’.251 
  Article 303(1) — The General Duty to Cooperate 
States have the duty to protect objects of an archaeological and historical nature found at sea and 
shall co-operate for this purpose. 
Article 303(1) renders unto coastal States a general duty to cooperate with each other to 
protect objects of an archaeological and historical nature. According to Strati, Article 303(1) 
provides a basis for the adoption of coastal measures where the coastal State is ‘not only 
entitled to adopt protective legislation in order to avoid interference of innocent passage with 
marine archaeological operations, but it also has the duty to do so’.252 Furthermore, Strati 
argues that Article 303(1) may be used as a basis for requiring flag States to comply with 
coastal legislation. As all States have a general duty to protect objects of archaeological and 
historical nature, and cooperate for this purpose, flag States should respect any measures 
coastal States adopt under this duty.253 However, as Scovazzi points out, ‘[a] State which 
persistently disregards any request by other States to negotiate on forms of cooperation aiming 
at the protection of the underwater cultural heritage could also be held responsible for an 
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internationally wrongful act’.254 The same would apply to a State that would knowingly 
destroy or allow the destruction of objects belonging to underwater cultural heritage.255 The 
scope and further implications of Article 303(1) were reviewed in 2013 by Michail Risvas. He 
concluded that States could make more use of flag and port State jurisdiction, as well as of 
different ad hoc bilateral and regional agreements.256 In another article, Risvas demonstrated 
how multilateral treaties are not always the best way of creating binding rules in international 
law, and therefore bilateral approaches could be shown to be a fruitful way of protecting 
underwater cultural heritage.257 In this context, there are two international agreements, that 
deserve to be reviewed in brief. 
  1995 M/S Estonia Agreement 
M/S Estonia was a ro-ro258 passenger ferry flying the Estonian flag and operating a daily route 
between Tallinn and Stockholm. The ship capsized and sank in an autumn storm during the 
night of 28 September 1994. Of the 989 people on board, only 137 survived the accident, 
making it the worst maritime disaster in the Baltic during peacetime.259 The wreck rests on the 
continental shelf of Finland within the Finnish EEZ. At the time of the sinking Finland had 
not declared an EEZ, so the vessel sank originally within Finland’s fishery zone of the time.260 
The Finnish Act on the Exclusive Economic Zone entered into force on 1 February 2005.261 
The disaster had a big impact particularly in Sweden and Estonia, due to the amount of 
casualties that were mostly of Swedish and Estonian citizenship. 
On 23 February 1995 an agreement between Finland, Estonia and Sweden was signed in 
Tallinn regarding the wreck of M/S Estonia.262 Currently the Agreement has nine State parties: 
the United Kingdom, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Denmark, Russia, and the original 
signatories. 
Pursuant to Article 1 of the Estonia Agreement, the wreck of the M/S Estonia and the 
surrounding area shall be regarded as a final place of rest for victims of the disaster, and as such 
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shall be afforded appropriate respect. The Parties also agreed, pursuant to Article 3, that the 
M/S Estonia shall not be raised. Pursuant to Article 4: 
1. The Contracting Parties undertake to institute legislation, in accordance with their national 
procedures, aiming at the criminalization of any activities disturbing the peace of the final place of 
rest, in particular any diving or other activities with the purpose of recovering victims or property 
from the wreck or the seabed. 
2. The Contracting Parties undertake to make it possible to punish the commission of an offence, 
established in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article, by imprisonment. 
3. Notwithstanding the above provisions, a Contracting Party may take measures to cover the 
wreck or to prevent pollution of the marine environment from the wreck. 
The legal implications of this treaty are covered in detail by Professor Jan Klabbers and Dr 
Marie Jacobson. 263  The Estonia Agreement uses nationality and territory principles of 
jurisdiction in order to regulate activities on the wreck site, and thus it is not binding upon 
non-contracting Parties and their nationals. So far no State has objected to the treaty. Even 
though M/S Estonia is a relatively recent wreck, it will one day become part of UCH.  
  1972 Agreement Between the Netherlands and Australia Concerning the Old Dutch 
Shipwrecks 
An agreement between Australia and the Netherlands was signed on 6 November 1972 
concerning old Dutch shipwrecks of Dutch East India Company vessels in the waters off the 
Western Australian coast. The Australian and Netherlands Committee on Old Dutch 
Shipwrecks (ANCODS) was established to determine the maintenance and allocation of the 
material that would emerge from these vessels.264 Shipwrecks covered by the Agreement — 
although mentioned only in the arrangement setting up the Committee — include Zuytdorp 
(1712), Batavia (1629), Vergulde Draeck (the ‘Gilt Dragon’) (1656) and Zeewijk (1727).265 
Strati has noted that: ‘[T]o date, there has been no protest against Australia on the basis of the 
extension of its jurisdiction over the continental shelf. On the contrary, the latter has 
concluded two bilateral Agreements, one with the Netherlands and one with Papua-New 
Guinea, which assume the extension of its competence over the outer continental shelf area’.266 
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  Article 303(2) — A Legal Fiction 
In order to control traffic in such objects, the coastal State may, in applying article 33, presume 
that their removal from the seabed in the zone referred to in that article without its approval would 
result in an infringement within its territory or territorial sea of the laws and regulations referred to 
in that article. 
Article 303(2) is concerned with archaeological and historical objects found in the contiguous 
zone. While this article seems to be limited only to the removal of objects from the seabed, its 
precise nature has been recently subject to debate. The implications of Article 303(2) are 
reviewed and analysed in the chapter on the contiguous zone. 
  Article 303(3) — Identifiable Owners and the Laws of Salvage 
Nothing in this article affects the rights of identifiable owners, the law of salvage or other rules of 
admiralty, or laws and practices with respect to cultural exchanges.
Article 303(3) states that nothing in Article 303 affects the rights of identifiable owners, the 
law of salvage and other rules of admiralty, or laws and practices regarding cultural exchanges. 
Scovazzi has called Article 303(3) an ‘invitation to looting’ and is of the view that salvage law 
and other rules of admiralty are given an overarching status.267 In the Baltic Sea, the current 
absence of professional treasure salvage will severely limit the implication and effects that 
Article 303(3) might have. An argument can also be made, that sunken warships as ships 
operated for non-commercial purposes should not be subject to salvage, because there is 
nothing the salvor could return to the stream of commerce. Furthermore, pursuant to Article 
30(d) of the 1989 International Convention on Salvage,268 a State can reserve the right not to 
apply the provisions of the Convention when the property involved is maritime cultural 
property of prehistoric, archaeological or historic interest and is situated on the seabed. For 
example Finland has made such a reservation.  
  Article 303(4) — Relationship of Article 303 to Other International Agreements 
This article is without prejudice to other international agreements and rules of international law 
regarding the protection of objects of an archaeological and historical nature. 
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Article 303(4) includes a ‘without prejudice’ clause towards international agreements and rules 
of international law regarding the protection of objects of an archaeological and historical 
nature. While Nordquist has suggested that Article 303(4) is ‘self-explanatory’ and interlinked 
with Article 311 (concerning the relation of the LOSC to other conventions and international 
treaties), the precise meaning of Article 303(4) remains open to interpretation.269 For example, 
it is unclear whether Article 303 is without prejudice only to pre-existing treaties and 
conventions, or also to any related agreements that are made after the adoption of the 
LOSC.270 According to O’Keefe ‘it is obvious that Article 311(3) can only apply where the 
other agreement modifies or suspends’ provisions of the LOSC.271 It seems that there is more 
support for the interpretation that Article 303(4) is encouraging further agreement regarding 
the protection of objects of archaeological and historical nature and that it was, in fact, 
‘intended to harmonize the rules of the law of the sea regarding marine archaeology with the 
content of the emerging law of archaeology and cultural artifacts’.272 Furthermore, Boesten 
considered that while Article 303 offers no practical guidance for practical implementation, it 
‘paves the way for new legal agreements’.273 
  Baselines 
Baselines are the lines (i.e. points) on the coast of the coastal State from which the outer limits 
of all maritime zones of the coastal State are measured. Baselines, which often follow the low-
water line, also form the boundary between territorial sea and internal waters. Traditionally 
baselines were seen as a part of the body of law relating to the territorial sea, due to the fact 
that the territorial sea was the only zone under coastal State jurisdiction.274 However, this has 
changed because baselines are used to measure the outer limits of all maritime zones, and thus 
have special significance.  
While the acceptance of some kind of coastal State sovereignty over a belt of water seawards 
from the coastline has been accepted for hundreds of years, the modern concept of baselines 
appeared for the first time in the 1839 Anglo–French Fisheries Convention,275 which used the 
low-water mark — and under certain conditions, other natural phenomena — as the normal 
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baseline.276 The League of Nations attempted to codify rules regarding baselines in the law of 
the sea, and the 1930 Hague Codification Conference tried to tackle a number of issues 
regarding baselines. Even though the Conference was unsuccessful in achieving a convention, 
the resultant draft articles expressed what many countries apparently held to be customary
international law at that time.277 The work of the Codification Conference was not in vain, 
and draft articles formed much of the basis for the preparatory work of the International Law 
Commission (ILC) for UNCLOS  I.278 As a result, the 1958 Geneva Convention on the 
Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone included a number of articles that dealt with 
baselines and in most respects also represented customary international law.279 The LOSC 
repeats the contents of the 1958 Convention. The rules embodied in Articles 5–11, 13, 14 and 
47 of the LOSC distinguish between normal baselines, straight baselines and archipelagic 
baselines.
  Normal and Straight Baselines 
Pursuant to Article 5 of the LOSC, the normal baseline is the low-water line along the coast as 
marked on large-scale charts officially recognised by the coastal State.280 While this approach 
seems logical, in practice coasts are rarely straight, and often feature indentations or 
penetrations by bays, islands, sandbanks and rocks.281 Thus, many coastal States have adopted 
the use of straight baselines. 
 
Source: Map No. 3530.4 — The role of straight baselines in simplifying territorial sea boundaries from Baselines: An Examination 
of the Relevant Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (United Nations: New York, 1989). 
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Straight baselines are described in Article 7 of the LOSC.282 Straight baselines allow the 
coastal State to eliminate complex patterns that would otherwise result from the use of normal 
baselines. At the same time, straight baselines ‘allow the coastal State, at its discretion, to 
enclose those waters which, as a result of the close interrelationship with land, have the 
character of internal waters’.283 
The baseline system incorporated in 1958 was substantially based on the decision of the 
ICJ in the 1951 Anglo–Norwegian Fisheries Case,284 where the Norwegian use of straight lines 
was confirmed legal under international law. Today, the use of straight baselines is well 
recognised by the LOSC and it is not seen as an exception to the law.285 
  Analysis 
After studying State practice regarding baselines, geographer Professor John Prescott concluded 
that ‘it would now be possible to draw a straight baseline along any section of the coast in the 
world and cite an existing straight baseline as a precedent’.286 The way that coastal States draw 
their baselines, and thus measure the outer limits of their territorial seas, can extend the limits 
of every other maritime zone further seawards for noticeable distances, thus bringing greater 
areas within a coastal State’s internal waters and territorial sea.287 Professors W. Michael 
Reisman and Gayl Westerman warned that:  
[T]he chief practical effect of a straight baseline claim is to augment the areas of internal and 
territorial waters within State control. When individual baseline segments are very long, however, 
significant areas of continental shelf and exclusive economic zone are also gained.288 
Churchill and Lowe note the importance of precise and objective rules which would lead 
two independent cartographers to the same results.289 Maritime law professionals Ashley Roach 
and Robert Smith have argued that ‘[w]hile no detailed internationally accepted standards 
currently exist that define what is meant by the terms in [A]rticle 7 of the LOS Convention, it 
appears that only certain countries have coastlines that qualify for straight baselines’.290 At the 
same time they point out that among the few countries that appear to be in compliance are 
Norway, Sweden and Finland. As Churchill and Lowe explain, ‘[t]he effect of drawing straight 
baselines, even strictly in accordance with the rules, is often to enclose considerable bodies of 
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sea as internal waters’.291 To the common user of the sea this has no practical difference, but 
the rights a coastal State enjoys on internal waters differ from the rights enjoyed on the 
territorial sea. 
  Internal Waters 
Pursuant to Article 8 of the LOSC, waters which lie landward from baselines are called 
internal waters.292 Internal waters also include lakes and rivers, which form part of the land 
territory of the State.293 However, Article 7(3) of the LOSC states that sea areas within straight 
baselines must be sufficiently closely linked to the land to be internal waters. Within their 
internal waters coastal States enjoy full sovereignty as expressed in Article 2(1) of the LOSC.  
To the recreational user of the seas, the difference between internal waters and territorial sea 
is hardly seen in real life and makes no practical difference. Internal waters usually comprise 
bays, estuaries, ports and other waters enclosed by straight baselines, which are common 
destinations for recreational use. 294  However, according to Professor Ian Brownlie, ‘for 
purposes of international law the distinction between internal waters and territorial sea is 
important, in spite of the fact that the legal interest of the coastal State amounts to sovereignty 
in either case’.295 This conclusion is probably based on the absence of right for innocent 
passage within internal waters. Pursuant to Article 17 of the LOSC, innocent passage is 
limited to the territorial sea. Although recreational and commercial vessels flying foreign flags 
visit ports around the world on a regular basis, the sovereignty that coastal States enjoy over 
ports and internal waters implies that there is no inherent right of innocent passage for foreign 
flagged vessels to enter these zones.296 According to Churchill and Lowe the only exception to 
this rule in customary law is in the case of distress, for example if a ship needs to enter a port 
within internal waters in order to preserve human life.297 
For foreign flagged vessels, the most important consequence of entering a foreign port is 
that the ships put themselves within the territorial jurisdiction of the coastal State, thus 
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entitling the coastal State to enforce its laws against the ships and those on board.298 The right 
of the coastal State to prescribe conditions for access to their ports is regarded as a rule of 
custom.299 While the coastal State can exercise control over its ports as an indirect means to 
control activities that affect shipwrecks and UCH, a strong presumption still exists that 
‘designated ports are open to foreign vessels in the absence of express provisions to the contrary 
made by the port State’.300 Freedom of access to maritime ports by all ships, and the equal 
treatment of all ships, is guaranteed by the 1923 Convention and Statute on the International 
Regime of Maritime Ports.301 Article 2 of the Statute requires every contracting State to grant 
the vessels of every other contracting State equality of treatment with its own vessels. However, 
port States still have the right to prescribe conditions of entry, as long as all ships, regardless of 
nationality, are treated equally. Therefore a coastal State can make ‘entry to its ports dependent 
on conditions concerning the removal of underwater cultural property,’ and ‘its permission 
will be required for archaeological operations conducted from its ports, even when the latter 
take place in international waters’.302 
All ships are dependent on the use of ports, and the success of underwater operations 
depends to a large extent upon using these ports for service, shelter and as a base of 
operation.303 The use of port control is not limited to archaeological operations, and it can be 
used on every matter the port State has an interest in.304 Even if the coastal State does not have 
the possibility to extends its laws to cover sites such as sunken warships or other shipwrecks 
beyond the territorial sea, its port control can ensure a substantial degree of control on a 
practical level — assuming that the port State is aware of the operations that ships entering its 
ports have engaged in.305 Port control can thus provide ex post facto306 means to control access 
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to sunken warships and other shipwrecks, in the event that the operating vessel enters a port of 
the coastal State. Because the Baltic Sea and the Gulf of Finland are relatively small areas, the 
use of local ports is unavoidable. However, an effective regime would require consistency and 
cooperation between States, because port control is only effective if the legislation is uniform 
and there are no safe havens where protective legislation is weaker. 
  Territorial Sea 
One of the oldest concepts in the history of the law of the sea is the territorial sea. The early 
practice and developments regarding the territorial sea were more concerned with the water 
column than with submerged areas or the seabed,307 but the acceptance of some kind of coastal 
State sovereignty over a belt of water seawards from the coastline has been recognised for 
hundreds of years.308 This perception of sovereignty was traditionally based on the theory that 
the territorial sea is the property of the coastal State, acquired by the processes of occupation 
and embodied in the exercise of power from the shore via the ‘cannon-shot rule’ and other 
forms of constructive presence.309 Before the breadth of the territorial sea was finally agreed 
upon in UNCLOS III, most States accepted three nautical miles as the customary rule of 
international law. While the three-nautical-mile limit is generally thought to originate from 
the cannon-shot rule, O’Connell proposed that, ‘[i]n the present state of historical research the 
relationship between the cannon-shot rule and the three-mile limit in its genesis cannot be 
satisfactorily explained’.310 However, this view can be contested to some extent: 
In 2014 the Vasa Museum tested a replica lightweight 24-pounder cannon, and with the powder 
used, the maximum calculated range was 4  200 metres, which is a little over two nautical miles. 
However, this required elevating the gun to 40 degrees from the horizontal, which is not possible 
with the type of carriage and gun port arrangement used on ships. Shore batteries could elevate 
their guns much more, and sometimes chose to do so in order to achieve plunging fire — shot 
which fell straight down onto the target rather than coming in from the side. The 2014 tests 
showed that the spread of shot at 1  000 metres was in a circle about 18 metres in diameter, so at 
5  ½ times that distance — three nautical miles — a more than six times larger circle would be 
expected due to an aerodynamic effect called the Magnus Effect, that causes the spread of round 
shot to expand like a trumpet rather than a cone. So if the circular error — as artillerists call it — 
is 120 metres, and the shore artillery is shooting at a target 50 metres long and 50 metres tall (a 
typical ship at that time), the chance of hitting is less than 1 in 4 under optimum circumstances, 
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before one takes into account factors such as visibility, movement of the target and human factors 
in loading and aiming. The range of guns varied with a lot of different factors, such as size, length 
of barrel, type of powder, type of shot and size of charge. Surviving gunners’ tables from the late 
16th and early 17th centuries indicate that at maximum elevation of 40 degrees, heavier guns 
could readily send a shot more than 3 nautical miles (5  556 metres), although accuracy at that 
distance was questionable. Generally speaking, a larger gun has a longer potential range than a 
smaller gun, since the larger ball has less surface area to produce resistance for its mass than a 
smaller ball. Still, if a shore battery could fire enough rounds, ships within three nautical miles 
were at risk, and the three-nautical-mile limit became a practical buffer for ships sailing off a 
potentially hostile shore.311  
It has been clearly demonstrated that shore batteries could reach distances of over three 
nautical miles, and that this was roughly the maximum belt of water that coastal States could 
effectively control — at least around the coastal areas and ports where shore batteries were 
present. It can be reasonably assumed that the three-nautical-mile limit was indeed based on 
the distance that coastal States could effectively protect from the shore.  
Nordic States such as Sweden and Finland deviated from the traditional cannon-shot rule 
and adopted the fixed distance of a Scandinavian league of four nautical miles regardless of the 
actual presence of shore-based batteries.312 According to Wyndham L. Walker, ‘in the case of 
both the four mile and the three mile limit the standard was taken without any conscious 
reference to cannon range what[so]ever, [but] simply as one league — a general primary and 
convenient standard of measurement at sea’.313 The Scandinavian approach was thus based on 
a practical measurement instead of an assumed range of a cannon shot. 
In the 1950s the three-nautical-mile limit had gained widespread acceptance, but in 
practice most claims varied between three and twelve nautical miles.314 Furthermore, when the 
limits of the territorial sea was discussed by the ILC, most members were of the opinion that 
no customary rule existed fixing the breadth of the territorial sea, and that there were no 
modern principles from which it could be logically derived.315 The view expressed by Professor 
Alphonse Gidel on this matter is apt: there was only a rule in the negative sense, that the 
validity of claims of up to three nautical miles could not be denied.316 
The first steps towards codification were taken in 1930 when The Hague Conference for 
the Codification of International Law discussed, among other things, the breadth of the 
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territorial sea. The Bases for Discussion No. I stated that a ‘[S]tate possesses sovereignty over a 
belt of sea round its coasts; this belt constitutes its territorial waters’.317  However the 
Conference was not able to agree upon a convention on the territorial sea, nor was it able to 
agree upon the breadth of the territorial sea.  
In 1958, UNCLOS I was also unable to define the breadth of the territorial seas. However, 
it did succeed in codifying rules regarding the territorial sea and the contiguous zone in the 
TSC. It was not until UNCLOS III that international efforts to stabilise the maximum limits 
of the territorial sea succeeded — a process that was made easier by the acceptance by the 
United States and the Soviet Union to hold territorial sea claims to twelve nautical miles.318 
Pursuant to Article 3 of the LOSC, every State has the right to establish a territorial sea up to a 
limit not exceeding twelve nautical miles, measured from baselines.319 
Nowadays coastal State sovereignty over the territorial sea, as expressed in Article 2 of the 
LOSC, has become a fundamental principle of the law of the sea: 
1. The sovereignty of a coastal State extends, beyond its land territory and internal waters and, in 
the case of an archipelagic State, its archipelagic waters, to an adjacent belt of sea, described as the 
territorial sea. 
2. This sovereignty extends to the air space over the territorial sea as well as to its bed and subsoil. 
3. The sovereignty over the territorial sea is exercised subject to this Convention and to other rules 
of international law.320 
The LOSC and international law recognise the sovereignty of coastal States, but they do 
not ‘determine the extent and the degree of the authority that each sovereign exercises in the 
territorial sea’.321 Thus it is up to domestic legislation to determine the extent and form of 
jurisdiction that a coastal State wishes to exercise in the territorial sea. However in practice, the 
laws that apply on internal waters also apply on the territorial sea. Inside their territorial waters 
coastal States have full jurisdictional powers when it comes to regulating activities towards 
UCH and shipwrecks. There are two commonly applied approaches: some coastal States 
generally apply and extend the cultural heritage legislation of land archaeology to cover 
underwater sites; other coastal States, such as in the Baltic region and especially in the Nordics, 
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have adopted relatively uniform cultural heritage laws and special legislation dealing 
specifically with UCH.322 
For security reasons, virtually all coastal States have issued legislation that requires a licence 
to be obtained, and prior notification to be given, for survey activities within their territorial 
sea. For example in Finland, pursuant to Section 12 of the Territorial Surveillance Act, 
exploration of the formation, structure or composition of the seabed or sediments through 
geological or geophysical surveys, and systematic measurement and recording of the 
topography of the sea bottom, are not allowed within the Finnish territorial waters without 
permission.323 
  Innocent Passage 
The only limitation to coastal State sovereignty is the right of innocent passage through the 
territorial sea as expressed in Article 17 of the LOSC.324 Article 18 of the LOSC states that 
innocent passage must be ‘continuous and expeditious’, and exclude all kinds of ‘hovering’ for 
purposes other than stopping and anchoring insofar as it is incidental to ordinary navigation 
or rendered necessary by force majeure or distress.325 ‘Innocent passage’ is defined in Article 19 
of the LOSC, which also enumerates activities which would render passage not innocent.326 
Activities applicable to marine operations affecting shipwrecks and UCH would render passage 
not innocent, under the provisions of: 
Article 19(2)(g) ‘the loading or unloading of any commodity, currency or person contrary to the 
customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations of the coastal State’;327  
Article 19(2)(j) ‘the carrying out of research or survey activities’;328 and  
Article 19(2)(l) ‘any other activity not having a direct bearing on passage’.329 
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Furthermore, pursuant to Article 21, coastal States may adopt laws and regulations — in 
conformity with the provisions of the LOSC and other rules of international law — relating to 
innocent passage.330 
  Creeping Jurisdiction and Territorial Temptations 
The phrase ‘creeping jurisdiction’ is often employed, especially by the big maritime powers, as 
a defence against the gradual extension of other States’ jurisdiction seawards from the coast.331 
E. D. Brown summarised the notion of creeping jurisdiction as the ‘belief that maritime 
jurisdictional rights granted for one purpose are likely to expand either ratione loci or ratione 
materiae332 and that there is no guarantee that they will not “creep” out further into the high 
seas or that the freedom of navigation will not be further eroded’.333 
The issue of creeping jurisdiction is clearly visible the further we depart from the territorial 
sea, and it is therefore closely associated with the protection of shipwrecks and UCH. Ninety 
per cent of the time, the location of shipwrecks on the seabed is a matter of pure coincidence. 
Furthermore, the maritime zones where sunken warships from the World Wars rest today did 
not even exist in their present form and extent at the time of the sinking. As a result the 
question is which State, if any, has jurisdiction over the ocean space where these wrecks rest on 
the seabed? Moreover, who has the right to regulate activities at these sites, if the location is 
beyond the territorial sovereignty of any State? The problem is that maritime boundaries are 
not based on any natural state of affairs, but result from man-made decisions. Unfortunately, 
shipwrecks do not care about man-made boundaries.  
The protection of sunken warships and other forms of UCH has always been dependent on 
the location, rather than the nature, of the property. As the location on the seabed does not 
determine the interests States generally have on sunken warships, coastal and flag States alike 
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have been tempted to find ways to protect shipwrecks beyond their territorial waters through 
different forms of functional jurisdiction. Professor R. P. Anand noted there is always a risk 
that ‘exclusive rights for some purposes’ will easily transform into ‘exclusive rights for others, 
perhaps all purposes’.334 The expansion of the breadth of the territorial sea from a general three 
nautical miles to twelve is still a relatively new change in international affairs. This, and the 
introduction of new maritime zones of functional jurisdiction has eroded the ambit of 
freedoms States can enjoy on the sea. Therefore big maritime States are against the 
fragmentation of the provisions of the LOSC, and are reluctant to make changes that would 
deviate from the consensus framework achieved during UNCLOS III.335 This attitude was 
clearly present before and during the negotiations at UNESCO that lead to the adoption of 
the CPUCH in 2001.336  
In 1995 UNESCO published a preliminary study on the advisability of preparing an 
international instrument for the protection of UCH.337 On the basis of this study a group of 
experts was convened to debate the main issues of the proposal. The group was composed of 
people nominated by UNESCO, International Maritime Organization (IMO) and the United 
Nations Division of Ocean Affairs and Law of the Sea (DOALOS), along with observers sent 
by some States.338 Garabello noted that ‘[u]nanimity was reached on the issue of the necessity 
of a new international instrument, while all other aspects proved to be very contentious’.339 In 
other words, any attempts to elaborate the vague and ambiguous Article 303 of the LOSC 
beyond ‘mere repetition’ were resisted.340 While the fears of creeping jurisdiction certainly have 
some justification, it is suggested that in practice the protection of shipwrecks hardly hampers 
the freedom of navigation or other traditional uses of the sea. As Strati observed: 
With respect to archaeological objects, the creeping jurisdiction argument may be thought to have 
a basis in reality since the attribution of sovereign rights over archaeological objects is additional to 
the already existing rights over the natural resources of the continental shelf and the EEZ. This is 
clearly not the case for the following reasons: (a) underwater archaeological remains are inevitably 
connected with the continental shelf in that they are located on and under the seabed. Whatever 
the legal regime of their protection, it will ‘overlap’ with the continental shelf; (b) the continental 
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shelf regime itself, introduced by Truman’s Proclamation, was a departure from the freedom of the 
high seas, which presumably covered the vast ocean areas beyond the territorial sea boundary. The 
emergence of the need to protect and preserve the underwater cultural heritage should likewise 
have resulted in the enunciation of a legal regime shaped upon its nature and needs. Claims are 
creeping forward in any event. A major advantage of the conventional establishment of jurisdic-
tional zones is that these trends are held to a reasonable limit. If a jurisdicional [sic] zone is well 
defined and the attributed rights properly specified, the possibilities of ‘creeping’ jurisdiction are 
minimised and the prospects of a minimum public order of the oceans are increased. The attribu-
tion of jurisdiction alone would not turn the continental shelf into a territorial zone.341 
In light of the notion of State ownership and sovereign immunity of sunken warships, the 
views expressed by Strati are convincing. Nothing suggests that the ideology behind the 
Truman Proclamations could not be applied to the extension of some flag State rights over 
sunken warships or UCH. In this application, a strong element of reciprocity would exist in 
the form of recognition of the rights of other States over their sunken warships; all States 
would have the right to adopt corresponding policies; and the flag State could not assert any 
rights to sunken warships of other States. If this logic is applied solely to sunken warships, the 
ratione materiae is very limited and narrow.  
  Analysis 
Extensions to the breadth of the territorial sea were made in order to bring a stop to creeping 
jurisdiction. However, these extensions have made many maritime nations wary of any further 
future increases to coastal State jurisdiction. Regarding the protection of sunken warships and 
UCH in general, port control can have substantial impact even on underwater operations 
beyond the territorial sea. Furthermore the undertaking of any kind of research activities 
during passage automatically renders the passage non-innocent, because archaeological 
research cannot be justified either as an exercise of the freedom of navigation or as any related 
use of the sea.342 The protection of shipwrecks in general within territorial waters under the 
sovereignty of a coastal State does not create considerable problems under international law.343 
However, issues may emerge when a sunken warship is found within the territorial limits of a 
State other than the flag State, if these States do not or cannot cooperate. International 
conflicts are likely to be caused by States that wish to expand the extent of domestic legislation 
beyond the current territorial limits. In principle these States are assumed to expand the ambit 
of protection to the same legislative extent that has been adopted within the domestic legal 
framework. This means that a shipwreck outside of the territorial sea would be protected on 
the same grounds and legal basis as a shipwreck within territorial waters. These bases are 
mostly founded on domestic policies shaped by political and historical matters of individual
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States. It is likely that these policies will also dictate how States will act in the international 
arena. States’ international relations and diplomacy policies regarding UCH and sunken 
warships are easier to understand from a domestic perspective. It is highly unlikely that a State 
would try to enforce policies or other ambitions internationally, if they are not part of the 
domestic agenda or legislation. While Nordic heritage laws share the same background, they 
differ mostly in the definitions of cultural property that is entitled to protection. For example, 
Finland has adopted 100 years as the cut-off point for protection, while Sweden protects 
objects from the year 1850 or earlier — the same policy they apply on land. Thus protection 
practice is far from uniform.344 However the domestic approach can make a difference if the 
coastal State wishes to exercise the rights granted by Article 303(2) of the LOSC regarding 
archaeological and historical objects in the contiguous zone. 
  Contiguous Zone 
The contiguous zone is a zone seaward of the territorial sea where the coastal State can exercise 
certain measures of control necessary to prevent and punish infringements of its customs, 
fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws that take place within its territory or territorial sea.345 The 
contiguous zone is not subject to coastal State sovereignty and all vessels and aircraft enjoy the 
high seas freedoms of navigation, overflight and other internationally lawful uses of the seas. 
O’Connell described the contiguous zone as ‘the product of a nineteenth-century notion 
that a coastal State had jurisdiction beyond its territorial sea for the purpose of protecting its 
revenue against smuggling and its public health against disease’.346 Historically the concept of 
the contiguous zone dates back to the 18th century when Great Britain enacted ‘Hovering 
Acts’ in order to control and fight foreign smuggling within a distance of eight leagues (i.e. 24 
nautical miles) from the shore.347 From that time till the 20th century, State practice regarding 
the concept and acceptance of the contiguous zone has varied.348 Churchill and Lowe observed 
that in Europe several States did not claim territorial seas, but rather, a variety of jurisdictional 
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zones mostly concerned with fiscal matters, fisheries or customs where the ‘width of each zone 
was fixed at whatever distance the State concerned thought it was necessary for the purpose for 
which that zone was established’.349 These authors also identified three main approaches used 
in the early part of the 20th century to the issue of coastal State jurisdiction beyond the widely 
accepted three-nautical-mile territorial sea. First, there were States that denied the existence of 
such a jurisdiction; second, there were States that claimed a variety of jurisdictional zones; and 
third, there were States that claimed jurisdictional zones distinct from the territorial sea for a 
specific purpose such as security or customs.350 
In the 1920s the idea and concept of the contiguous zone was taken up by the ‘learned 
societies’.351 The first attempts to codify the rules regarding the contiguous zone were taken at 
the 1930 Hague Conference for the Codification of International Law. The proposal for the 
contiguous zone was not well received and the Conference was unable to reach any agreement 
due to two major obstacles. As Lowe observed, the first obstacle was ‘that extended jurisdiction 
should be limited, in essence, to the control necessary to secure compliance with coastal laws 
within territorial waters: in other words, that the zone had as its raison d’être [French, ‘reason 
for existence’] the establishment of enforcement, not legislative, jurisdiction’.352 The second 
obstacle was that some States believed that the zone should be an area of the high seas, 
implying the freedom of navigation. This meant that ‘any agreement upon the establishment 
of a contiguous zone would therefore have had to settle the question of the limit of territorial 
sea as well’.353 Because the Conference failed to reach an agreement on the limit of the 
territorial sea, there was no way to draw clear lines between the two zones.354 
  Development of the Current Rules 
During the years following the 1930 Hague Conference, an increasing number of States 
adopted the contiguous zone in their practice and the concept became clearly distinguished 
from the territorial sea.355 According to Lowe, State practice during the years 1930–1958 
indicate that ‘States thought themselves entitled to extend legislative and enforcement 
jurisdiction alike, for limited purposes, into the contiguous zone’.356 However, the views of 
prominent authors such as Gidel, Fitzmaurice, and Lauterpacht, along with State practice, 
differed on the nature of the zone — namely whether it was one of enforcement jurisdiction 
only or an extension of legislative jurisdiction of the coastal State. The issues regarding the 
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legislative and enforcement jurisdictions that coastal States could enjoy in the contiguous zone 
were also debated in-depth at the ILC when the Commission was preparing its draft articles 
for UNCLOS I.357 Regardless of the different opinions, there was evidently sufficient support 
for the concept of the contiguous zone in the practice of States for UNCLOS I to consider its 
adoption.358 Interestingly, Lowe also observed that there was no detailed discussion at the 
Conference of the juridical nature of the contiguous zone, and ‘the debates centred upon 
attempts to widen the list of interests which could be protected within it, and the relation 
between the width of the zone and the width of the territorial sea’.359 Article 24 of the TSC 
provided that: 
1. In a zone of the high seas contiguous to its territorial sea, the coastal State may exercise the 
control necessary to: 
(a) Prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary regulations within its 
territory or territorial sea; 
(b) Punish infringement of the above regulations committed within its territory or territorial 
sea. 
2. The contiguous zone may not extend beyond twelve miles from the baseline from which the 
breadth of the territorial sea is measured. 
3. Where the coasts of two States are opposite or adjacent to each other, neither of the two States is 
entitled, failing agreement between them to the contrary, to extend its contiguous zone beyond the 
median line every point of which is equidistant from the nearest points on the baselines from 
which the breadth of the territorial seas of the two States is measured. 
The text suggests that the intention of the Conference was to establish only the right of 
coastal States to enforcement jurisdiction. 360  If Article 24 ascribes only enforcement 
jurisdiction to the coastal State, it follows that enforcement action can only be taken ‘in 
respect of offences committed within the territory or territorial sea of a State, not in respect of 
anything done within the contiguous zone itself ’.361 In other words, if the coastal State could 
not legislate within the contiguous zone, it has no applicable legislation to enforce and thus 
‘the “crimes” in relation to which the powers of prevention and punishment are given to the 
coastal State must be committed within the territory or territorial sea of the coastal State’.362 
Churchill and Lowe observed that this seemed to be the intention of UNCLOS I. Any other 
interpretation would have suggested extending coastal jurisdiction in such a way that the 
freedom of the high seas would have been attenuated. During UNCLOS III two significant 
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changes were introduced to the new Article 33 of the LOSC; however, the list of purposes 
followed Article 24 of the TSC verbatim. Pursuant to Article 33 of the LOSC: 
1. In a zone contiguous to its territorial sea, described as the contiguous zone, the coastal State may 
exercise the control necessary to: 
(a) prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations 
within its territory or territorial sea; 
(b) punish infringement of the above laws and regulations committed within its territory or 
territorial sea. 
2. The contiguous zone may not extend beyond 24 nautical miles from the baselines from which 
the breadth of the territorial sea is measured.363 
The first significant difference between the Conventions, was that under the TSC the 
contiguous zone was ‘a zone of the high seas contiguous to [...] territorial sea’ but Article 33 
expresses it as ‘a zone contiguous to [...] territorial sea’. Thus if the coastal State has not 
declared an EEZ the contiguous zone is part of the high seas regime. If the coastal State has 
declared an EEZ, then the contiguous zone will become a part of the EEZ, and the legal 
regime associated with the EEZ will be applied instead of the regime of the high seas.364 In the 
Baltic Sea, all coastal States have claimed an EEZ, and so the regime of the EEZ is applica-
ble.365 A strict reading of Article 33 makes this distinction important because coastal State 
jurisdiction over the contiguous zone pertains only to the waters above the seabed. If the 
coastal State has declared an EEZ, the seabed will fall under the sui generis366 regime of the 
EEZ, rather than sharing the legal status of the continental shelf. This has now increased the 
difficulty of resolving the problem of the legal status of the contiguous zone.367 Furthermore, 
Article 33(1) contains no reference to the internal waters, but it is reasonable to consider that 
internal waters are included in the ambit of ‘territory’.368 
Another significant difference between the Articles was the omission of any provisions 
corresponding Article 24(3) of the TSC on the delimitation of the contiguous zone between 
adjacent States. A dispute arising out of conflicting claims by States whose coasts are opposite 
or adjacent to each other will be subject to the dispute settlement provisions of Part XV of the 
LOSC. Caflisch suggested that problems should be resolved, preferably, by analogy to Article 
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15 of the LOSC on the delimitation of the territorial sea.369 Somewhat by contrast a group of 
experts chaired by Satya N. Nandan noted that: 
There is no provision in the [LOSC] for the delimitation of contiguous zones. Such a zone cannot, 
by definition, be extended into the territorial sea of another [S]tate. Since the nature of control to 
be exercised in the contiguous zone does not create any sovereignty over the zone or its resources, it 
is possible for two [S]tates to exercise control over the same area if their zones should overlap, for 
the purpose of prevention of or punishment for infringement of their respective customs, fiscal, 
immigration or sanitary laws and regulations within their respective territories or territorial sea.370 
Even though the ratione materiae of the contiguous zone has not been changed by Article 
33 of the LOSC, it is apparent that the legal status of the coastal State jurisdiction over the 
contiguous zone is still not free from controversy. A restrictive interpretation of Article 33 
arrives at the same conclusion as the interpretation of Article 24 of the TSC: that ‘the coastal 
State has only enforcement jurisdiction in its contiguous zone and, consequently, action of the 
coastal State may only be taken concerning offences committed within the territory or 
territorial sea of the coastal State, not in respect of anything done within the contiguous zone 
itself ’.371 As a result the laws and regulations of the coastal State are not extended to its 
contiguous zone, which means that any infringement of municipal laws of the coastal State 
within the contiguous zone is outside the scope of this provision. According to a more liberal 
view supported by Judge Shigeru Oda and Professors O’Connell and Ivan Shearer, the coastal 
State could regulate the violation of its municipal law within the contiguous zone for some 
limited purposes.372 
The LOSC does not contain specific requirements for how notice is to be given of the 
establishment of a contiguous zone. Nevertheless, a contiguous zone is not automatically 
ascribed to coastal States, so a formal establishment declaration is needed.373 Nordquist 
suggests that a notice of some sort in most cases ‘will probably be performed through some 
legislative act, the publication and notification of which will be left to the State promulgating 
                                                
369 Lucius Caflisch, ‘The Delimitation of Marine Spaces Between States With Opposite or Adjacent Coasts’ in 
René-Jean Dupuy and Daniel Vignes (eds) A Handbook on the New Law of the Sea, Volume I (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers: Dordrecht, 1991), 425–499 at 442–445. 
370 Nordquist (et al.) (eds), UNCLOS: A Commentary, Vol. II, at 273–274, supra note 280 citing Commonwealth 
Expert Study Group on Maritime Issues, Ocean management, a regional perspective : the prospects for 
Commonwealth maritime co-operation in Asia and the Pacific. Report by a Commonwealth Group of Experts 
(Commonwealth Secretariat: London).  
371 Tanaka, The International Law of the Sea, at 122–123, supra note 214. This restrictive view was supported by 
Fitzmaurice, see further Fitzmaurice, ‘Some Results of the Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea’, at 113–115, 
supra note 345. 
372 See further Shigeru Oda, ‘The Concept of the Contiguous Zone’, 11 International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly, no. 1 (1962) 131–153 at 153. See also O’Connell, The International Law of the Sea Volume II, at 1060, 
supra note 14 and I. A. Shearer, ‘Problems of Jurisdiction and Law Enforcement Against Delinquent Vessels’, 35 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly, no. 2 (1986) 320–343 at 330. 
373 See e.g., Churchill and Lowe, The Law of the Sea, at 135, supra note 15 and Mariano J. Aznar, ‘The Contiguous 
Zone as an Archaeological Maritime Zone’, 29 International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law, (2014) 1–51 at 48. 
71 
 
such legislation’.374 It can be assumed, that a coastal State would always give due publicity to 
any claims or declarations regarding the contiguous zone. It seems that most, if not all, claims 
regarding the establishment of a contiguous zone have been published in the Law of the Sea 
Bulletin after some sort of formal proclamation.375 It is up to the coastal State to determine the 
matters outlined in Articles 33 and 303(2) (i.e. customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws) 
for which the contiguous zone will be established. For example, Section 3(1) of the Finnish 
Customs Act states that the customs territory of Finland extends two nautical miles beyond 
the outer limit of the territorial sea, unless otherwise agreed at international level.376 As a result, 
Finland does not have a contiguous zone proper, but nevertheless this claim has been 
internationally recognised and the national customs authorities can supervise adherence of 
domestic customs regulations as provided by the Customs Act. This also limits enforcement 
solely to customs matters. 
  Genesis of Marine Archaeology Within the Contiguous Zone 
Historically the contiguous zone, as a water column regime prior to the adoption of the 
LOSC, remained irrelevant to marine archaeology and shipwrecks because the seabed was 
subject to principles excluding coastal State sovereignty — and shipwrecks are always on, or 
embedded in, the seabed. Article 303(2) of the LOSC, regarding the protection of objects of 
an archaeological and historical nature, extends the rights that coastal States already enjoy 
within the contiguous zone by virtue of Article 33. Article 303(2) was based on a proposal put 
forward by the Greek delegation to UNCLOS III in 1979 — and later amended several times 
by Greece and supported by Cape Verde, Italy, Malta, Portugal, Tunisia and Yugoslavia —
which became known as the ‘seven-State proposal’. The first version of the proposal concerned 
the EEZ and the continental shelf respectively: 
(a) The coastal State exercises sovereign rights over any object of purely archaeological or historical 
nature on the seabed and subsoil of its exclusive economic zone [or] on or under its continental 
shelf for the purpose of research and salvaging. 
b)  However, regarding archaeological or historical objects originating from a State or country or 
from a State of cultural origin other than the coastal State, the State of the primary origin will 
have, in case of disposal, preferential rights.377 
This proposal was amended and revised several times by the seven States. Every revised 
proposal suggested that coastal States would exercise, in various forms, sovereign rights over 
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any object of purely archaeological or historical nature on the seabed and subsoil of their 
exclusive economic zones, or on or under their continental shelf for the purpose of research, 
protection, presentation and salvaging.378 In the final revision of the proposal, the term 
‘sovereign rights’ was changed to ‘jurisdiction’: 
The coastal State may exercise jurisdiction, while respecting the rights of identifiable owners, over 
any object of an archaeological and historical nature on or under its continental shelf for the 
purpose of research, recovery and protection. However, particular regard shall be paid to the 
preferential rights of the State or country of origin, or the State of cultural origin, or the State of 
historical and archaeological origin, in case of sale or any other disposal, resulting in the removal of 
such objects out of the coastal State.379 
However, this proposal received strong opposition, in particular from the Netherlands, the 
United Kingdom and the Unites States, and was not included in the next round of 
negotiations.380 The US delegation tried to dissociate the issue of archaeological objects from 
the natural resource regime and introduced the idea of a general duty to protect archaeological 
objects found at sea. The US’s proposal read: 
All States have the duty to protect objects of an archaeological and historical nature found in the 
marine environment. Particular regard shall be given to the State of origin, or the State of cultural 
origin, or the State of historical and archaeological origin of any objects of an archaeological and 
historical nature found in the marine environment in the case of sale or any other disposal, result-
ing in the removal of such objects from a State which has possession of such objects.381 
Strati observed that the seven-State proposal and later amendments were rejected because 
there was fear that ‘the extension over the continental shelf of a set of rights which bore no 
relation to natural resources would favour creeping jurisdiction and alter overtime [sic] the 
conceptual character of the regime applicable to this area’. 382  This would have been 
problematic, especially because the negotiations on the continental shelf and EEZ were already 
concluded. According to Oxman the proposals in question, 
were found objectionable on substantive grounds and because they would reopen negotiations on 
the substance of the economic zone and continental shelf regimes. Major maritime powers made 
clear that they could not accept a general extension to the continental shelf or economic zone of a 
set of coastal [S]tate rights that bore no relation to natural resources. They argued that over time it 
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could alter the conceptual character of the regimes applicable to those areas, a matter of particular 
importance in dealing properly with the question of allocating residual rights.383 
Nevertheless, there seemed to be no opposition to ‘some enforcement powers’ over the 
contiguous zone, as long as ‘they were narrowly circumscribed and did not constitute a 
precedent’.384 After it became clear that the acceptance of some powers existed, the problem 
then became how to expand the rights of the coastal State over the contiguous zone in such a 
way that the limited enforcement competence would not mount to legislative competence.385 
As a result UNCLOS III adopted a ‘presume the facts and leave the principle intact’ approach 
— a legal fiction.386 Pursuant to Article 303(2): 
In order to control traffic in such objects, the coastal State may, in applying article 33, presume 
that their removal from the seabed in the zone referred to in that article without its approval would 
result in an infringement within its territory or territorial sea of the laws and regulations referred to 
in that article.387 
According to Oxman this approach ‘avoids the procedural and substantive risks and 
complications of a doctrinal change and in a special situation achieves with efficiency a 
generally desired result’.388 
Strati suggests that the introduction of a 24-nautical-mile archaeological zone was neverthe-
less one of the main innovations of UNCLOS III, despite the limiting language of Article 
303(2) and its departure from the initial proposal of Greece and supporting States.389 In 
substance, she argues, far more extensive rights are recognised through ‘the combination of 
Article 303(1), which advocates the general duty to protect archaeological objects, and the 
fiction established by Article 303(2), allows the expansion of coastal legislation over the 24-
mile zone’. 390 Despite the critique received by Article 303(2), other prominent authors are also 
of the opinion that this provision has in fact created an archaeological zone and that the 
provisions of Article 303(2) in combination with Article 33 have been superseded by 
normative action and State practice.391 In contrast the more limited scope of Article 24 of the 
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TSC made the establishment of any archaeological zone not permissible due to the limited 
number of purposes for which the zone could be established.392 
  A Legal Fiction 
Due to the restricted scope of Article 33 of the LOSC, Article 303(2) relies on a dual fiction in 
order to avoid any express statement of expansion to coastal State jurisdiction beyond the 
territorial sea. First, Article 303(2) assumes that the removal of archaeological and historical 
objects is to be regarded as an infringement of customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws 
and regulations of the coastal State, which in practice have nothing to do with archaeological 
and historical objects. Second, it is assumed that the removal of archaeological and historical 
objects within the contiguous zone is to be considered as an act within the territory or the 
territorial sea of the coastal State. Nordquist explains this peculiar approach by reasoning that: 
Article 303, on archaeological and historical objects found at sea, uses the expression ‘in applying 
article 33’ with regard to the control of traffic in objects of an archaeological and historical charac-
ter found at sea. These words may appear ambiguous, but in light of the legislative history of 
article 303 probably do not require the coastal State to assert any rights of control under article 33 
for the purpose of exercising its rights under article 303 [...]. The implication is that the coastal 
State’s rights of control under article 33 exists independently of its rights under article 303, and 
that there is no interrelationship between the two articles.393 
Furthermore: 
[Article 303(2)], in creating a presumption juris et de jure, deliberately does not use the term 
‘contiguous zone’, which is the title of article 33. The duty and rights of the coastal State under 
article 303 are different in kind from those under article 33.394 
The use of this fiction as a means of expanding coastal jurisdiction over archaeological and 
historical objects found in the 24-nautical-mile zone is the reason for the interpretation 
problems surrounding its precise scope and nature.395 Article 303(2) empowers coastal States 
to treat the removal of such archaeological and historical objects from the seabed of the 
contiguous zone as if the objects were removed from the State’s territory or territorial sea. The 
coastal State would thus be able to exercise preventive or punitive control over the perpetrators 
in the contiguous zone. If a foreign ship has removed archaeological and historical objects 
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from the seabed or subsoil of the contiguous zone, the coastal States would also, it seems, 
enjoy a right of hot pursuit under Article 111(1) of the LOSC, However, this right of hot 
pursuit would only apply in the case that the contiguous zone in question has been proclaimed 
for the protection of such archaeological or historical objects.396
Strati suggested two different ways to interpret Article 303(2): a grammatical interpretation 
and a teleological interpretation. Under the grammatical interpretation, she argues ‘the coastal 
State would be granted enforcement jurisdiction to control the removal of archaeological 
objects from the contiguous zone’.397 Under the teleological interpretation, Article 303(2) 
establishes a 24-nautical-mile archaeological zone. However, the language ‘caters for both 
interpretations’, as Strati concluded.398 Nevertheless, most authors seem to accept that the 
coastal State can in fact establish an archaeological zone by virtue of Article 303(2). 
  Contiguous Zone as an Archaeological Zone 
In his 2014 seminal article Professor Mariano Aznar studied conventional and unilateral State 
practice regarding the expansion of coastal State rights over the contiguous zone during the last 
decades.399 Aznar tabulated the practice of over 120 States, among which 78 had declared 
archaeological rights over their contiguous zone, EEZ or continental shelf. Twenty-nine of 
these declaring States were among the 50 States with the longest coastline and the biggest 
EEZ.400 
Aznar’s conclusion was that State practice has changed the legal rules governing the coastal 
States’ archaeological rights over their contiguous zone. Aznar demonstrated how coastal States 
have gradually extended their rights over their contiguous zone conventionally and unilaterally 
in an attempt to protect underwater cultural heritage, with no clear objections from other 
States. In this way, the ambiguity of Article 303(2) of the LOSC has slowly introduced a new 
functional jurisdictional zone.401 Aznar’s view is that the following three factors have been 
critical to the rise of this zone. First, the influence of cold war paradigms: the issues of security 
concerns and access to resources superseded any archaeological preoccupations during 
UNCLOS III.402 Today archaeological concerns have changed due to technological advances 
and remote survey capabilities. Second, the emerging trend to protect underwater cultural 
heritage: this should be interpreted as application of the LOSC (especially Article 303(4)), 
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along with the CPUCH.403 Third, a lack of objections from other States: there have been no 
objections in the wake of coastal States declaring conventional and unilateral extensions of 
cultural heritage legislation over the contiguous zone.404 As Churchill and Lowe have generally 
observed, ‘[t]he claims to legislative jurisdiction in the contiguous zone do not appear to have 
evoked significant international opposition in practice’.405 This is especially the case with 
underwater cultural heritage: interests in cultural heritage can be assumed to be general, in the 
sense that the interests of other States are not affected in practice. In other words, the 
protection benefits everyone. Many sunken warships affect the interests of more than one 
State. Especially in the Baltic Sea, all coastal States can be assumed to share an interest in the 
protection of sunken warships, as they share the historical basis for that protection. Such 
shared interest is crucial, as the practicability of the contiguous zone and the extent of coastal 
State legislation over that zone will be dependent on reciprocity and recognition of the coastal 
States’ legislation and enforcement decisions. 
Furthermore, as Churchill and Lowe expressed, ‘[o]pposition to the extension of contigu-
ous zone rights to cover security interests should perhaps be seen as a reflection of the concern 
among maritime States that security zones represent a particular threat to the freedom of 
navigation. The extension of contiguous zone rights in other respects (as was done in relation 
to archaeological objects in [A]rticle 303 of the 1982 Convention) may prove to be more 
acceptable to the international community’.406 Based on current State practice and the absence 
of protests, it seems that they have. 
It can be debated whether State practice concerning the protection of underwater cultural 
heritage represents fragmentation, interpretation or amendment of the applicable rules. Aznar 
contends that there has been, 
a broader change of the rule through a customary process, departing from Art. 303(2) LOSC (and 
even earlier), through a conventional and unilateral practice — not easily or simply labelled as the 
‘subsequent practice’ envisaged in Art. 31(3)(b) [of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties] 
— and the crystallisation of a new rule with the adoption of Art. 8 of the UNESCO Convention. 
It is not, hence, a mere new understanding of the meaning of the LOSC terms, but an intention to 
create a new legal regime governing coastal States’ archaeological rights in their contiguous zone, 
adding to the original, limited and controversial enforcement rights more extensive legislative 
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rights over all and any activities directed to underwater cultural heritage located in that maritime 
zone. This, as we have just seen, has historical, contextual and material reasons.407 
  Analysis 
The law of the sea has been constantly evolving since its inception: the development of new 
rules and constantly developing State practice is nothing new. Just as the 1958 Geneva 
Conventions were superseded by subsequent practice and codification, the LOSC is not 
immutable. 408  Time moves on, and circumstances and the legislative environment are 
constantly changing. As Lowe points out: 
Treaty texts will always have lacunae, and possibilities of different legal analyses, and uncertainties 
concerning the legal characterization of factual circumstances. That is inherent in the nature of the 
relationship between language and the physical reality to which it is applied. All that can reasona-
bly be asked is that the main areas of anticipated uncertainty in respect of which agreement upon 
precise legal stipulations is possible should be addressed. Unanticipated problems, by definition, 
cannot be addressed in advance, except by creating dispute settlement processes which give to 
specified institutions the power to resolve such disputes with authoritative, binding effect.409 
While Aznar admits that State practice is not uniform, his research demonstrates that there 
is a ‘general and constant practice in favour of the existence of a crystallised customary rule 
recognizing, as a matter of law, legislative and enforcement rights in favour of coastal States for 
the protection of underwater cultural heritage in the contiguous zone’.410 After the adoption of 
the LOSC, the rights and duties that coastal States enjoy over the contiguous zone have been 
elaborated on and clarified to some extent in the CPUCH. However, in the Baltic Sea, only 
Lithuania has ratified the CPUCH, and only Estonia is in the process of ratification. The 
practicability of the contiguous zone and the extent of coastal State legislation over that zone 
will be solely dependent on reciprocity and recognition of the coastal States’ legislation and 
enforcement decisions. 
If State practice and the concept of an archaeological zone as demonstrated by Aznar is 
accepted, the contiguous zone can — in its developed form as an archaeological zone — make 
significant contributions to the level of protection coastal States can assert in the Gulf of 
Finland. From an administrative point of view however, problems can arise since the LOSC 
does not provide any regulatory framework that coastal States could apply. Thus, any rules that 
coastal States would eventually wish to apply and enforce within the 24-nautical-mile zone, 
depend solely on the authorities of the coastal State and its domestic legislation. The lack of 
any internationally accepted definition for objects of ‘archaeological and historical’ nature 
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means it is up to the coastal States to determine what such an object is. If the domestic 
definition were to include shipwrecks from the World Wars, they can be protected as objects of 
archaeological and historical nature in the contiguous zone. Due to the opposite and adjacent 
coasts of Finland, Estonia and Russia, which limit each other in the Gulf of Finland, the 
adoption of an archaeological zone would cover the whole Gulf beyond the territorial seas of 
the respective States. Each coastal State would have the means to control activities in the 
contiguous zone. However, in the absence of any applicable cooperative framework the current 
situation remains unresolved. 
In the case that the contiguous zone shares the legal status of the EEZ, it is suggested that 
Article 59 of the LOSC would apply should any conflict of interest arise between two States.411 
Pursuant to Article 59, in cases where a dispute arises concerning a claim by a coastal State to 
jurisdictional rights not expressly granted under the Convention, the question should be 
resolved ‘on the basis of equity’ and ‘taking into account the respective importance of the 
interests’ of the parties concerned and the international community as a whole. The 
implication of Article 59 are reviewed and analysed in the chapter on the EEZ. Churchill and 
Lowe do not attempt to presume the effects of the contiguous zone being under the regime of 
the EEZ, but note that ‘it is likely to make the extension of contiguous zone rights ratione 
materiae, and the inclusion of both enforcement and legislative jurisdiction, more easy to 
defend than formerly’.412 
  The High Seas and ‘International Waters’ 
The first attempt to codify the law regarding the high seas took place under the auspices of the 
League of Nations in 1930 to no avail. In 1958 UNCLOS I adopted the Convention on the 
High Seas (HSC) as a declaration of established principles of international law. Pursuant to 
Article 1 of the HSC, the term ‘high seas’ refers to all parts of the sea that are not included in 
the territorial sea or internal waters of a State. However, this has changed since the 
introduction of new functional maritime zones, namely the EEZ and the Area (i.e. the 
international seabed area).413 The LOSC does not provide any definition for the high seas, and 
only states in Article 86 of Part VII414 titled ‘High Seas’ that:  
                                                
411 Ibid., at 41. 
412 Churchill and Lowe, The Law of the Sea, at 139, supra note 15. 
413 Regarding the concept of the high seas in general, see ibid., at 203–222. Regarding jurisdiction on the high 
seas, see O’Connell, The International Law of the Sea Volume II, at 792–830, supra note 14. For an examination of 
the high seas freedoms in modern law of the sea, see Anderson, Modern Law of the Sea, at 229–249, supra note 
168. Regarding the high seas and UCH, see Strati, UCH: An Emerging Objective, at 215–230, supra note 19. 
414 For an introduction to Part VII, see Myron H. Nordquist (et al.) (eds), United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Sea 1982: A Commentary, Volume III (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers: Dordrecht, 1995) at 27–43. 
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The provisions of this Part apply to all parts of the sea that are not included in the exclusive 
economic zone, in the territorial sea or in the internal waters of a State, or in the archipelagic 
waters of an archipelagic State.415 
Consequently the high seas refer only to the water column and the surface of the maritime 
zone that start at the outer limits of the EEZ — assuming that an EEZ has been declared. On 
the high seas the seabed forms part of the Area pursuant to Part XI of the LOSC. Sometimes 
the term ‘international waters’ is used instead of ‘high seas’ to describe areas beyond the 
territorial jurisdiction of any State. However, this term can be misleading and it should not be 
confused with other zones beyond the sovereignty of the coastal State — where the traditional 
high sea freedoms do not apply without restrictions and the coastal State has functional 
jurisdiction — such as on the EEZ. Thus, Article 86 must be read together with Article 58 on 
the rights and duties of other States in the EEZ. One of the major difficulties during 
UNCLOS III was the relationship between the EEZ and the high seas.416 The conclusion of 
the Conference was that due to the sui generis nature of the EEZ, the LOSC should not 
attempt to define the high seas but instead indicate the ratione loci of the provisions relating to 
the high seas.417 
Pursuant to Article 87418 of the LOSC the high seas are open to all States, whether coastal 
or landlocked. The freedom of the high seas is comprised of, inter alia:  
(a) freedom of navigation;  
(b) freedom of overflight; 
(c) freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines, subject to Part VI of the LOSC; 
(d) freedom to construct artificial islands and other installations permitted under international law;  
(e) freedom of fishing, subject to the conditions laid down in Section 2 (of Part VII, regarding 
conservation and management of the living resources of the high seas); and 
(f) freedom of scientific research, subject to Parts VI and XIII of the LOSC.  
These freedoms are to be exercised with due regard for the interests of other States in their 
exercise of the freedom of the high seas, and also with due regard for the rights under the 
LOSC with respect to activities in the Area outlined in Part XI. The high seas shall be reserved 
for peaceful purposes and no State may validly purport to subject any part of the high seas to 
its sovereignty. As the Baltic Sea has no high seas, they will not be covered any further in this 
paper. 
  The Area and International Seabed 
The ‘Area’419, sometimes also the ‘international seabed area’, refers pursuant to Article 1(1.1) of 
the LOSC to the seabed, ocean floor and subsoil beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. All 
                                                
415 For a commentary and history of Article 86, see ibid., at 59–71. 
416 Ibid., at 32. 
417 Ibid. 
418 For a commentary and history of Article 87, see ibid., at 72–86. 
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of the freedoms of the high seas apply in the Area. Article 136 of the LOSC recognises the 
Area and its resources as a part of the common heritage of mankind,420 and Article 137(1) 
states that sovereign rights may not be claimed over any part of the Area or its resources.421 
The framework of the Area is applicable to the seabed beyond the outer limits of the 
continental shelf of coastal States (pursuant to Article 76 of the LOSC), and of archipelagic 
States (pursuant to Article 47 of the LOSC). The regime of the Area is mainly concerned with 
mineral recovery from the deep seabed beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.  
As the Baltic Sea has no Area or international seabed that would be a part of the common 
heritage of mankind, the subject will not be covered any further in this paper. However, the 
Area deserves to be covered in brief due to its impact on the negotiations at UNCLOS III and 
on the regime adopted in the LOSC.422 
  Part XI and the 1994 Implementation Agreement 
The regime of the Area is placed under Part XI of the LOSC and should be read together with 
the 1994 Implementation Agreement.423 Part XI is the largest part of the LOSC and was the 
hardest to negotiate.424 Many industrialised States, including big maritime powers such as the 
United States, United Kingdom and Germany, were dissatisfied with Part XI and the original 
deep sea mining regime while being open to the rest of the Convention.425 While many States 
ratified the LOSC within the first decade of its adoption, they consisted almost exclusively of 
                                                                                                      
419 When reading the English version of the LOSC the usage of the word ‘Area’ with an uppercase ‘A’ should 
always be distinguished from the use of the word ‘area’ with a lowercase ‘a’, which is always used in its dictionary 
sense. See Nordquist (et al.) (eds), UNCLOS: A Commentary, Vol. II, at 40, supra note 280. 
420 For a detailed discussion regarding the concept of the ‘common heritage of mankind’, see Carl Q. Christol, 
‘The Common Heritage of Mankind Provision in the 1979 Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the 
Moon and Other Celestial Bodies’, 14 International Lawyer, no. 3 (1980) 403–483. For a commentary of Article 
136, see Myron H. Nordquist (et al.) (eds), United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982: A Commentary, 
Volume VI (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers: Dordrecht, 2002) at 95–100. 
421 For a commentary and history of Article 137, see Nordquist (et al.) (eds), UNCLOS: A Commentary, Vol. VI, at 
101–111, supra note 420. 
422 For history and background, see generally Churchill and Lowe, The Law of the Sea, at 223–254, supra note 14. 
Regarding the treatment of UCH in the Area, see generally Boesten, Valuable Shipwrecks in International Waters, 
at 50–55, supra note 20; Strati, UCH: An Emerging Objective, at 295–315, supra note 19 and Anastasia Strati, 
‘Deep Seabed Cultural Property and the Common Heritage of Mankind’, 40 International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly, no. 4 (1991) 859–894. 
423 See Agreement relating to the implementation of Part XI of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea of 10 December 1982, 9 June 1994, 1836 UNTS 3; 33 ILM 1311. In accordance with Article 2 of the 1994 
Implementation Agreement, the Agreement and Part XI ‘shall be interpreted and applied together as a single 
instrument’ and in the event of any inconsistency between the Agreement and Part XI, the provisions of the 
Agreement shall prevail. The 1994 Implementation Agreement has 147 State parties, see supra note 140. For a 
comprehensive introduction to Part XI, see Nordquist (et al.) (eds), UNCLOS: A Commentary, Vol. VI, at 3–68, 
supra note 420. 
424 Nordquist (et al.) (eds), UNCLOS: A Commentary, Vol. VI, at 3, supra note 420. 
425 Ibid., at 3–4. Churchill and Lowe, The Law of the Sea, at 236–238, supra note 15 and Anderson, Modern Law 
of the Sea, at 15, supra note 168. 
81 
 
members of the ‘Group of 77’, the coalition of developing States of the UN.426 The original 
Part XI regime prevented many industrialised States from becoming parties to the LOSC until 
the adoption of the 1994 Implementation Agreement. This Agreement removed the most 
controversial elements, such as the compulsory transfer of technology and subsidisation of the 
activities of the Enterprise, the organ of the International Seabed Authority which carries out 
activities in the Area.427 
  Manganese Nodules 
Until the 20th century, the deep ocean floor received very little legal attention due to its 
inaccessibility. In 1872 the HMS Challenger set sail on a five-year oceanographic expedition, 
which, has been considered to be one of the most important stages in the development of 
ocean science and marine scientific research.428 No previous expedition had been devoted 
solely to scientific research, and the effort put into and the amount of data generated by the 
expedition exceeded by far what had been done before.429 Our understanding of the sea has 
developed enormously since the Challenger expedition, but the legacy of this nearly 150-year-
old voyage is still affecting the use of the seas in multiple ways. One of these lingering legacies 
stems from the discovery of manganese nodules, also called polymetallic nodules. 
On 7 March 1873 the ship’s dredge hauled up on its deck something the crew described as 
‘peculiar black oval bodies which were composed of almost pure manganese oxide’.430 While 
the chemical composition of these nodules varies, the most valuable chemical elements are 
nickel, copper, and cobalt.431 Manganese nodules attracted attention from around the globe 
over 80 years later, during the 1957–1958 International Geophysical Year, and especially in 
1965 when mining engineer John Mero published a book regarding the economic possibilities 
of mining manganese nodules, with the prediction that it should become a sound business in 
the future.432 Soon it was widely recognised that commercial seabed mining would benefit only 
a handful of developed States, and partly endanger trade of the minerals by land-based 
                                                
426 The Group of 77 included around 120 States during UNCLOS III and today consists of 134 members, see 
<www.g77.org/doc/members.html>. Regarding G77 and their influence on Part XI, see especially Churchill and 
Lowe, The Law of the Sea, at 227–229, supra note 15. 
427 Nordquist (et al.) (eds), UNCLOS: A Commentary, Vol. VI, at 4, supra note 420. The Enterprise is the organ of the 
International Seabed Authority which shall carry out activities in the Area. See further Annex IV of the LOSC. 
428 A. L. Rice, ‘The Challenger Expedition - the end of an era or a new beginning?’ in Margaret Deacon, Tony 
Rice, and Colin P. Summerhayes (eds) Understanding the Oceans: A Century of Ocean Exploration (reprinted 1st 
edn, Routledge: Abingdon, 2003), 27–48 at 27. 
429 Ibid. 
430 See the International Seabed Authority, Deep Sea Mineral Resources: Polymetallic Nodules, at 
<www.isa.org.jm/deep-sea-mineral-resources-polymetallic-nodules>. 
431 See the brochure of the International Seabed Authority, Polymetallic Nodules. Available at 
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exporters (many of which were developing States).433 The issue was debated in the UN General 
Assembly during the following years.434 
With regards to sunken warships, manganese nodules played a major role in ‘Project 
Azorian’,435 which was an attempt by the CIA (United States Central Intelligence Agency) to 
recover a sunken Soviet submarine — the K-129 — lost on the high seas in 1968.436 For this 
specific purpose the CIA built a deep-sea drillship platform called the USNS Hughes Glomar 
Explorer and used extraction of manganese nodules as a cover story for the vessel. As Ronzitti 
points out, some commentators have argued that the level of secrecy adopted for the operation 
shows that the US was of the opinion that it could not recover the vessel without Soviet 
consent.437 
  Article 149: Archaeological and Historical Objects 
Article 149 of the LOSC is concerned with ‘archaeological and historical objects’ found in the 
Area.438 Article 149 provides that: 
All objects of an archaeological and historical nature found in the Area shall be preserved or 
disposed of for the benefit of mankind as a whole, particular regard being paid to the preferential 
rights of the State or country of origin, or the State of cultural origin, or the State of historical and 
archaeological origin. 
Article 149 has received critique due to its ambiguity and alleged lack of significance.439 
One of the biggest issues is the absence of an international body to implement the Article 
because the International Seabed Authority (ISA) does not have any jurisdictional powers over 
UCH. The ISA’s jurisdiction in the Area is limited by Articles 1(3) and 133(b) of the LOSC, 
and extends only to activities related to the exploration and exploitation of mineral resources. 
                                         
433 Churchill and Lowe, The Law of the Sea, at 223–224 and 227–229, supra note 15. 
434 See UNGA, Declaration of Principles Governing the Seabed and the Ocean Floor, and the Subsoil Thereof, 
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As objects of ‘archaeological and historical nature’ do not fall under the scope of ISA, the 
implementation of Article 149 seems to have been left solely to the State parties.440 
Other issues concern the lack of specifications for how this heritage — these ‘objects’ — 
shall be ‘preserved or disposed of for the benefit of mankind’, and who is responsible for these 
actions. Moreover, there is no obligation to report accidental discoveries of UCH, nor any 
establishment of preferred rights for the three State interest groups that are acknowledged. In 
the end the Article leaves it entirely open as to how mankind should benefit from these 
objects. As far as the author is aware, Article 149 has only been invoked once — by Peru 
during the case concerning the Spanish warship Nuestra Señora de las Mercedes sunk in 1804. 
Peru’s claims were rejected on the grounds that, first, Peru was not a party to the LOSC and, 
second, that the wreck was found in the EEZ of Portugal.441 
  Continental Shelf 
In the law of the sea, and within the framework of the LOSC, the regime of the continental 
shelf ultimately concerns the natural resources of the ocean floor and seabed. The term 
‘continental shelf’, however, embodies two different definitions.442 The first is geological, and 
the second is judicial. From a geological perspective, the continental shelf is merely a 
submerged prolongation of the land territory which refers to ‘that part of the continental 
margin which is between the shoreline and the shelf break or, where there is no noticeable 
slope, between the shoreline and the point where the depth of the superjacent water is 
approximately between 100 and 200 meters’.443 From a judicial perspective, coastal States have 
a continental shelf up to a distance of 200 nautical miles, unless limited by opposite or 
adjacent coasts. Thus the coastal State will always have a judicial continental shelf, regardless of 
the geological features of the seabed, by virtue of Article 76(1) of the LOSC: 
The continental shelf of a coastal State comprises the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas 
that extend beyond its territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to 
the outer edge of the continental margin, or to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the baselines 
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from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured where the outer edge of the continental 
margin does not extend up to that distance.444 
 
Continental margin as defined in Article 76 of the LOSC from Baselines: An Examination of the Relevant Provisions of the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (United Nations: New York, 1989). 
The regime of the continental shelf is placed under Part VI of the LOSC. Pursuant to 
Article 76 of the LOSC, a coastal State may establish the outer limits of its continental shelf 
wherever the continental margin extends beyond 200 nautical miles. The foot of the 
continental slope can only be established by meeting the requirements of Article 76(4)–76(7). 
The final limits of the continental shelf will be established on the final and binding 
recommendation of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS). 
There are now two distinct legal bases for coastal State rights to the seabed beyond 
territorial sovereignty. The first is that of the continental shelf, and the second is that of the 
EEZ.445 If a coastal State has not declared an EEZ, the waters above the continental shelf are 
part of the high seas. If a coastal State has established an EEZ, the continental shelf becomes 
the seabed part of the EEZ.446 In the Baltic Sea, coastal States cannot extend their continental 
shelf as the whole seabed is part of the continental shelf proper and is limited by opposite and 
adjacent States. Furthermore, all coastal States in the Baltic region have declared an EEZ.447 
Thus, the continental shelf and EEZ of every coastal State overlap to the present established 
maximum distance.  
Rights of the Coastal State Over the Continental Shelf
The first clear assertion of title over natural resources on the continental shelf was made in 
1945 by President Truman in his two proclamations regarding the natural resources on the 
                                                
444 For a commentary of Article 76, see ibid., at 837–890. 
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seabed and high seas fisheries.448 The proclamation regarding the continental shelf stated that 
the exercise of jurisdiction over the natural resources of the subsoil and seabed of the 
continental shelf by the contiguous nation was reasonable and just. This was not a claim to 
ownership of the seabed itself, but related only to the rights to harvest and exploit the 
resources of specific areas on the high seas.449 Since the water column above the continental 
shelf would still keep its character as high seas, the right of free and unimpeded navigation 
would not be affected.  
In the following years, more and more States laid claims over their continental shelves. By 
the time of UNCLOS I at least a certain amount of right over the continental shelf was already 
recognised and generally accepted.450 
The rights that coastal States enjoy over the continental shelf were first formally recognised 
in the Convention on the Continental Shelf (CSC). Article 2(1) of the CSC expressed that 
coastal States enjoyed sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting natural 
resources of the continental shelf. Natural resources are defined in Article 2(4) of the CSC and 
include the mineral and other non-living resources of the seabed and subsoil together with 
living organisms belonging to sedentary species. The rights expressed in the CSC over the 
continental shelf were firmly established by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 1969 
when the Court stated in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases that:  
The rights of the coastal State in respect of the area of continental shelf that constitutes a natural 
prolongation of its land territory into and under the sea exist ipso facto and ab initio, by virtue of its 
sovereignty over the land, and as an extension of it in an exercise of sovereign rights for the purpose 
of exploring the seabed and exploiting its natural resources. In short, there is here an inherent 
right. In order to exercise it, no special legal process has to be gone through, nor have any special 
legal acts to be performed. Its existence can be declared (and many States have done this) but does 
not need to be constituted. Furthermore, the right does not depend on its being exercised. To echo 
the language of the Geneva Convention [on the Continental Shelf], it is ‘exclusive’ in the sense 
that if the coastal State does not choose to explore or exploit the areas of shelf appertaining to it, 
that is its own affair, but no one else may do so without its express consent.451 
Within the LOSC, the rights of States over the continental shelf are outlined in Article 77. 
The term ‘natural resources’, which appears in different contexts depending on the maritime 
zone in question, is not defined further.452 Pursuant to Article 77: 
1. The coastal State exercises over the continental shelf sovereign rights for the purpose of explor-
ing it and exploiting its natural resources. 
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2. The rights referred to in paragraph 1 are exclusive in the sense that if the coastal State does not 
explore the continental shelf or exploit its natural resources, no one may undertake these activities 
without the express consent of the coastal State. 
3. The rights of the coastal State over the continental shelf do not depend on occupation, effective 
or notional, or on any express proclamation. 
4. The natural resources referred to in this Part consist of the mineral and other non-living re-
sources of the seabed and subsoil together with living organisms belonging to sedentary species, 
that is to say, organisms which, at the harvestable stage, either are immobile on or under the seabed 
or are unable to move except in constant physical contact with the seabed or the subsoil.453 
While some coastal States have enacted legislation that protects shipwrecks and UCH on 
the continental shelf, it is commonly accepted that natural resources do not include 
shipwrecks, UCH or related cargo. This was expressed already in 1956 by the International 
Law Commission (ILC) in the Commission’s comments on the draft for UNCLOS I. It was 
stated that: ‘[i]t is clearly understood that the rights in question do not cover objects such as 
wrecked ships and their cargoes (including bullion) lying on the seabed or covered by the sand 
of the subsoil’. 454  Regardless of this, a growing number of States have extended their 
jurisdiction over archaeological objects beyond the territorial sea to the continental shelf.455 
Since the continental shelf doctrine is superseded in the Baltic Sea by the EEZ, the relevant 
issues will be dealt with below within the framework of the EEZ. 
  Analysis 
In the Baltic Sea, the continental shelf doctrine plays an insignificant role, since all coastal 
States have established an EEZ. Some authors have argued that one simple way to control 
activities on shipwrecks on the continental shelf is to regulate the disturbance of the seabed. 
O’Connell has argued that ‘a wreck site embedded in coral could be immunized by the 
expedient of forbidding interference with the coral, which is a “natural resource” of the 
continental shelf’.456 While this argument can be accepted, its applicability in the Baltic is 
severely limited: shipwrecks covered by anything other than barnacles, or located in such a way 
that interference with them could constitute a disturbance of the seabed, are nowhere to be 
found. Most of the wrecks found in the Baltic are well preserved, sometimes completely intact 
and sitting more or less upright on the seabed. Thus the removal of objects would not disturb 
the seabed, since the objects are not embedded at all. 
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Exclusive Economic Zone
The exclusive economic zone extends up to 200 nautical miles from baselines, and within it 
coastal States enjoy sovereign rights for the purposes of exploring and exploiting, conserving 
and managing living and non-living natural resources. Within the EEZ, the freedom of the 
high seas, including the high sea fisheries, has ceased to exist in its traditional form.457 
The EEZ is a zone of recent origin, though it developed out of the doctrine of the conti-
nental shelf and the resource-related rights that coastal States enjoyed beyond the territorial 
sea.458 According to Professor Barbara Kwiatkowska, the phenomenon of post-World War II 
claims over the seabed and creeping jurisdiction ‘culminated in the concept of the 200 mile 
EEZ which combined the pre-existing rights of the coastal [S]tate over the sea-bed resources 
with those over living resources of the superjacent waters under one category of sovereign 
rights over all natural resources’.459 The juxtaposition of rights on the continental shelf and on 
the EEZ has been considered ‘a remarkable novelty’ in international law and ‘a significant 
departure’ from the continental shelf doctrine.460  
Because the continental shelf regime already granted exclusive rights over the resources on 
the seabed, some States preferred to claim a 200-nautical-mile exclusive fishing zone (EFZ) 
instead of an EEZ.461 According to Churchill and Lowe, the EEZ became ‘a reflection of the 
aspiration of the developing countries for economic development and their desire to gain 
greater control over the economic resources off their coasts, particularly fish stocks, which in 
many cases were largely exploited by the distant-water fleets of developed States’.462 As a result, 
many States saw the EEZ during UNCLOS III as a compromise to the contemporary 
exclusive fishing zone, territorial sea and epicontinental sea claims up 200 nautical miles.463 A 
vast majority of the States that have claimed an EEZ did so before the LOSC was adopted, 
with ‘an almost complete absence of protests’.464 This led most scholars to conclude that the 
concept of an EEZ was already customary international law before it was codified in the 
LOSC.465 In 1985, nine years before the LOSC came into force, the ICJ concluded in the 
Libya/Malta Continental Shelf case, that: 
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It is in the Court’s view incontestable that [...] the institution of the exclusive economic zone, with 
its rule on entitlement by reason of distance, is shown by the practice of States to have become a 
part of customary law.466 
The socio-economic importance of the EEZ has been enormous. As Churchill and Lowe 
observed, ‘[t]he universal establishment of 200 mile EEZs would embrace about thirty-six per 
cent of the total area of the sea. Although this is a relatively small proportion, the area falling 
within 200 mile limits contains over ninety per cent of all presently commercially exploitable 
fish stocks, about eighty-seven per cent of the world’s known submarine oil deposits, and 
about ten per cent of manganese nodules’.467 The acceptance of the EEZ also meant a move 
away from open access to many resources and regulations based on flag State jurisdiction, to 
almost exclusive coastal State access and jurisdiction to these resources.468 
  Rights and Duties 
Article 55 of the LOSC469 states that the EEZ is an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial 
sea, subject to the specific legal regime established in Part V of the LOSC,470 under which the 
rights and jurisdiction of the coastal State and the rights and freedoms of other States are 
governed. The rights, jurisdiction and duties that coastal States enjoy in the EEZ are expressed 
in Article 56: 
1. In the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State has: 
(a) sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the 
natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the waters superjacent to the seabed and 
of the seabed and its subsoil, and with regard to other activities for the economic exploita-
tion and exploration of the zone, such as the production of energy from the water, currents 
and winds; 
(b) jurisdiction as provided for in the relevant provisions of this Convention with regard to: 
(i) the establishment and use of artificial islands, installations and structures; 
(ii) marine scientific research; 
(iii) the protection and preservation of the marine environment; 
(c) other rights and duties provided for in this Convention. 
2. In exercising its rights and performing its duties under this Convention in the exclusive econom-
ic zone, the coastal State shall have due regard to the rights and duties of other States and shall act 
in a manner compatible with the provisions of this Convention. 
3. The rights set out in this article with respect to the seabed and subsoil shall be exercised in 
accordance with Part VI.471 
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The rights of other States are expressed in Article 58: 
1. In the exclusive economic zone, all States, whether coastal or land-locked, enjoy, subject to the 
relevant provisions of this Convention, the freedoms referred to in article 87 of navigation and 
overflight and of the laying of submarine cables and pipelines, and other internationally lawful uses 
of the sea related to these freedoms, such as those associated with the operation of ships, aircraft 
and submarine cables and pipelines, and compatible with the other provisions of this Convention. 
2. Articles 88 to 115 and other pertinent rules of international law apply to the exclusive economic 
zone in so far as they are not incompatible with this Part. 
3. In exercising their rights and performing their duties under this Convention in the exclusive 
economic zone, States shall have due regard to the rights and duties of the coastal State and shall 
comply with the laws and regulations adopted by the coastal State in accordance with the provi-
sions of this Convention and other rules of international law in so far as they are not incompatible 
with this Part.472 
Departing from the traditional high seas regime of the HSC, fishing has now come within 
the jurisdiction of the coastal State inside the EEZ. While other high sea freedoms have 
persisted in the EEZ, they are subject to a greater degree of limitations than on the high 
seas.473 As it is clear from the wording of Articles 56 and 58, the LOSC contains no provisions 
to attribute any jurisdictional rights to coastal States with regards to shipwrecks or archaeologi-
cal and historical objects found within the EEZ. Thus the LOSC leaves open the question of 
whether coastal States can prescribe and enforce legislation that would protect shipwrecks and 
sunken warships on the EEZ. 
  Legal Nature 
While there seems to be a strong presumption of the search, study and recovery of shipwrecks 
as a high seas freedom, the situation is significantly different within the EEZ, which does not 
form a part of the high seas.474 Thus, the EEZ has been described as a sui generis zone — it is 
neither part of the high seas nor does it fall under the full sovereignty of coastal States. 
Professor René-Jean Dupuy summed up this twofold premise and its importance: 
[T]here had been uncertainty and disagreement on the question [of] whether or not the economic 
zone remained part of the high seas. That question is of essential importance at a practical level: it 
affects the scope of the rights of the coastal State and the rights of third States. If the answer given 
is affirmative, the result is that the rights and competences of coastal States are what the French 
jurists specializing in public law call ‘competences of attribution’. This means that since the zone is 
a subdivision of the high seas, therefore where the legal texts are mute,475 freedoms are presumed to 
exist and the rights and competences of the coastal State should be regarded as exceptions to this 
principle. As is well known, every exception must be interpreted strictly. 
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Conversely, if one analyses the economic zone not as part of the high seas but as a new type of 
‘zone of national jurisdiction’, this leads to regarding the rights and competences of the coastal 
State as the principle, while the freedoms of navigation, overflight, cable-laying and pipeline-laying 
must be interpreted as remnants, in the zone, of the former régime of freedom of the high seas, and 
consequently as exceptions to the principle of the coastal State’s primacy.476 
The LOSC offers arguments in favour of both a high seas and a sui generis status of the 
EEZ, as Kwiatkowska has demonstrated.477 According to Churchill and Lowe the fear of 
creeping jurisdiction during UNCLOS III made many maritime States argue that the EEZ 
should have a residual high seas character, ‘i.e., any activity not falling within the clearly 
defined rights of the coastal State would be subject to the regime of the high seas’.478 However, 
this sentiment did not find its way to the final Convention, and Articles 55 and 86 of the 
LOSC clearly state that the EEZ does not have a residual high seas character. However, it does 
not have a residual territorial sea character either. Thus, there is no presumption in favour of 
either the coastal State or other States in the case that an activity is not covered by Article 56 
or 58 of the LOSC. It is easy to agree with Judge Oda, who wrote that ‘[t]he EEZ is a sui 
generis regime, and the argument as to whether it still remains a part of the high seas seems to 
be purely academic’.479 Oxman is of similar opinion, and considered the issue as, 
the classic dilemma of describing the glass as half-full or half-empty, thereby arguably implying the 
direction of movement. The advocates of the view that the economic zone is sui generis did not 
deny the application of some high seas principles and rules to the zone; the high seas advocates did 
not deny the application of some non-high seas principles to the zone. In large measure, the two 
groups could agree on the result, but not on the theory.480 
Whereas the provisions of the LOSC have covered most of the more obvious uses of the 
EEZ, there are uses which do not fall within the rights or jurisdiction of either coastal or other 
States.481 The LOSC contains no specific provisions for shipwrecks or UCH located on the 
continental shelf or EEZ beyond the 24-nautical-mile contiguous zone — all proposals for 
such recognition were rejected during UNCLOS III. As Dromgoole explains, ‘[t]he basic 
international legal regime governing the search for, and recovery of, shipwrecks and other 
UCH beyond the twenty-four miles is therefore dependent on the fundamental juridical (in 
other words, legal) nature of these zones’.482 Uses that fall under the category of ‘residual’ or 
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‘unattributed’ rights, leave open the question of which State has the competence to regulate 
activities on shipwrecks on the EEZ.483 Such activities can include the protection of, the search 
for, and the recovery of shipwrecks.484  
  Unattributed Rights and Jurisdiction 
In the case of an unattributed right, there are no presumptions in favour of either coastal States 
or other States. Thus each case would ‘be decided on its own merits on the basis of the criteria 
set out in [A]rticle 59’ of the LOSC.485 The LOSC does not provide any solution to 
unattributed rights except under Article 59, which concerns resolution for conflicts on matters 
not specifically attributed to coastal States or other States. Strati points out that the reciprocal 
‘due regard rule’ of Articles 56(2) and 58(3) is only applicable to rights and duties governed by 
the LOSC, while Article 59 deals with the attribution of residual rights:486 
In cases where this Convention does not attribute rights or jurisdiction to the coastal State or to 
other States within the exclusive economic zone, and a conflict arises between the interests of the 
coastal State and any other State or States, the conflict should be resolved on the basis of equity 
and in the light of all the relevant circumstances, taking into account the respective importance of 
the interests involved to the parties as well as to the international community as a whole.487 
Since Article 59 does not refer to any procedure for solving disputes concerning residual 
rights, it has been suggested that the first step is to attempt settlement by consensual means. If 
this turns out to be unsuccessful, the matter becomes subject to the dispute settlement 
procedures of Part XV.488 
While Article 59 has been described as being ‘elusive’ and ‘one of the most ambiguous 
provisions’489 of the whole Convention, it has several important implications.490 First, it 
acknowledges ‘the existence of rights or jurisdiction in the EEZ attributed by the Convention 
to neither coastal State nor other States’.491 Second, it reinforces the sui generis nature of the 
EEZ. As the original sponsor of Article 59 Ambassador Jorge Castañeda explains, the question 
of unattributed rights of States within the EEZ, 
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would not arise had the zone been characterized, either as a territorial sea or as high seas, since in 
one case or the other the coastal State or the third State would have been respectively favoured 
according to whether the zone had been identified as one or the other. Precisely, because the zone 
was defined as a sui generis zone, which was neither territorial sea nor high seas, it was indispensa-
ble to rely on some guideline or criterion to settle disputes that might arise out of concurrent uses 
of the sea within the exclusive economic zone, that is by the presence of competitive rights between 
the coastal State and the other States.492 
According to the President of UNCLOS III, Tommy Koh: 
The compromise was not to say that the residual rights and jurisdictions belong either to the 
international community or the coastal States. What we did say in Article 59 is that each case has 
to be judged on its merits on a basis of equity and taking into account all the circumstances of each 
case. That is the compromise. Again, I would say that some coastal States in recent years have 
asserted the view that residual rights and jurisdictions belong to the coastal States. This position, in 
my view, is not consistent with the consensus arrived at in the Castañada [sic] negotiating group 
and not consistent with the intention of Article 59 of the Convention.493 
In 1989, Kwiatkowska noted that the provisions of Article 59 had not been tested, and 
were ‘only exceptionally incorporated into the EEZ basic legislation of states’.494 Today the 
situation is not fundamentally any different, and there seems to be little State practice 
regarding the application of Article 59. One of the only cases where the question of 
unattributed right arose was in the M/V Saiga (No. 2) case of Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines against Guinea.495 The central question in this case was whether or not Guinea was 
entitled to apply its customs law in its EEZ. The M/V Saiga was an oil tanker serving as a 
bunkering vessel (i.e. a vessel supplying fuel) and had supplied bunker oil to three fishing 
vessels licensed by Guinea to fish in its EEZ. The M/V Saiga, after being fired on and boarded 
by Guinean patrol boats, was arrested and brought to Conakry, where the ship and her crew 
were detained, the cargo of bunker oil was removed, and the ship’s master was prosecuted for 
customs violations.496 St Vincent and the Grenadines had stated that the imposition of 
customs duties on an oil tanker for bunkering activities carried out in the exclusive economic 
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zone was prohibited by the LOSC. The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) 
found that Guinea’s actions had violated the LOSC and awarded damages to Saint Vincent 
and the Grenadines. However the judgement was not based on the application of Article 59; 
no reference was made to the Article at all, although it had been considered as a possible way 
of solving the conflict in an obiter dictum of the Tribunal.497 
In practice, the application of Article 59 to solve problems regarding unattributed rights 
requires that a dispute, based on some sort of legislative act or enforcement, has already begun. 
In the case of shipwrecks and UCH, a coastal State would first have to assert jurisdiction over 
such objects, and then wait to see whether this act would cause any objections from other 
States. Would such an attempt to protect underwater cultural heritage, then, amount to a 
breach of an international obligation, and be seen as an act against the rights other coastal 
States enjoy over the EEZ? This dilemma is considered by Strati who sums up, with reference 
to the continental shelf, that: 
At international level, the coastal State will not be responsible simply by asserting jurisdiction over 
underwater cultural property on the continental shelf. As a rule, the mere act of passing legislation 
is not creative of responsibility. The responsibility of a State for acts or omissions of the legislature 
arises from the implementation of legislation which is in breach of international law. Normally, in 
the case of injury to aliens a claimant must establish damage consequent on the implementation of 
legislation. Nevertheless, as argued by Prof. Schwarzenberger: ‘It is a matter of argument whether 
the mere existence of such legislation or only action under it constitutes the breach of an interna-
tional obligation. Sufficient relevant dicta of the World Court exist to permit the conclusion that 
the mere existence of such legislation may constitute a sufficient proximate threat of illegality to 
establish a claimant’s legal interest in the proceedings for at least a declaratory judgment.’ In 
practice, as with most maritime claims, the validity of claims over cultural property on the conti-
nental shelf is ultimately a question of opposability. They will still be valid vis-à-vis States which 
have aquiesced [sic] in them.498  
Thus it could be inferred that the mere passing of legislation on unattributed rights would 
not amount to a breach of an international obligation — at least so long as the State in 
question acts bona fide and there is no abuse of rights in the sense that the State simply decided 
to disobey the law. Lowe expressed that ‘[f]requently, disputes arise not because States choose 
simply to disobey the law; rather, they disagree on what the law is’.499 Thus, ‘[t]here is no 
rational basis on which any formulation of a rule inferred from State practice can be said to 
constitute an “improper” inference of a rule from that practice, although there may be 
considerations of principle or policy external to the process of inference which render one 
                                                
497 The M/V "SAIGA" Case (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v. Guinea), Prompt Release, 2 ITLOS Reports 16, at 
para. 58. 
498 Strati, UCH: An Emerging Objective, at 259, supra note 19 citing Georg Schwarzenberger, International Law, 
Volume I (3rd edn, Stevens & Sons: London, 1957) at 614. Footnotes omitted. 
499 Vaughan Lowe, ‘The Role of Equity in International Law’ in D. W. Greig (ed.) 12 The Australian Yearbook of 
International Law (Australian National University: Canberra, 1988–1989), 54–81 at 60. See also Michael Akehurst, 
‘Equity and General Principles of Law’, 25 International and Comparative Law Quarterly, no. 4 (1976) 801–825. 
94 
 
interpretation preferable to another’.500 Because there are no presumptions in favour of either 
the coastal State or other States in the EEZ, there is an inherent juxtaposition of rights, but no 
prejudice to the nature of the use of unattributed rights. Furthermore, as the wording of 
Article 59 suggests, a settlement by consensual means between States in a dispute would also 
mean that the decision on the attribution of rights would partly rest with these States. Since 
every case of attribution of residual rights has to be decided individually, and on the basis of 
equity and in light of all the relevant circumstances, attribution of the same rights could be 
different in separate cases. This demonstrates the difficulty of predicting possible results in 
future cases. Nevertheless, some general observations and presumptions can be made in light 
of the wording and purpose of Article 59. 
Generally authors have recognised different categories of equity based on the three, 
sometimes four, different functions equity can perform. Lowe has distinguished these different 
kinds of equity as follows: 
The traditional categories are equity infra legem, equity praeter legem, and equity contra legem, to 
which some jurists add a fourth category of decisions ex aequo et bono. Each category is said to have 
distinguishing characteristics. Equity infra legem is ‘that form of equity which constitutes a method 
of interpretation of the law in force, and is one of its attributes’, or equity ‘used to adapt the law to 
the facts of individual cases’. Equity praeter legem, in contrast, is equity used to fill gaps in the law, 
or more precisely used ‘not … with a view to filling a social gap in law, but … in order to remedy 
the insufficiencies of international law and fill its logical lacunae’. Equity contra legem is equity 
used in derogation from the law, to remedy the social inadequacies of the law. Decisions ex aequo et 
bono are decisions which ‘do not have to be at all related to judicial considerations’. In fact, this 
attractive division cannot easily be sustained in the context of public international law.501 
An equitable solution under Article 59 would thus require the combination and application 
of equity infra legem and praeter legem, and most certainly also some aspects of ex aequo et 
bono. Generally there has been disagreement on whether international tribunals could fill gaps 
in the law by recourse to equity praeter legem,502 but in the case of unattributed rights Article 
59 actually demands it in the absence of precise rules of attribution. However, the attribution 
of rights would certainly be based on an adaption of the rules of the LOSC to the facts of the 
individual case, thus invoking equity infra legem. Furthermore, nothing suggests that the result 
could not be based solely on ex aequo et bono. 
According to Nordquist:  
Equity is not an abstract concept, but is qualified by the provision that a conflict resolved on the 
basis of equity should take into account ‘the respective importance of the interests involved to the 
parties as well as to the international community as a whole’. Given the functional nature of the 
exclusive economic zone, where economic interests are the principal concern this formula would 
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normally favour the coastal State. Where conflicts arise on issues not involving the exploration for 
and exploitation of resources, the formula would tend to favour the interests of other States or of 
the international community as a whole.503  
Kwiatkowska is of the view that ‘the concerns of the international community would 
certainly be of significant importance in the case of any conflict with regard to jurisdiction 
over archeological [sic] and historical objects found within the EEZ’.504 This is probably 
particularly true when a coastal State wishes to protect sunken warships — regardless of their 
nationality — in order to preserve them for historical purposes. 
Strati listed four factors relevant to the settlement of disputes regarding the exercise of 
archaeological research and the right to control access to underwater sites.505 These factors are: 
first, the existence of a cultural link between the cultural property in question and one of the 
parties of the dispute; second, in case of relatively recent wrecks, the qualification of one of the 
parties as the flag State of the sunken vessel; third, the accommodation of the interests of the 
international community in the protection and preservation of the underwater cultural 
property; and fourth, interference with the exercise of the rights of the coastal or flag States. 
It is not difficult to apply Strati’s four factors to the Baltic region. The naval battles and 
operations that took place in the Baltic Sea certainly have a cultural link to several coastal 
States in the Baltic region — all coastal States will benefit from the protection of underwater 
cultural heritage from the World Wars because it is common history. Most of these wrecks are 
of recent origin, and practice has shown that coastal States have wide national interest in their 
sunken warships and naval history. There is also a strong element of reciprocity between 
Nordic and Baltic States in general, that suggest that the interests of other States would be 
respected in matters regarding the protection of underwater cultural heritage and shipwrecks. 
Strati posits that it will be ‘difficult for third States to oppose the expansion of coastal 
jurisdiction over archaeological objects in the EEZ’.506 Another solution is that ‘coastal States 
may take advantage of their extensive rights over the EEZ and exercise control over underwater 
cultural property indirectly, i.e., by claiming that archaeological research conducted by third 
States interferes with their resource-related rights’ as there is nothing in the LOSC ‘to prevent 
coastal States from undertaking protective measures in the exercise of their resource 
jurisdiction over the EEZ’.507 
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  Analysis 
In the Nordic region there has always been strong State protection and State-controlled 
preservation of ancient sites and cultural heritage.508 This has been based on the idea that the 
State has the best means for providing, and is more bona fide towards, protection of cultural 
heritage, which is seen as common heritage and public property.509 This approach echoes 
contemporary practice and the trend of the ‘common heritage of mankind’ ideology, which is 
endorsed especially in the CPUCH.510 Furthermore, technically all States protect underwater 
cultural heritage and shipwrecks under their domestic laws, regardless of the country of origin. 
The Finnish Act on the Exclusive Economic Zone511 makes no reference to unattributed 
rights. In Sweden, Section 10 of the Swedish Economic Zone Act512 is explained by Professor 
Mahmoudi as laying the burden of proof ‘on the flag [S]tate to show that the enjoyment of a 
certain right has in fact been recognized as a general principle of international law’.513 The only 
Baltic State that applies domestic cultural heritage laws in its EEZ is Estonia. In 2011 the 
Estonian Heritage Conservation Act514 was amended and, pursuant to Section 3(5), the Act 
covers all ‘underwater monuments’ within the territorial sea and on the EEZ. Section 34(3) of 
the Act specifies that any search or study of an underwater monument, which includes all 
shipwrecks, is subject to permission from the Estonian National Heritage Board. Additionally, 
Section 34(4) states that an activity license is required for any underwater study specified in 
the Act. The Act is and has been enforced on foreign nationals in the EEZ, and it is 
noteworthy that so far no State has objected. The adoption of such legislation can be 
considered as an application of the general duty to protect archaeological and historical objects 
pursuant to Article 303(1) of the LOSC.  
In the Baltic region virtually all sunken warships, with a few exceptions, were lost during 
the past World Wars. These wrecks belong to a conflict that influenced all coastal States within 
this particular region. All States lost warships beyond the present territorial limits. Within the 
Nordic cultural heritage tradition it would seem unlikely that any Nordic State would object 
to cultural heritage laws aimed at protecting underwater cultural heritage beyond territorial 
                                                
508 Matikka, Chapter 3: Finland, at 45, supra note 104. 
509 For example, the travaux préparatoires of the Finnish Antiquities Act state that cultural heritage is seen as a part 
of public property and national heritage, and deserves to be preserved for future generations due to its research 
potential. For this particular reason shipwrecks that have sunk over 100 years ago, and can be presumed 
abandoned, default to the State. See further (in Finnish), Hallituksen esitys Eduskunnalle laiksi 
muinaismuistolain 20 §:n muuttamisesta (HE 80/2002) and Hallituksen esitys eduskunnalle muinaismuistoja 
koskevan lainsäädännön uudistamiseksi (HE 100/1962). 
510 The CPUCH acknowledges in the beginning of the Preamble ‘the importance of underwater cultural heritage 
as an integral part of the cultural heritage of humanity and a particularly important element in the history of 
peoples, nations, and their relations with each other concerning their common heritage’.  
511 Laki Suomen talousvyöhykkeestä (1058/2004). 
512 Lag (1992:1140) om Sveriges ekonomiska zon. 
513 Said Mahmoudi, ‘Current Legal Developments: Sweden’, 8 International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law, 
no. 4 (1993) 524–529 at 528–529. 
514 Muinsuskaitseseadus (RT I 2002, 27, 153). See further <www.muinas.ee/board/legislation>. 
97 
 
waters. While Estonia is the only coastal State in the Baltic that has established such laws, the 
absence of protests from other States suggests that there is generally no opposition to this kind 
of legislation. Furthermore, foreign nationals diving in the EEZ of Estonia have complied with 
the Estonian heritage legislation.
  Marine Scientific Research 
The origins of marine scientific research (MSR) date back to the HMS Challenger oceano-
graphic expedition that took place between 1872 and 1876. The expedition was followed by 
twenty years of compiling and organising the gathered information.515 Contemporary MSR 
however, was born in the aftermath of World War II when the exploitation of natural 
resources of the sea started to expand.516 
In a general sense, MSR can be defined as ‘study and experimental work designed to 
increase man’s knowledge of the marine environment’ and it ‘encompasses any scientific work, 
wherever carried out, having the marine environment as object’.517 This was the definition 
included in the Informal Single Negotiating Text (ISNT) of UNCLOS III, but later omitted 
from the final text of the LOSC.518 By another definition, MSR means ‘those activities 
undertaken in ocean space to expand scientific knowledge of the marine environment and its 
processes’.519 
As an activity, MSR falls under the wider concept of ‘marine data collection’, which should 
be understood as a generic term without legal content describing the umbrella under which to 
consider different data collection activities that take place in the marine environment.520 The 
LOSC however, does not use the term ‘marine data collection’. Instead, the Convention 
distinguishes between ‘marine scientific research’, ‘hydrographic surveys’ and ‘research and 
survey activities’, without providing any definition for these terms, thus leaving their 
interrelation and specific meaning open to different interpretations. According to Professor 
Alfred Soons, this just implies that if States cannot agree on a definition, consensus is best 
maintained by having no definition at all.521 Unfortunately, an approach such as this leaves 
many practical difficulties unsolved. However, even in the absence of clear definitions, 
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different types of marine data collection activities can be identified. Roach and Smith outlined 
four general categories, with seven subcategories, for the division of marine data collection: 
1) Marine scientific research 
2) Surveys 
?   Hydrographic surveys 
?   Military surveys 
3) Operational oceanography 
?   Ocean state estimation 
?   Weather forecasting 
?   Climate prediction 
4) Exploration and exploitation of 
?   Natural resources 
?   Underwater cultural heritage (shipwrecks)522 
Within the category of marine scientific (or oceanographic) research, Soons has identified 
four subcategories: 
?   Physical oceanography, which deals with waves, tides, currents, magnetism, heat ex-
change, etc.; 
?   Chemical oceanography, which involves the study of the complex chemistry of the ocean; 
?   Marine biology, which consists of the study of plant and animal organisms in the sea; and 
?   Marine geology and geophysics, which deal with the study of sediments and topography 
of the ocean floor, as well as the deeper structure of the ocean floor and its physical prop-
erties.523 
According to Soons, the gathering of any data that does not concern the marine environ-
ment is not considered to be MSR. Following this logic, marine archaeological research would 
not be MSR because it ‘does not involve the study of the natural marine environment, but 
involves the study and recovery of man-made objects present on and in the sea floor which are 
relevant from a historical or cultural point of view’.524 Strati arrived at the same conclusion: 
‘within the sphere of the law of the sea, archaeological endeavour does not constitute marine 
scientific research, which is confined to the natural environment and its resources’.525 Her 
further observations explain the issue: 
The position may become complicated in relation to devices that are employed both in archaeolog-
ical research and in other oceanographical surveys, such as the photographic sonar. If it is consid-
ered that marine archaeology is a multi-disciplinary science which derives from and contributes to 
a wide range of applied sciences, it will be very difficult to draw the line between archaeological 
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research and research concerning the continental shelf simpliciter. Most importantly, which will be 
the criteria on the basis of which the nature of research will be determined?526 
It should be borne in mind that, during the negotiations at UNCLOS III, the understand-
ing of UCH and its archaeological and historical value was very limited. Maritime archaeology 
was still evolving as a new discipline, and was barely even considered as a scientific discipline 
of its own.527 Furthermore, technology such as the MBES did not exist, and archaeological 
issues were considered to be of little value next to the more pressing matters of the time.  
Another matter which has had an impact, perhaps bigger that many people understand, has 
been the wide adoption of GPS and associated satellite positioning systems used for precise 
navigation. Before satellite navigation and electronic charts became commonly used standards, 
it was extremely difficult to get an accurate position on the sea without the support of adjacent 
coastal State(s) and the use of shore stations (such as the Decca Navigation System)528 to 
triangulate the position of the surveying vessel.529 This issue is considerable with regards to 
shipwrecks. Without accurate positioning, locating shipwrecks becomes highly challenging, 
and all the more so, the greater the distance from shore. An inaccurate positioning means that 
the exact location of a newly-found shipwreck is not known, thus depriving the find of any 
usability. Prior to the introduction of the GPS in the 1990s, and later the Differential GPS 
(DGPS), all navigation systems required the establishment of fixed stations ashore in the 
proximate vicinity of the survey area. It was not until the GPS that the surveying vessel became 
independent of the need for shore stations for positioning.530 As Dr Sam Bateman pointed out 
in 2005, ‘[i]t is possibly not a coincidence that hydrographic surveying in the EEZ has only 
become controversial over the last decade or so with the introduction of GPS that has allowed 
ships to accurately fix their position without shore control’.531 
The absence of this technology during the time of UNCLOS III had an impact on what 
was achieved in the MSR regime of Part XIII of the LOSC. Furthermore, Professor Soons’ 
widely-cited opinions regarding the exclusion of marine archaeology and hydrographic surveys 
from the ambit of MSR were written during the negotiations of UNCLOS III, well before the 
‘advent (in the late 1990s) of the systematic search operations that are now being conduct-
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ed’.532 Nonetheless, it cannot be denied that the views of Professor Soons reflected the aims of 
the Conference. Many authors still generally agree with Soons, that the term MSR 
‘encompasses scientific research that is directed at the marine environment, rather than merely 
undertaken in the marine environment’.533 Thus, maritime archaeology would always fall 
outside the scope of MSR: it is not focused on the marine environment itself, but on objects 
that are found within the marine environment. However, this dominant view of the exclusion 
of maritime archaeology, shipwreck hunting and other survey activities, has recently been 
challenged by several authors, and thus deserves to be reviewed.534  Ocean explorer Dr 
Katherine Croff explains that these challenges have been raised because ‘[t]he inclusion of 
archaeology as marine science would have implications that would open up new rights and 
responsibilities of coastal and research States, as both fulfill their duties to protect and preserve 
archaeological and historical objects found on the seabed’.535 While many problems associated 
with conducting survey activities are generally related to the deeper waters of the continental 
shelf and the EEZ,536 in the Baltic Sea any search for shipwrecks can be conducted without the 
use of expensive deepwater technology due to the relatively shallow depth of water, especially 
in the Gulf of Finland. 
  The Regime of MSR Under the LOSC 
The LOSC has twenty-seven Articles concerning MSR, all placed under Part XIII of the 
Convention.537 However, the LOSC does not define MSR by activity, nor does it define any 
operational methods or means of undertaking MSR. It also does not establish any objective 
criteria to determine the purposes and motives of MSR activities. This has led to conflicting 
positions regarding jurisdiction, especially concerning the control of hydrographic and military 
surveys in the EEZ.538  
Hydrographic surveys reveal anomalies on the seabed — such as shipwrecks — although 
generally speaking they are activities ‘with the purpose of collecting data for the production of 
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navigational charts to support safety of navigation, such as the depth of water, configuration 
and nature of the natural bottom, directions and force of currents, height and times of tides, 
and hazards for navigation’.539 More often than not, sunken ships are found as by-products of 
hydrographic and other surveys,540 but these survey activities are also used for intentional and 
directed UCH searches. If these survey activities would be categorised as MSR for the purposes 
of the LOSC, coastal States would have the possibility to regulate — and thus gain greater 
control over — shipwreck survey activities on the EEZ and continental shelf.  
Pursuant to Article 238 of the LOSC, all States and competent international organisations 
have the right to conduct marine scientific research subject to the rights and duties of other 
States as provided for in the Convention.541 General principles concerning the conduct of 
MSR are provided in Article 240 of the LOSC: 
In the conduct of marine scientific research the following principles shall apply: 
(a) marine scientific research shall be conducted exclusively for peaceful purposes; 
(b) marine scientific research shall be conducted with appropriate scientific methods and means 
compatible with this Convention; 
(c) marine scientific research shall not unjustifiably interfere with other legitimate uses of the sea 
compatible with this Convention and shall be duly respected in the course of such uses; 
(d) marine scientific research shall be conducted in compliance with all relevant regulations adopt-
ed in conformity with this Convention including those for the protection and preservation of 
the marine environment.542 
The circumstances under which a coastal State can withhold its consent to MSR activities 
in the EEZ and on the continental shelf are listed in Article 246(5) of the LOSC.543 
Many authors generally exclude hydrographic (and other marine) surveys from the ambit of 
MSR because Part XIII of the LOSC (concerning MSR) does not mention hydrographic 
surveys at all. Furthermore, the argument goes that MSR should be distinguished from 
hydrographic surveying activities because Articles 19(2)(j) and 21(1)(g) of the LOSC make a 
distinction between ‘marine scientific research’, ‘hydrographic surveys’ and ‘research and 
survey activities’.544 According to Professor Soons, ‘[f]rom Articles 19, 21 and 40, which use 
the term “hydrographic surveying” separately from “research”, it follows that the term “marine 
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scientific research”, for the purposes of the Draft Convention, does not cover hydrographic 
surveying activities’.545 He goes on: 
With respect to hydrographic surveying (an activity which is not to be considered marine scientific 
research, although it is somewhat similar to it [...]), it is submitted that this activity, when it is 
conducted for the purpose of enhancing the safety of navigation or in connection with the laying 
of submarine cables or pipelines, must be regarded as an internationally lawful use of the sea 
associated with the operations of ships in accordance with Article 58, and can therefore be con-
ducted freely in the exclusive economic zone. However, hydrographic surveying activities in 
connection with the exploration and exploitation of the natural resources of the exclusive econom-
ic zone must be regarded as part of the exploration or exploitation activities and are therefore 
subject to complete coastal State jurisdiction.546 
Another proposed reason for authors excluding hydrographic and other surveys from the 
scope of MSR is that hydrographic surveying activities can be regarded ‘as embracing the safety 
of navigation’, and ‘as an internationally lawful use of the sea related to the freedom of 
navigation and therefore permissible for all States in the EEZ’547 pursuant to Article 58 of the 
LOSC. Based on this argument, Roach and Smith argue that ‘[t]he conduct of surveys in the 
EEZ is an exercise of the freedoms of navigation and other internationally lawful uses of the 
sea related to those freedoms, such as those associated with the operations of ships, which 
[A]rticle 58 of the LOS Convention guarantees to all States’.548 
  New Interpretations for Hydrographic Surveys as MSR 
Any search for shipwrecks is essentially a hydrographic survey that attempts to locate 
anomalies on the seabed. Such a survey — with the specific aim of locating underwater 
cultural heritage — falls under the scope of maritime archaeology. However, the exact same 
methods and equipment are used for other purposes in different kinds of marine data 
collection. Thus, a survey conducted for archaeological purposes is sometimes effectively 
indistinguishable from MSR. The fundamental problem is that the same activities can be 
carried out for different purposes, and fall under and be regulated by different regimes. 549 For 
example an MBES survey will always produce backscatter data as a by-product, which is 
‘valuable for geological mapping, habitat assessments and for engineering [matters] such as 
submarine cable route selection’.550 As a result, the data collected can be the same, when the 
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only thing that makes the distinction between MSR and applied surveys is the collected 
parameters and their intended use.551 This issue is elaborated on by Dromgoole: 
Although the primary purpose of remote-sensing activities by treasure salvors is to locate ship-
wrecks, a considerable amount of general data concerning the seabed and subsoil inevitably will be 
generated through the use of sonar and magnetic imaging devices. For each search area (and it 
should be recalled that these areas can be thousands of square miles in size), a substantial databank 
of information will be systematically accumulated and stored. This information will include many 
of the natural parameters of the marine environment. Such data have many potential applications, 
including in relation to the exploration and exploitation of marine resources, development of 
renewable energy sources, conservation and management of the marine environment, and even the 
delimitation of maritime boundaries and zones. It is a truism that much of the seafloor is currently 
unmapped and that present levels of knowledge about the seabed and subsoil are poor and inade-
quate. The data collected by treasure salvors are therefore likely to be of considerable potential 
utility and, consequently, commercial value. As Bateman points out, such data are a ‘tradable 
commodity’; there is nothing to preclude those that have gathered the data from selling them on 
for use in a potentially wide variety of applications.552 
More practical problems arise from the terms — ‘marine scientific research’, ‘hydrographic 
surveys’ and ‘research and survey activities’ — used by the LOSC, as Dr Julia Xue explains: 
Based on Part XIII of the [LOSC], people may argue that the methods of the data collected and 
their motives or intended use constitute the primary differences between MSR and hydrograph-
ic/military survey and thus distinguish whether the marine data collection activities are MSR and 
subsequently determine the relevant applicable rules. Then some questions are more difficult, such 
as how can the motives for MSR and hydrographic/military survey be determined? What consti-
tutes ‘scientific purpose’ and ‘military purpose’ and who determines it? When does information for 
‘making of navigational charts and safety of navigation’ become a military survey and not hydro-
graphic survey? These questions are especially difficult to answer in a general climate of mistrust 
and suspicion.553 
The data collected from hydrographical surveys can be used for different purposes, and has 
clear economic value to the coastal State. Bateman opines that ‘the coastal State should be in a 
position to manage and control the release of such data, regardless of how and by whom it was 
collected’.554 Xue is supportive of this view, and argues further that: 
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If ‘hydrographic survey’ or ‘military survey’ were to be excluded from the scope of MSR, ‘hydro-
graphic survey’ and ‘military survey’ could be carried out in coastal States’ EEZ without any 
restrictions. Eventually, this would lead to a collapse of the present MSR regime in the EEZ. This 
was certainly not what the [LOSC] regime intended. The increased importance of EEZ manage-
ment and State practice suggest that hydrographic/military survey in the EEZ should be under the 
jurisdiction of the coastal State.555 
The collapse that Xue warns of would result from the free choice to conduct MSR through 
other forms of marine data collection, which would provide the same data and results, without 
the need to consent to the MSR regime of the LOSC. 
  Analysis 
The legal nature and intended purpose of hydrographic surveys affects the right to conduct 
them. If hydrographic surveys are included in the notion of MSR, they fall under the consent 
regime of the coastal State. If hydrographic surveys are excluded from the scope of MSR, there 
are two possible approaches. One approach is put forward by authors such as Roach and 
Smith, who have argued that the conduct of surveys is an exercise of the freedoms of 
navigation, and other internationally lawful uses of the sea related to those freedoms, which 
Article 58 of the LOSC guarantees to all States without restriction.556 The other view is that, 
since the search for archaeological and historical objects (conducted in a form of hydrographic 
survey), or any other form of archaeological research is not included in the comprehensive list 
of freedoms mentioned in Article 58, this activity would fall under the category of unattribut-
ed rights in the EEZ. Thus, should a dispute arise between two or more States over, for 
example, a hydrographic survey for the search for archaeological and historical objects, then 
the dispute resolution process for unattributed rights as set forth in Article 59 of the LOSC 
would apply.557  
Thus it remains uncertain whether the attribution of rights in the case of hydrographic 
surveys would fall under Article 58 or eventually Article 59, should a dispute between two or 
more State arise. The following example demonstrates the issue: 
On 23 October 2009 the Swedish survey company Marin Mätteknik Ab (today MMT Ab) pub-
lished a press release regarding the discovery of a British submarine, HMS E-18, lost in the Baltic 
Sea during World War I in May 1916.558 The search was conducted by MMT’s survey vessel M/V 
Triad, sailing under a Swedish flag, in an area off the Estonian island of Hiiumaa in the Estonian 
EEZ. Just before entering the Estonian EEZ, M/V Triad finished a survey it had been conducting 
for the Nord Stream natural gas pipeline in the Finnish EEZ. Swedish historian–explorer and 
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Chairman of the Board of MMT, Carl Douglas, had been searching for the wreck in cooperation 
with Australian Darren Brown, whose great-grandfather, Albert Robinson, had been serving on the 
submarine. Robinson survived the loss of E-18 because he fell ill with appendicitis and was con-
fined to his bed shortly before E-18’s last patrol. For years Brown had spent much of his spare time 
researching historical archives of Britain, Germany, Estonia and Russia. 
According to Estonian officials, M/V Triad had been at the wreck site for three days. On the first 
day, the Estonian Police and Border Guard enquired as to the intentions of M/V Triad. According 
to the Estonians, the vessel replied that it was calibrating its equipment. On the second day, the 
vessel stated that they were, in fact, doing research on an unknown shipwreck under the permit 
from the Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. By the time Estonian officials realised that no 
permits had been issued, M/V Triad had already left the Estonian EEZ. According to Estonian 
newspaper Postimees, M/V Triad had left, if not escaped, the Estonian EEZ at full steam after a 
Border Guard plane performed a flight over the vessel.559 In the aftermath, Estonian officials 
contacted the appropriate Swedish authorities. MMT did not, however, disclose the location of the 
wreck to Estonian authorities. Nevertheless, the location of M/V Triad had been marked down and 
when the Estonian Maritime Administration conducted multibeam surveys in the area in 2013, 
the wreck was found, again. Ola Oskarsson, one of the founders of MMT, commented that 
according to their view, they did not have any legal obligation to disclose the location of the wreck 
in spite of it being in the Estonian EEZ, and that the Estonians had acted aggressively for no good 
reason.  
 
The British World War I submarine HMS E-18, as seen in a multibeam sonar hydrographic survey on the Estonian EEZ. 
(Courtesy of Estonian Maritime Administration, 2013.) 
The situation is similar to the one faced by ITLOS in the case of M/V Saiga (No. 2), where 
the Tribunal had to identify the exact powers of States with regards to bunkering in the EEZ. 
The Tribunal chose not to address the question of whether bunkering was ancillary to fishing 
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(which is subject to coastal State jurisdiction) or ancillary to navigation (which is subject to the 
freedoms and lawful uses of the sea granted to all States under Article 58 of the LOSC). The 
Tribunal also avoided any reference to Article 59 and unattributed rights. It remains unclear 
whether hydrographic surveys can be conducted as an exercise of the freedom of navigation 
and other internationally lawful uses of the sea under Article 58(1). While the intentions of 
the drafters at UNCLOS III is rather clear, the new developments in technology and current 
State practice have indicated that coastal States might be more eager than before to assert 
rights on hydrographic surveys and archaeological research alike.  
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
Unilateral Action. 
One cannot complain that this is an illicit process in any way, for the technological changes of the 
time, and the disturbances that have resulted in environmental and social matters, require that 
there be changes in the law. It is not a matter of recording old rules, but one of making new ones, 
and there are no other ways of doing this than by agreement or unilateral action; and when agree-
ment is not forthcoming then by unilateral action alone. It has always been the case that claims to 
the sea have been made unilaterally, but since 1945 there has been a fundamental change in the 
way they have been vindicated. Previously, they were defined as consistent with the existing law, 
because its rules were said to be unclear or flexible. Ambiguity was exploited. Today they tend 
increasingly to be justified only on the hypothesis that change is necessary. It is this alteration in 
emphasis that so seriously affects the methodology of international law, for there is no discernible 
criterion for determining, in a condition of incoherence, what rule the practice of States supports. 
Certainly a prime condition of authentic legal reasoning is that it supports the old rule until the 
new one takes its place, but it is often difficult to say, from the mere enumeration of subscribers to 
the one or the other point of view, when the substitution has taken place.560 
D. P. O’Connell 
 
It is clear that the evolution of the modern law of the sea had very little, if anything, to do 
with the protection of shipwrecks and other forms of underwater cultural heritage. From a 
cultural heritage management point of view, the delimitation of different maritime zones, 
which determine the level of protection underwater cultural heritage is entitled to receive, 
makes little sense. The delicate package deal reached during UNCLOS III was a compromise 
where every party gained and lost something. Underwater cultural heritage and shipwrecks 
were one of the ‘parties’ that lost. It has become widely accepted that the LOSC represents 
customary international law — if not completely, then at least mostly. This interpretation is 
supported by the vast number of State parties to the Convention: 167 in total, after Palestine’s 
ratification on 2 January 2015. O’Keefe points out there are those ‘who consider [the LOSC] 
as the only international instrument which would guide all developments concerning 
underwater cultural heritage’.561 However, the provisions of the LOSC are far from complete, 
and pose serious problems to coastal States and flag States alike who wish to protect sunken 
warships and other forms of underwater cultural heritage. While the issues regarding the 
                                                
560 O’Connell, The International Law of the Sea Volume I, at 31, supra note 14. 
561 O’Keefe, Shipwrecked Heritage, at 57–58, supra note 25. 
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protection of underwater cultural heritage have been addressed in the CPUCH, only one 
Baltic State has ratified that Convention. Furthermore, the CPUCH only covers shipwrecks 
that were sunk over 100 years ago, thus presently excluding the last shipwrecks from World 
War I (1914–1918) and all shipwrecks from World War II (1939–1945). Nevertheless, for as 
long the CPUCH does not receive wider acceptance, coastal States are left with the provisions 
of the LOSC and individual State practice, which provide at least the following possibilities to 
coastal States regarding the protection of shipwrecks and especially sunken warships. 
The lack of any internationally accepted definition for objects of ‘archaeological and 
historical’ nature leaves it up to coastal States to determine what may be included in such a 
category. Thus what objects will be considered as having an archaeological and historical 
nature will always depend on domestic heritage legislation and domestic policies. For example 
Estonia protects any underwater monument based on its historical importance; Finland 
protects objects that have been underwater for more than 100 years; and Sweden protects 
objects from the year 1850 or earlier. Nevertheless, nothing suggests that sunken warships 
from the World Wars could not be included in the notion of archaeological and historical 
objects pursuant to Article 303. Sunken warships from both World Wars are historically and 
archaeologically important, and hold source material and information which are not available 
from any other source. Therefore they should be protected under special circumstances as 
objects of historical and archaeological nature. 
The nature of the laws of salvage in civil law tradition is distinct from the laws of salvage 
under the common law admiralty. Thus an action in rem is not even recognised by Nordic 
legal doctrines because ‘a thing’ cannot be party to a suit. This severely limits the potential for 
professional treasure hunting in the Baltic region. 
The Baltic Sea and the Gulf of Finland are relatively small areas, and the use of local ports 
by ships is unavoidable. Because of this dependence on ports, coastal States can make use of 
port control — which is not limited to archaeological operations, but can be exercised on 
every matter the port State has an interest in. Even if a coastal State cannot extend its laws to 
cover sites such as sunken warships or other shipwrecks beyond the territorial sea, its port 
control can ensure a substantial degree of control on a practical level. However, an effective 
regime requires consistency and cooperation between coastal States, and most importantly, 
political will: port control is only effective if legislation is uniform and there are no safe havens 
where protective legislation is weaker. 
In the contiguous zone, recent State practice (and the opinions of respected authors) 
provide evidence that coastal States have, in fact, wide possibilities to protect UCH by virtue 
of Article 303(2) and the establishment of a 24-nautical-mile archaeological zone. However, it 
is left solely to the coastal States to assess and implement the required provisions for such a 
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zone. In the Gulf of Finland, the establishment of an archaeological zone by all coastal States 
— Finland, Estonia and Russia — would protect the whole Gulf. 
In the continental shelf Article 81 of the LOSC could be utilised to afford coastal States a 
broad right to regulate drilling. While term ‘drilling’ is not defined by the LOSC, it has been 
argued that it could be interpreted to include activities that disturb or alter the seabed, which 
may be the effect of intrusive operations at a shipwreck site. For archaeological activities where 
equipment such as underwater installations and structures could be utilised, it may be possible 
to use the provisions in Articles 60 and 80, which give coastal States certain rights to authorise 
and regulate the construction, operation and use of such facilities. However, the absence of any 
salvage industry focused on historical shipwrecks in the Baltic Sea makes the application of 
Articles 60, 80 and 81 somewhat theoretical and irrelevant. Furthermore, activities such as 
looting seldom disturb the seabed in any way, because most shipwrecks in the Baltic Sea are 
well preserved and not embedded in the seabed. 
Within the EEZ, the adoption and enforcement of national legislation could be considered 
as an application of the general duty to protect archaeological and historical objects pursuant 
to Article 303(1). Furthermore, physical tampering with a shipwreck may well cause damage 
to living resources — and a coastal State may be able to argue that there has been interference 
with its sovereign rights. As an unattributed right in the EEZ, the protection of shipwrecks 
and underwater cultural heritage is subject to the provisions of Article 59 and without 
prejudice to coastal State laws until there is a dispute. Thus, any consequences in the event 
that a coastal State should extend its laws to the EEZ are hard to predict. Currently only 
Estonia has enacted such legislation, which has not been objected to by other States. 
Article 303(4) is without prejudice to other international agreements and rules of interna-
tional law regarding the protection of objects of an archaeological and historical nature. Thus, 
coastal States always have an option to conclude regional or bilateral treaties (such as in the 
case with M/S Estonia and the treaty between the Netherlands and Australia). Regional treaties 
seem to be the most effective way to achieve protective regimes, because they are easier to 
conclude and in the Baltic Sea it can be assumed that many coastal States have an interest for 
such protective treaties. While it has been suggested that a new convention could be drafted 
for the protection of UCH, it is hard to imagine that any international forum could negotiate 
a treaty that could take into consideration the varying interests of all States. Since such a treaty 
would require global acceptance, the most effective results can be gained through regional and 
bilateral treaties. Regional agreements have the weakness of being inapplicable and 
unenforceable to third States, but the interests and characteristics of the Baltic Sea would make 
it virtually impossible for vessels from third States to jeopardise a protective scheme set up in a 
comprehensive regional agreement. 
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The regulation of marine scientific research — and the question of whether the use of 
hydrographic surveys is an exercise of the freedoms of navigation and other internationally 
lawful uses of the sea — has proven to be a contentious issue. If such surveys were included in 
the ambit of marine scientific research, they would fall under the consent regime of coastal 
States. While this would give coastal States some control regarding the finding of new 
shipwrecks, the control of surveys does not as such offer any protection for known wreck sites. 
For as long as government officials from coastal States keep waiting for clear and ready-
made provisions printed in bold font — and for someone else to enforce them — our cultural 
heritage will languish. Changes to international policies, and the creation of new customary 
and conventional international law, are usually driven by the pressures of domestic politics.562 
Although the LOSC does not offer any applicable framework for the protection of sunken 
warships or underwater cultural heritage, coastal States in the Baltic Sea have multiple options 
to consider. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
562 Lawrence A. Howard, ‘The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea and the Treaty/Custom 
Dichotomy’, 16 Texas International Law Journal, no. 3 (1981) 321–345 at 333–334. 
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